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1.
There's More to the Picture Than Meets the Eye: Young Children's Difficulty Understanding Biased Interpretation 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
5 experiments investigated children's understanding that expectations based on prior experience may influence a person's interpretation of ambiguous visual information. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds were asked to infer a puppet's interpretation of a small, ambiguous portion of a line drawing after the puppet had been led to have an erroneous expectation about the drawing's identity. Children of both ages failed to ascribe to the puppet an interpretation consistent with the puppet's expectation. Instead, children attributed complete knowledge of the drawing to the puppet. In Experiment 2, the task was modified to reduce memory demands, but 4- and 5-year-olds continued to overlook the puppet's prior expectations when asked to infer the puppet's interpretation of an ambiguous scene. 6-year-olds responded correctly. In Experiment 3, 4- and 5-year-olds correctly reported that an observer who saw a restricted view would not know what was in the drawing, but children did not realize that the observer's interpretation might be mistaken. Experiments 4 and 5 explored the possibility that children's errors reflect difficulty inhibiting their own knowledge when responding. The results are taken as evidence that understanding of interpretation begins at approximately age 6 years. 相似文献
2.
The present studies investigated children's and adults' intuitive beliefs about the physical nature of essences. Adults and children (ranging in age from 6 to 10 years old) were asked to reason about 2 different ways of determining an unknown object's category: taking a tiny internal sample from any part of the object (distributed view of essence) or taking a sample from one specific region (localized view of essence). Results from 3 studies indicated that adults strongly endorsed the distributed view, and children showed a developmental shift from a localized to distributed view with increasing age. These results suggest that even children go beyond mere placeholder notions of essence, committing to conceptual frameworks of how essences might be physically instantiated. 相似文献
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4.
Karl S. Rosengren Susan A. Gelman Charles W. Kalish Michael McCormick 《Child development》1991,62(6):1302-1320
Beliefs about naturally occurring transformations were examined in children aged 3 to 6 years in 4 experiments. Experiment 1 tested children's understanding that animals (but not artifacts) predictably get larger over time. Experiment 1a examined whether the results obtained in the first experiment could be attributed to an added memory component on the artifact task. Experiment 2 further examined beliefs about the aging of artifacts. In Experiment 3, color and shape (metamorphosis) changes of animals were investigated. At all ages, children appeared to understand that animals get larger and not smaller with age. While older children and adults allowed for rather dramatic changes in the size and shape of animals over the life span if the alternative involved decreasing in size with age, preschool children were less willing to accept these changes. Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that even young preschool children have 2 conceptual insights about natural transformations: that they are lawful and nonrandom, and that they are domain and mechanism specific. Further, children as young as age 3 are able to go beyond the perceptual appearance of animals in making judgments about transformations caused by growth. Implications for children's understanding of personal and species identity are discussed. 相似文献
5.
This study investigated whether humans have two mind‐reading systems whereby the efficient system, unlike the flexible system, is naturally limited. There were two experiments and the first included adults as well as children (3‐ to 4‐year‐olds; total N = 128). In Experiment 1, all groups efficiently gazed in anticipation of an agent's beliefs about object location but not object identity (an ambiguous figure). In Experiment 2, children showed limits in anticipating a competitive agent's action in terms of his perspective on what is desirable. Flexibility in verbally predicting agents' actions across contexts developed with age. Convergence on signature limits across different ages and methods suggests that indirect anticipations involve minimal mind reading, whereas direct predictions tap a refined understanding of perspective. 相似文献
6.
Confusions between memories for performed and imagined actions: a developmental comparison 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Children are often assumed to be more confused than adults are about the origin of self-generated memories (e.g., what they did or thought). The present experiments showed evidence in support of this assumption but only under some circumstances. In Experiment 1, 6- and 9-year-olds were as good as adults in distinguishing what they did from what they saw someone else do. However, children had particular trouble distinguishing what they did from what they imagined doing. Confusion between performed and imagined actions was evident across a range of actions. Clustering data also showed that information about origin is part of the memory for an event; all subjects recalled actions according to who performed what action (Experiment 1). Further, the presence of person categories as a basis for organization reduced clustering based on action class more for children than for adults (Experiment 1 vs. 2). Collectively, these findings indicate that children become sensitive to some distinctions in memories sooner than they do to others. 相似文献
7.
