共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Matt McCormick 《Ethics and Information Technology》2001,3(4):277-287
Many people have a strong intuition that there is something morallyobjectionable about playing violent video games, particularly withincreases in the number of people who are playing them and the games'alleged contribution to some highly publicized crimes. In this paper,I use the framework of utilitarian, deontological, and virtue ethicaltheories to analyze the possibility that there might be some philosophicalfoundation for these intuitions. I raise the broader question of whetheror not participating in authentic simulations of immoral acts in generalis wrong. I argue that neither the utilitarian, nor the Kantian hassubstantial objections to violent game playing, although they offersome important insights into playing games in general and what it ismorally to be a ``good sport.' The Aristotelian, however, has a plausibleand intuitive way to protest participation in authentic simulations ofviolent acts in terms of character: engaging in simulated immoral actserodes one's character and makes it more difficult for one to live afulfilled eudaimonic life. 相似文献
2.
Stephanie L. Patridge 《Ethics and Information Technology》2013,15(1):25-34
In a recent and provocative essay, Christopher Bartel attempts to resolve the gamer’s dilemma. The dilemma, formulated by Morgan Luck, goes as follows: there is no principled distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. So, we’ll have to give up either our intuition that virtual murder is morally permissible—seemingly leaving us over-moralizing our gameplay—or our intuition that acts of virtual pedophilia are morally troubling—seemingly leaving us under-moralizing our game play. Bartel’s attempted resolution relies on establishing the following three theses: (1) virtual pedophilia is child pornography, (2) the consumption of child pornography is morally wrong, and (3) virtual murder is not murder. Relying on Michael Rea’s definition of pornography, I argue that we should reject thesis one, but since Bartel’s moral argument in thesis two does not actually rely thesis one that his resolution is not thereby undermined. Still, even if we grant that there are adequate resources internal to Bartel’s account to technically resolve the gamer’s dilemma his reasoning is still unsatisfying. This is so because Bartel follows Neil Levy in arguing that virtual pedophilia is wrong because it harms women. While I grant Levy’s account, I argue that this is the wrong kind of reason to resolve the gamer’s dilemma because it is indirect. What we want is to know what is wrong with virtual child pornography itself. Finally, I suggest alternate moral resources for resolving the gamer’s dilemma that are direct in a way that Bartel’s resources are not. 相似文献
3.
This paper is concerned with whether there is a moral difference between simulating wrongdoing and consuming non-simulatory representations of wrongdoing. I argue that simulating wrongdoing is (as such) a pro tanto wrong whose wrongness does not tarnish other cases of consuming representations of wrongdoing. While simulating wrongdoing (as such) constitutes a disrespectful act, consuming representations of wrongdoing (as such) does not. I aim to motivate this view in part by bringing a number of intuitive moral judgements into reflective equilibrium, and in part by describing the case of a character that I call The Devious Super Geek who simulates wrong to particular people that he knows personally. I build bridging cases from the case of the Devious Super Geek to capture games in which one simulates wrong to imaginary members of extant, morally salient categories. The surprising conclusions that we are led to include not just that simulated wrongdoing is pro tanto wrong, but that simulated Just killing is pro tanto wrong, and also that the simulated killing of zombies and aliens is also pro tanto wrong. Finally, I describe how I propose to handle some potential objections and attempt to weigh the pro tanto wrong identified in the paper against some countervailing considerations in some all things considered judgements. 相似文献
4.
Monique Wonderly 《Ethics and Information Technology》2008,10(1):1-10
Although the word empathy only recently came into existence, eighteenth century philosopher, David Hume, significantly contributed to our current understanding
of the term. Hume was among the first to suggest that an empathic mechanism is the central means by which we make ethical
judgments and glean moral knowledge. In this paper, I explore Hume’s moral sentimentalism, and I argue that his conception
of empathy provides a surprisingly apposite framework for interpreting and addressing a current issue in practical ethics:
the moral significance of ultra-violent video games. Ultimately, I attempt to show that a Humean account of morality uniquely
explains the dangers of ultra-violent video gaming by elucidating a direct connection between playing such games and moral
harm. 相似文献
5.
