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1.
Almost four decades ago, Kathleen Pearson examined deceptive practices in sport using a distinction between strategic and definitional deception. However, the complexity and dynamic nature of sport is not limited to this dual-categorization of deceptive acts and there are other features of deception in sport unaccounted for in Pearson's constructs. By employing Torres’s elucidation of the structure of skills and Suits's concept of the lusory-attitude, a more thorough taxonomy of in-contest sport deception will be presented. Despite the ubiquitous presence of deception in sport, few scholars have examined this concept in the sport philosophy literature since Pearson’s contribution. This paper hopes to advance a deeper understanding of deceptive practices in competitive sport and also comment on the ethical permissibility of certain sport skills from a moral perspective.  相似文献   

2.
Herein I address and extend the sparse literature on deception in sports, specifically, Kathleen Pearson’s Deception, Sportsmanship, and Ethics and Mark J. Hamilton’s There’s No Lying in Baseball (Wink, Wink). On a Kantian foundation, I argue that attempts to deceive officials, such as framing pitches in baseball, are morally unacceptable because they necessarily regard others (e.g., the umpire) as incompetent and as a mere means to one’s own self-interested ends. More dramatically I argue, contrary to Pearson and Hamilton, that some forms of competitor-to-competitor deception (which Pearson labels ‘strategic deception’) are similarly unacceptable. Specifically, I offer a ‘principle of caustic deceit’ according to which any strategic deception that divorces a game from its constitutive skills is morally untoward and ought to be met with negative social pressure at least, and/or legislated out of existence. The problem with these forms of strategic deception is that they treat one’s opponents, again in the Kantian sense, as a mere means to one’s own self-interested ends.  相似文献   

3.
ABSTRACT

This paper involves a discussion of the results of a recent research project where I interviewed athletes who play on a Canadian University's sport teams. The interviews were fairly open‐ended, exploring the athletes’ interpretations of what makes a situation an ethical dilemma and then what moral reasoning process they use in resolving the dilemmas they face. The interviews were analysed utilizing a hermeneutic approach. In analysing the transcribed interviews, I uncovered the layers of text in an attempt to interpret the athletes’ conception of ethical dilemmas. Then I focused on the reasoning process the athletes articulated in their attempts to resolve ethical dilemmas. This process required successive ‘readings’ where I attempted to relate knowledge from moral theory/moral philosophy to the words and experiences of the athletes interviewed.

This research has the potential to be both theoretically and practically significant. The theoretical significance of the research lies in the application of a study of moral theory/moral philosophy to actual ethical dilemmas faced by athletes. Although moral philosophy is a well‐established scholarly discipline, the application of insights gleaned from a study of this discipline to the practice of sport has not received much attention in the scholarly literature. Most of the empirical research conducted in the area of sport and moral reasoning has focused on theories of moral development, i.e. Piaget, Kohlberg, and so forth (Booth, 1981; Figley, 1984; Romance, 1988; Brandi, 1989; Shields & Bredemeier, 1995), while most of the research concerned with moral theory/moral philosophy has been solely conceptual in nature (Shea, 1996; Arnold, 1984; Fraleigh, 1984; Zeigler, 1984; Feezell, 1986). The research presented in this paper integrates a naturalistic framework, specifically hermeneutic analysis, with conceptual knowledge derived from moral theory/moral philosophy.

The research also has the potential to have significant practical implications. My objective is to determine what sort of moral reasons athletes provide when they attempt to resolve ethical dilemmas encountered in their sport. Understanding these reasons has significant implications in that teachers and coaches could facilitate the development of the critical thinking skills and dispositions required in moral reasoning if they were aware of where their athletes were in need of guidance.