OBJECTIVE: This case study examined children's reports from an obscene phone call (i.e., a verbal sexual abuse). We investigated which type of information the children reported, the completeness and accuracy of the children's statements, and whether there were systematic patterns in terms of memory distortions and omissions. METHOD: The completeness and the accuracy of the children's statements were examined by matching 64 children's statements given during police interviews with a detailed documentation of each phone call, made by the perpetrator during the actual phone calls. RESULTS: All children remembered the phone call per se, but they were found to omit almost all of the sexual and sensitive information (perpetrator's questions and statements) and about 70% of the neutral information given by the perpetrator. However, the children were accurate in the information they did report. CONCLUSIONS: The fact that the children did remember more of the neutral information suggests that they actually remembered the sexual information as well, but that they chose not to report it. Results indicate that children who have been sexually abused may remember more than they report in an initial interview. One possible underlying reason is that children experience shame or embarrassment. 相似文献
8.
Three experiments (total N=140) tested the hypothesis that 5-year-old children's membership in randomly assigned "minimal" groups would be sufficient to induce intergroup bias. Children were randomly assigned to groups and engaged in tasks involving judgments of unfamiliar in-group or out-group children. Despite an absence of information regarding the relative status of groups or any competitive context, in-group preferences were observed on explicit and implicit measures of attitude and resource allocation (Experiment 1), behavioral attribution, and expectations of reciprocity, with preferences persisting when groups were not described via a noun label (Experiment 2). In addition, children systematically distorted incoming information by preferentially encoding positive information about in-group members (Experiment 3). Implications for the developmental origins of intergroup bias are discussed. 相似文献
9.
Reflecting on Scientific Thinking: Children's Understanding of the Hypothesis-Evidence Relation 总被引：1，自引：1，他引：1
3 experiments were carried out to examine children's understanding of the role of covariation evidence in hypothesis formation. Previous research suggested that it is not until 8 to 11 years of age that children begin to understand how a given pattern of covariation supports a particular hypothesis about which factor is causally responsible for an observed effect. Experiments 1 to 3 employed a different (fake evidence) technique than previous research and showed that by 6 years of age most children understand how evidence would lead a story character to form a different hypothesis than the subject's own. Experiment 3 showed that most 6- and young 7-year-olds understand how a character's future actions (e.g., choice of an object) and predictions of future outcomes depend on the hypothesis he or she holds. 相似文献
10.
When do children begin to store visually presented information using a speech code? Conrad has shown that at age 6, but not before, children have more difficulty in recalling items whose names rhyme than items whose names do not and concluded that at 6 years of age children begin to store information in memory using verbal labels. Experiment 1, using a technique similar to the one introduced by Conrad, showed that 4-year-old children memorized nonrhyming items better than rhyming ones. Experiment 2 used a different technique. Instead of comparing the performance obtained with 2 series of different items, one with rhyming and the other with nonrhyming names, we have, by using bilingual children, made comparisons within the same series of items. In one language the items had rhyming names and in the other, nonrhyming names. This technique controlled for the intrinsic difficulty of the items. The results of experiment 2 confirmed those obtained in experiment 1. Our conclusion is that 4-year-old children already use a speech code in order to store and organize information in memory. 相似文献
11.