Sebastian Ostritsch 《Ethics and Information Technology》2017,19(2):117-128
According to the amoralist, computer games cannot be subject to moral evaluation because morality applies to reality only, and games are not real but “just games”. This challenges our everyday moralist intuition that some games are to be met with moral criticism. I discuss and reject the two most common answers to the amoralist challenge and argue that the amoralist is right in claiming that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in simply playing a game. I go on to argue for the so-called “endorsement view” according to which there is nevertheless a sense in which games themselves can be morally problematic, viz. when they do not only represent immoral actions but endorse a morally problematic worldview. Based on the endorsement view, I argue against full blown amoralism by claiming that gamers do have a moral obligation when playing certain games even if their moral obligation is not categorically different from that of readers and moviegoers. 相似文献
6.
当今社会“幼儿教育小学化”倾向十分严重,这是一种错误的教学方式,对幼儿造成很大的伤害。本文从各派儿童心理发展理论出发,从“误天时”、“无地利”、“失人和”三方面入手,深入分析了幼儿教育小学化对幼儿学习有效性、幼儿身心健康、幼儿健全人格的危害。 相似文献
7.
My avatar,my self: Virtual harm and attachment 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Jessica Wolfendale 《Ethics and Information Technology》2007,9(2):111-119
Multi-user online environments involve millions of participants world-wide. In these online communities participants can use
their online personas – avatars – to chat, fight, make friends, have sex, kill monsters and even get married. Unfortunately
participants can also use their avatars to stalk, kill, sexually assault, steal from and torture each other. Despite attempts
to minimise the likelihood of interpersonal virtual harm, programmers cannot remove all possibility of online deviant behaviour.
Participants are often greatly distressed when their avatars are harmed by other participants’ malicious actions, yet there
is a tendency in the literature on this topic to dismiss such distress as evidence of too great an involvement in and identification
with the online character. In this paper I argue that this dismissal of virtual harm is based on a set of false assumptions
about the nature of avatar attachment and its relation to genuine moral harm. I argue that we cannot dismiss avatar attachment
as morally insignificant without being forced to also dismiss other, more acceptable, forms of attachment such as attachment
to possessions, people and cultural objects and communities. Arguments against according moral significance to virtual harm
fail because they do not reflect participants’ and programmers’ experiences and expectations of virtual communities and they
have the unintended consequence of failing to grant significance to attachments that we take for granted, morally speaking.
Avatar attachment is expressive of identity and self-conception and should therefore be accorded the moral significance we
give to real-life attachments that play a similar role.
A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Cyberspace 2005 Conference at Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic 相似文献
8.
Real wrongs in virtual communities 总被引：2，自引：4，他引：2
Thomas M. Powers 《Ethics and Information Technology》2003,5(4):191-198
Beginning with the well-knowncyber-rape in LambdaMOO, I argue that it ispossible to have real moral wrongs in virtualcommunities. I then generalize the account toshow how it applies to interactions in gamingand discussion communities. My account issupported by a view of moral realism thatacknowledges entities like intentions andcausal properties of actions. Austin's speechact theory is used to show that real people canact in virtual communities in ways that bothestablish practices and moral expectations, andwarrant strong identifications betweenthemselves and their online identities. Rawls'conception of a social practice is used toanalyze the nature of the wrong and thestage-setting aspect of engaging in a practice. 相似文献
9.
Kenneth Einar Himma 《Ethics and Information Technology》2009,11(1):19-29
In this essay, I describe and explain the standard accounts of agency, natural agency, artificial agency, and moral agency,
as well as articulate what are widely taken to be the criteria for moral agency, supporting the contention that this is the
standard account with citations from such widely used and respected professional resources as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I then flesh out the implications of some of these well-settled theories with respect to the prerequisites that an ICT must
satisfy in order to count as a moral agent accountable for its behavior. I argue that each of the various elements of the
necessary conditions for moral agency presupposes consciousness, i.e., the capacity for inner subjective experience like that
of pain or, as Nagel puts it, the possession of an internal something-of-which-it is-is-to-be-like. I ultimately conclude
that the issue of whether artificial moral agency is possible depends on the issue of whether it is possible for ICTs to be
conscious. 相似文献
10.