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4.
Abstract

This article aims to develop a comprehensive understanding of changing cultural norms that have enabled and constrained women’s sport activities. It aims moreover, to analyse the changing nature of women’s sport activities in Taiwan. I want to show that what men can do, what women can do – and what I want to, what I can, and what I will do. I also address how I became interested in sports history and the pursuits I have made in that field.  相似文献   

5.
Playing to your opponent’s weakness is a strategy commonly adopted in head-to-head sports. I argue, however, that competitors in head-to-head sports should adopt the opposite strategy: playing to your opponent’s strength (PTS). To do so, I first distinguish two senses of victory and explain what constitutes a meaningful victory in head-to-head sports. I then examine the implications of mutualism as exhibited in Robert L. Simon’s view that sport is a mutual quest for excellence through challenge. Finally, I defend the notion that competitors in head-to-head sports should adopt PTS by stating and answering seven objections.  相似文献   

6.
In this article, I begin to develop and defend a reformed concept of ‘cheating’ as ‘wrongful competitive norm violating’. I then use this to reject Oliver Leaman’s view that cheating is sometimes not wrong and can make sport better as sport. I also consider and reject an attempt by John Russell to defend what would essentially be a middle position between Leaman’s and mine. Russell’s defense of his view also fails, either for the same reasons that Leaman’s does or because it is irrelevant.  相似文献   

7.
This paper argues that recent treatments of ethics in sport have accorded too much importance to the promotion and portrayal of a sport’s excellences, and too little to the consent of participants First, I consider and reject a fundamental challenge to the idea that consent should play a central role in determining the morality of action in sport – namely, Sean McAleer’s argument to the effect that consent is incapable of rendering normally impermissible actions permissible in sport. I then offer a preliminary examination of the proper relation in the moral evaluation of action in sport between considerations of consent and ‘internalist’ considerations regarding the nature and purpose of sport. Taking as my starting point J.S. Russell’s treatment of this topic, I argue that consent is the more weighty, and in many cases the more fundamental, value and that when it conflicts with internalist considerations, it is consent that takes moral priority.  相似文献   

8.
In 2010, pitcher Armando Galarraga was denied a perfect game when umpire Jim Joyce called Jason Donald safe at first with two outs in the bottom of the 9th. In the numerous media discussions that followed, Joyce’s ‘blown’ call was commonly referred to as ‘mistaken’, ‘wrong’, or otherwise erroneous. However, this use of language makes some not uncontroversial ontological assumptions. It claims that the fact that a runner is safe or out has nothing to do with the ruling of the umpire himself, but rather with some state of the universe that does not depend on the umpire for its existence (e.g. the runner’s reaching the base before the ball or not). In this paper, I recast the problem as a version of Plato’s Euthyphro Dilemma and argue that the view implied by the above assertions is actually misguided. Instead, I hope to show that an alternative view – what I call ‘restricted umpire voluntarism’ – is actually more in line with the spirit of the game of baseball and is not as counterintuitive as it may appear at first glance.  相似文献   

9.
The 2010 Quinnipiac cheerleading case raises interesting questions about the nature of both cheerleading and sport, as well as about the moral character of each. In this paper we explore some of those questions, and argue that no form of college cheerleading currently in existence deserves, from a moral point of view, to be recognized as a sport for Title IX purposes. To reach that conclusion, we evaluate cheerleading using a quasi-legal argument based on the NCAA’s definition of sport and conclude that cheerleading fails to qualify as a legitimate sport. A philosophical argument leads to the same conclusion, primarily because of the essential entertainment-aspect of cheerleading. We then examine a consequentialist moral case for making cheerleading an intercollegiate sport and argue that the balance of moral reasons is against doing so. Finally, we look at cheerleading’s newest offspring – Acrobatics and Tumbling, and STUNT – and express our moral reservations about their current claims to be worthy of Title IX recognition. While we would not claim that any single one of our arguments is decisive, we are convinced that the cumulative weight of the arguments against granting intercollegiate sport status to any of the forms of cheerleading or its derivatives is, at present, irresistible.  相似文献   

10.
Since the 1960s environmental problems have increasingly been on the agenda in Western countries. Global warming and climate change have increased concerns among scientists, politicians and the general population. While both elite sport and mass sport are part of the consumer culture that leads to ecological problems, sport philosophers, with few exceptions, have not discussed what an ecologically acceptable sport would look like. My goal in this article is to present a radical model of ecological sport based on Arne Naess’s version of deep ecology called ecosophyT. After outlining the Naessian ecocentric view of biospheric egalitarianism I present the consequences for sport and physical activities. I also give examples from Arne Naess’s own practice of sport which was guided by the principle ‘Richness in ends, simplicity in means!’ I discuss whether Naessian deep ecological sport is what we will all end up with after the ecocatastrophe or whether it can be an inspiring ideal for many of us right now.  相似文献   