2 experiments examined children's understanding of the expression of speaker certainty and uncertainty and its relation to their developing theory of mind. In the first experiment, 80 children between 3 and 6 years of age were presented with a task in which they had to guess the location of an object hidden in 1 of 2 boxes. As clues to location, the children were presented with contrasting pairs of statements by 2 puppets. Different trials contained all of the possible pairwise combinations of either the modal verbs must, might, and could or the modal adjuncts probably, possibly, and maybe. Results showed that while 3-year-olds did not differentiate between any of the modal contrasts presented, 4-year-olds and older children were able to find the hidden object on the basis of what they heard. Performance was best for contrasts involving a highly certain term (either must or probably) paired with a less certain term (might, could, possibly, and maybe). Experiment 2 was designed to determine whether competence with modal terms was related to competence with mental terms in the same task, and whether performance on the certainty task was related to other aspects of the child's understanding of the nature of beliefs. 26 4-year-olds were presented with the certainty task, involving both modal and mental terms, and with tasks assessing their understanding of false beliefs, representational change, and the appearance-reality distinction. Results showed that all of these tasks were intercorrelated, implying that what may develop at 4 years of age may be a general understanding of the representational nature of belief. 相似文献
12.
Carl Nils Johnson 《Child development》1990,61(4):962-972
When do children distinguish a person's subjective identity from their outward bodily characteristics? As adults this distinction is evident in our commonsense recognition that a hypothetical brain transplant would entail a transplant of the mind or self. 4 studies were conducted to examine children's judgments about hypothetical body part transplants, including transplants of the brain, heart, mouth, and face. The results showed that during the elementary school years children are acquiring a firm understanding of the brain as the primary locus of psychological attributes and identity. The early school years, between the ages of 5 and 7 years, appeared to be a transitional phase, with performance being variable and subject to task conditions. While children this age readily imagined the consequences of transplants between themselves and another character of categorically different status (i.e., a pig or baby), they had great difficulty with proposed transplants between themselves and another child of the same status. Knowledge about categorical differences appeared to provide a needed framework for children's budding thinking about psychological differences. 相似文献
13.
Victimizers and Their Victims: Children''s Conceptions of the Mixed Emotional Consequences of Moral Transgressions 总被引：3，自引：0，他引：3
4-8-year-old children's conceptions of the emotional consequences of moral transgressions were assessed in 2 experiments. In Experiment 1, most children expected victimizers to feel positive emotions and victims to feel negative emotions, but 8-year-olds who assessed victims first subsequently attributed less positive emotions to victimizers. Despite efforts to manipulate the salience of victims' losses in Experiment 2, children had similar expectations about the emotional consequences of transgressions. However, a developmental shift emerged: 4-year-olds attributed extremely positive emotions to victimizers due to the material gains produced by victimization, whereas 8-year-olds attributed less positive emotions to victimizers, in part due to the unfairness and harm produced by victimization. Probe questions revealed that older children also attributed additional negative-valence emotions to victimizers, suggesting that victimizers are expected to feel conflicting rather than exclusively positive emotions. Discussion focused on potential cognitive constraints in children's conceptions of moral emotions. 相似文献
14.
Two experiments with 79 monolingual German speaking children between 2.5 and 4.5 years showed a consistent developmental gap between children's memory/inference of what someone wanted and what someone wrongly said or thought. For instance, when John is still playing and mother says, "John should be going to bed," more than 70% answered correctly that mother wanted John to go to bed. However, when mother said, "John is going to bed," about 70% answered wrongly that she thought/said that he was still playing. Correct answers emerged with the mastery of the false-belief task. In German, want sentences (about something to happen) obligatorily take the same grammatical that complement as say or think sentences. Therefore, the observed gap constrains de Villier's (1995) linguistic determinism, which claims that acquisition of the necessary grammatical structures for talking about the mind drives children's ability to think about the mind. 相似文献
15.