Robert Sharp 《Ethics and Information Technology》2012,14(3):231-239
The ubiquity of online social networks has led to the phenomena of having friends that are known only through online interaction. In many cases, no physical interaction has taken place, but still people consider each other friends. This paper analyzes whether these friendships would satisfy the conditions of Aristotle??s highest level of friendship?Cwhat he calls perfect friendship. Since perfect friendship manifests through a shared love of virtue, physical proximity would seem to be unnecessary at first glance. However, I argue that the nature of online interaction may preclude us from fully recognizing the virtues and vices in others to the degree necessary for perfect friendship to occur. As such, online friendships face significant obstacles against moving beyond utility or pleasure, and this has important repercussions for online interaction more generally. 相似文献
11.
Morgan Luck 《Ethics and Information Technology》2009,11(1):31-36
Most people agree that murder is wrong. Yet, within computer games virtual murder scarcely raises an eyebrow. In one respect this is hardly surprising, as no one is actually murdered within a computer game. A virtual murder, some might argue, is no more unethical than taking a pawn in a game of chess. However, if no actual children are abused in acts of virtual paedophilia (life-like simulations of the actual practice), does that mean we should disregard these acts with the same abandon we do virtual murder? In this paper I shall outline several arguments which attempt to permit virtual murder, whilst prohibiting virtual paedophilia. 相似文献
12.
Jeff Dunn 《Ethics and Information Technology》2012,14(4):255-265
Consider the multi-user virtual worlds of online games such as EVE and World of Warcraft, or the multi-user virtual world of Second Life. Suppose a player performs an action in one of these worlds, via his or her virtual character, which would be wrong, if the virtual world were real. What is the moral status of this virtual action? In this paper I consider arguments for and against the Asymmetry Thesis: the thesis that such virtual actions are never wrong. I also explain how the truth of the Asymmetry Thesis is closely aligned with the possibility of what Edward Castronova has called closed synthetic worlds. With some qualifications, the ultimate conclusion is that the Asymmetry Thesis is false and that these closed worlds are impossible. 相似文献
13.
Recent anthropological analyses of Chinese attitudes towards privacy fail to pay adequate attention to more ordinary, but
more widely shared ideas of privacy – ideas that, moreover, have changed dramatically since the 1980s as China has become
more and more open to Western countries, cultures, and their network and computing technologies. I begin by reviewing these
changes, in part to show how contemporary notions of privacy in China constitute a dialectical synthesis of both traditional
Chinese emphases on the importance of the family and the state and more Western emphases on individual rights, including the
right to privacy. This same synthesis can be seen in contemporary Chinese law and scholarship regarding privacy. A review
of recent work in philosophical ethics demonstrates that information ethics in China is in its very early stages. In this
work, privacy is justified as an instrumental good, rather than an intrinsic good. I argue by way of conclusion that privacy protections will continue to expand in China, in part under the pressures
of globalization, increasing trade with and exposure to Western societies, and the increasing demands for Western-style individual privacy by young people. Even so, I argue that these emerging conceptions of privacy will remain distinctively Chinese – i.e., they will retain a basic consistency with traditional Chinese values and approaches. 相似文献
14.
Patrick Stokes 《Ethics and Information Technology》2015,17(4):237-248
There has been increasing attention in sociology and internet studies to the topic of ‘digital remains’: the artefacts users of social network services (SNS) and other online services leave behind when they die. But these artefacts also pose philosophical questions regarding what impact, if any, these artefacts have on the ontological and ethical status of the dead. One increasingly pertinent question concerns whether these artefacts should be preserved, and whether deletion counts as a harm to the deceased user and therefore provides pro tanto reasons against deletion. In this paper, I build on previous work invoking a distinction between persons and selves to argue that SNS offer a particularly significant material instantiation of persons. The experiential transparency of the SNS medium allows for genuine co-presence of SNS users, and also assists in allowing persons (but not selves) to persist as ethical patients in our lifeworld after biological death. Using Blustein’s “rescue from insignificance” argument for duties of remembrance, I argue that this persistence function supplies a nontrivial (if defeasible) obligation not to delete these artefacts. Drawing on Luciano Floridi’s account of “constitutive” information, I further argue that the “digital remains” metaphor is surprisingly apt: these artefacts in fact enjoy a claim to moral regard akin to that of corpses. 相似文献
15.