11.
Deep ethical interpretivism has been the standard view of the nature of sport in the philosophy of sport for the past seventeen years or so. On this account excellence assumes the role of the foundational, ethical goal that justice assumes in Ronald Dworkin’s interpretivist model of law. However, since excellence in sports is not an ethical value, and since it should not be regarded as an ultimate goal, the case for the traditional account fails. It should be replaced by the shallow interpretivist model that I begin to sketch out and defend here.  相似文献   

12.
Abstract

In this paper, we explore and reflect critically on what elite sport may expect or fear from genetic technologies. In particular, we explore the language in which we (where ‘‘we’’ denotes scientists, sports scientists, the media, sports coaches, academics) tend to speak about genetics, elite sport, and the human body – we call this language ‘‘gene-talk’’ – which imagines the world of elite sport as one in which genes were always dominant in athletic performance. The dominant question here seems to be whether what is thought to be possible ought to be, and can be realized. We unpack the question by asking whether the practices needed for genetics to intervene so powerfully in elite sport exist in the straightforward and uncomplicated manner that the ‘‘gene-talk’’ literature seems to suggest. We argue that there is a lack of relevant studies to support and analyse the notion of sports performance as an immensely rich and complex practice.We conclude that elite sport may be more complex and heterogeneous than ‘‘gene-talk’’ has imagined to date.  相似文献   

13.
In this paper, I defend a general theory of competition and contrast it with a corresponding general theory of cooperation. I then use this analysis to critique mutualism. Building on the work of Arthur Applbaum and Joseph Heath I develop an alternative adversarial model of competitive sport, one that helps explain and is partly justified by shallow interpretivism, and argue that this model helps shows that the claim that mutualism provides us with the most defensible ethical ideal of sport is false. By replacing that view with an understanding of sporting adversarial ethics we can appreciate that the ethics of sport are more complex than has been commonly recognized.  相似文献   

14.
Historically, scholarship on ethics in sport has focused almost exclusively on practices of athletes, coaches and leagues. In this study, we highlight a serious void in the existing empirical literature on morality – ethical ideology and intention – of sport fans. Applying ‘bracketed morality,’ sport fans sometimes enact or accept behaviours otherwise regarded as problematic in everyday situations – insulting athletes, cursing at officials, celebrating riotously and/or intimidating fans of rival teams. Only some fans actually sanction (oppose) these kinds of behaviours, suggesting that they are questionable but not necessarily problematic, and, thus, worthy of closer investigation. Here, with the aid of four scenarios, we find that sport fans’ ethical ideology influences ethical intention. We also find that this influence is mediated twofold by ethical perception of moral problems and trivialization of observed situations, with trivialization exhibiting greater influence. Hence, while ethical ideologies and perceptions are important, they may be bracketed in evaluations of sport-fan behaviours.  相似文献   

15.
Stephen Mumford argues that aesthetic and moral values in sport are interdependent, focusing on cases where immorality taints beautiful performance. This interdependence thesis is insightful but, I argue, in need of refinement, as its normative implications are unclear and perhaps implausible (e.g. the Nazi aesthetics problem). I also challenge Mumford’s perspective on the infamous Dynamo Kiev death match. Whereas Mumford claims that the match’s morally oppressive circumstances detract from it so that ‘it was not something knowingly we should have admired aesthetically’, I argue that, on the contrary, and in light of what Mumford says about other cases, such circumstances actually enhance the game’s aesthetics such that it would be wrong not to appreciate it aesthetically.  相似文献   

16.
In an interconnected world, and with cultural diversity ever present, there is growing recognition in sport management for the need to understand such diversity alongside the desire for more inclusive organisations and processes. Research which informs these understandings is thus fundamental. Planning and doing research in an environment where the culture is different can, however, add a level of complexity to the research. No matter the project phase - conception, design, data collection or analysis - cultural consideration must be given (Johnston, 2014). Those undertaking research in differing cultural settings often look to find a research approach which marries with the cultural context. In the Pacific region, or for those working with Pacific people, a popular choice is talanoa. Drawing on empirical work with Pacific rugby athletes, the authors outline the talanoa process – an “embodied expression of the vanua concept” (Farrelly & Nabobo Baba, 2012, p. 1). Ethical issues, challenges, and opportunities in using this approach are reflected on, and the value of talanoa to sport management research and in particular the sub-field of sport-for-development is considered. The authors argue the importance of talanoa as a culturally-appropriate contemporary qualitative research approach when working with Pasifika people or Pasifika issues. Approaches such as talanoa are valuable for challenging sport management researchers to further examine their own roles in the process of producing sport-specific knowledge; for decentring current approaches to sport management research and for shifting the discipline towards politicization; as well as contributing to broader conversations regarding decolonising indigenous research (Shaw & Hoeber, 2016; Skinner & Edwards, 2010; Skinner et al., 2014).  相似文献   