Garry Young 《Ethics and Information Technology》2014,16(2):91-102
The morality of virtual representations and the enactment of prohibited activities within single-player gamespace (e.g., murder, rape, paedophilia) continues to be debated and, to date, a consensus is not forthcoming. Various moral arguments have been presented (e.g., virtue theory and utilitarianism) to support the moral prohibition of virtual enactments, but their applicability to gamespace is questioned. In this paper, I adopt a meta-ethical approach to moral utterances about virtual representations, and ask what it means when one declares that a virtual interaction ‘is morally wrong’. In response, I present constructive ecumenical expressivism to (i) explain what moral utterances should be taken to mean, (ii) argue that they mean the same when referring to virtual and non-virtual interactions and (iii), given (ii), explain why consensus with regard to virtual murder, rape and paedophilia is not forthcoming even though such consensus is readily found with regard to their non-virtual equivalents. 相似文献
16.
It is sometimes suggested that new research in such areas as artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and genetic engineering
should be halted or otherwise restricted because of concerns about possible catastrophic scenarios. Proponents of such restrictions
typically invoke the precautionary principle, understood as a tool of policy formulation, as part of their case. Here I examine
the application of the precautionary principle to possible catastrophic scenarios. I argue, along with Sunstein (Risk and Reason: Safety, Law and the Environment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) and Manson (Environmental Ethics, 24: 263–274, 2002), that variants of the precautionary principle that appear strong enough to support significant restrictions
on future technologies actually lead to contradictory policy recommendations. Weaker versions of the precautionary principle,
which do not have this feature, do not appear strong enough to support restrictions on future technologies. 相似文献
17.
Michael T. McFall 《Ethics and Information Technology》2012,14(3):221-230
Aristotle??s account of friendship has largely withstood the test of time. Yet there are overlooked elements of his account that, when challenged by apparent threats of current and emerging communication technologies, reveal his account to be remarkably prescient. I evaluate the danger that technological advances in communication pose to the future of friendship by examining and defending Aristotle??s claim that perfect or character-friends must live together. I concede that technologically-mediated communication can aid existing character-friendships, but I argue that character-friendships cannot be created and sustained entirely through technological meditation. I examine text-based technologies, such as Facebook and email, and engage a non-text based technology that poses the greatest threat to my thesis??Skype. I then address philosophical literature on friendship and technology that has emerged in the last decade in Ethics and Information Technology to elucidate and defend my account by contrast. I engage Cocking and Matthews (2000), who argue that friendship cannot be created and sustained entirely through text-based contact, Briggle (2008), who argues that friendship can be created and sustained entirely through text-based contact, and Munn (2012), who argues that friendship cannot be created and entirely sustained through text-based contact but can be created and sustained entirely in immersive virtual worlds. My account discusses a certain kind of friendship, character-friendship, and a certain kind of technology, Skype, that these accounts do not. Examination of these essays helps to demonstrate that character friendship cannot be sustained entirely by technologically-aided communication and that character-friends must live together. 相似文献
18.
I argue for two theses. First, many arguments against violent gaming rely on what I call the contamination thesis, drawing their conclusions by claiming that violent gaming contaminates real world interactions. I argue that this thesis is empirically and philosophically problematic. Second, I argue that rejecting the contamination thesis does not entail that all video games are morally unobjectionable. The violence within a game can be evaluated in terms of the values the game cultivates, reinforces, denigrates, or disrespects. Games which present violence in ways that disrespect objects of values are more objectionable than violent games that reinforce or cultivate those values. The resulting analysis evaluates games on a case-by-case basis and pays particular attention to the representational context of the violence. 相似文献
19.
Real friends: how the Internet can foster friendship 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Adam Briggle 《Ethics and Information Technology》2008,10(1):71-79
Dean Cocking and Steve Matthews’ article “Unreal Friends” (Ethics and Information Technology, 2000) argues that the formation
of purely mediated friendships via the Internet is impossible. I critique their argument and contend that mediated contexts,
including the Internet, can actually promote exceptionally strong friendships according to the very conceptual criteria utilized
by Cocking and Matthews. I first argue that offline relationships can be constrictive and insincere, distorting important
indicators and dynamics in the formation of close friends. The distance of mediated friendships mitigates this problem by promoting the courage to be candid. Next, I argue that the offline world
of largely oral exchanges is often too shallow and hasty to promote deep bonds. The deliberateness of written correspondence acts as a weight to submerge friendships to greater depths and as a brake to enhance attentiveness
to and precision about one’s own and one’s friend’s character. Nonetheless, close friendships may fail to develop on the Internet.
Insofar as this failure occurs, however, it would be for reasons other than those identified by Cocking and Matthews. 相似文献