17.
Among philosophers, the question about strategic fouls has been whether they are ethically justified in light of our best conception of sport. This paper proposes a different defense. I argue that many strategic fouls should be excused even if we regard them as unjustified. I first lay out a partial defense of the assumptions that playing to win cannot be subordinate to playing skillfully and that winning has value that cannot be accounted for in terms of the skill that produces it. I then argue that the logic of competitive play structures practical reason such that it is unreasonable to require even an ethical competitor always to subordinate the aim of winning to ethical standards within the game. Some ethical failures should be excused. The argument implies limits on the excusing conditions. I discuss these limits in some detail, showing that they fit patterns in the common acceptance of strategic fouls. I then address possible objections. In conclusion I argue that the logic of excuse rather than justification explains a common reaction to strategic fouls, resolving what might otherwise appear to be a contradiction in that reaction.  相似文献   

18.
Zero-sum aspects of sport have generated a number of ethical concerns and a similar number of defenses or apologetics. The trick has been to find a middle position that neither overly gentrifies sport nor inappropriately emphasizes the significance of winning and losing. One such position would have us focus on the process of trying to win over the fact of having one. It would also ameliorate any harms associated with defeat by pointing out that benefits like achievement, excellence, and moral development are available to winner and loser alike. Relying on the notion of ‘frame’ introduced by Polanyi, I argue that this approach underplays the poignant drama of sport (including the sting of defeat) and thus, seeks redemption at too high a cost. I argue for a version of red-blooded competition that is justified more by transcendence than mitigation, more by a willingness to play again tomorrow than civility during any single contest. I analyze sport in terms of its receptivity to such repetition and find that epistemological uncertainty, enhanced by the presence of chance in sport, renders repeat engagements both sensible and attractive. I conclude that sport verdicts, unlike outcomes in war, business, and love, do not settle things. Rather they invite both winner and loser alike to ‘play again tomorrow’.  相似文献   

19.
ABSTRACT

When sporting agents fail through wrongful or faulty behaviour, they should feel guilty; when they fail because of a deficiency in their abilities, they should feel shame. But sometimes we fail without being deficient and without being at fault. I illustrate this with two examples of players, Moacir Barbosa and Roberto Baggio, who failed in World Cup finals and cost their teams the greatest prize in sport. Although both players failed, I suggest that neither was at fault and neither was deficient. I argue that we can fail through no fault of our own because our abilities are always fallible. This fallibility means that to succeed – to achieve sporting glory – we must run the risk of failure. The appropriate emotion to feel over such failures is agent-regret. Sporting agents and observers should not take up what I call the ‘critical position’: the idea that someone who fails must be deficient or must have been at fault. This allows for a softer, but also more accurate, attitude towards our own failures and the failures of others. I end by suggesting that the fallibility of our abilities is made clear through playing or watching sport, and this can illuminate life more broadly.  相似文献   

20.
This paper develops and introduces the embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge into the current sports knowledge philosophical debate. This idea is based on my interpretation of Mark Rowlands’ Rilkean memory theory. Broadly speaking, Rowlands proposed that an embodied Rilkean memory is memory content that is then ‘woven into the body and its neural infrastructure’ resulting in new bodily or behavioral dispositions. I propose that elite-level sports knowledge may become contentless bodily and/or behavioral dispositions and take the form of embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge. This version of sports knowledge enriches the current philosophy of sports debate that has centered on the analytical distinction between procedural knowledge (knowing how) and declarative knowledge (knowing that). After presenting the embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge concept and providing empirical evidence that supports its existence, I argue that the current distinction between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ may not be exhaustive.  相似文献   

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