Three studies explored whether and when children could categorize objects on the basis of a novel underlying causal power. To test this we constructed a "blicket detector," a machine that lit up and played music when certain objects were placed on it. First, 2-, 3- and 4-year-old children saw that an object labeled as a "blicket" would set off the machine. In a categorization task, other objects were demonstrated on the machine. Some set it off and some did not. Children were asked to say which objects were "blickets." In an induction task, other objects were or were not labeled as "blickets." Children had to predict which objects would have the causal power to set off the machine. The causal power could conflict with perceptual properties of the object, such as color and shape. In an association task the object was associated with the machine's lighting up but did not cause it to light up. Even the youngest children sometimes used the causal power to determine the object's name rather than using its perceptual properties and sometimes used the object's name rather than its perceptual properties to predict the object's causal powers. Children rarely categorized the object on the basis of the associated event. Young children also sometimes made interesting memory errors-they incorrectly reported that objects with the same perceptual features had had the same causal power. These studies demonstrate that even very young children will easily and swiftly learn about a new causal power of an object and spontaneously use that information in classifying and naming the object. 相似文献
16.
A tale of two representations: the misinformation effect and children's developing theory of mind 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
The present research investigates representational ability as a cognitive factor underlying the suggestibility of children's eyewitness memory. The misinformation effect is used as an index of children's suggestibility, and performance on the false belief task is used as an assessment of children's representational abilities (N = 117). Analyses that considered the effect of representational ability and general memory ability on children's susceptibility to misleading information showed that differences in representational ability and general memory ability predicted participants' susceptibility to misleading information. These results demonstrate that the eyewitness memory of children who lack either multirepresentational abilities, sufficient general memory abilities, or both (i.e., most 3- and 4-year-olds) is less accurate than the eyewitness memory of children with both multirepresentational abilities and sufficient memory abilities (i.e., most 6-year-olds and adults). Thus, it appears that the earliest age at which children's eyewitness memory can be considered to be similar to that of adults is 6 years of age, when children's mental representational abilities are similar to those of adults. These results suggest that one factor underlying children's vulnerability to misleading information is the number of representations of an event that they can simultaneously hold and compare. 相似文献
17.
Function has been considered important in numerous literatures in the study of cognitive development, yet little is known about what and how infants learn about function. Five experiments examined what 10-month-old infants (N=80) learn about functions that involve a sound produced when an object is acted on. Infants habituated to a single object (Experiment 1) or multiple objects that performed the same function (Experiment 2) learned both the actions and the sounds. Infants did not appear to learn relations between actions and sounds (Experiment 3) or appearances and sounds (Experiment 4), although they did learn the relations between appearances and actions (Experiment 5). These results are discussed in terms of how infants learn about object function. 相似文献
18.
Pamela M. Smith 《教育心理学》1993,13(2):107-118
Children aged 4 to 10 years old were asked to draw a person standing absolutely still and a person walking very fast so that someone not present would know from the pictures alone what had been depicted. Even at four some children were able to convey the difference to a viewer and there was increasing success with age. The number of differentiating cues increased with age and there was an age‐related trend in the order in which specific cues appeared in the drawings. The ability of the children to respond flexibly to the task gives no support to notions of rigid mental representations determining what young children can draw. It is argued that contrast tasks are a useful tool for investigating problem solving skills in the domain of drawing and could be used to extend children's skill by providing an occasion for explicit dialogue about how representational information is conveyed to a viewer. 相似文献
19.
Children''s Representations of the Pattern of Daily Activities 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
William J. Friedman 《Child development》1990,61(5):1399-1412
An important part of humans' knowledge of time depends on forming mental representations of recurrent temporal patterns. This study was an attempt to characterize the representations of one such pattern--the relative times of occurrence of daily activities such as waking, lunch, dinner, and going to bed in 4-9-year-old children. The results of 3 experiments showed that by 5 years of age children can judge the backward order of daily activities, judge the forward order from multiple reference points within the day, and evaluate the lengths of intervals separating daily activities. By about 7 years, children can also judge backward order from multiple reference points. These findings impose constraints on the types of representational models that can explain young children's knowledge of this pattern. The results also show that certain operations can be performed on this content about 6 years earlier than on 2 other temporal contents--the patterns of days of the week and months. 相似文献
20.
Mind what mother says: narrative input and theory of mind in typical children and those on the autism spectrum 总被引：5，自引：0，他引：5
In 2 studies mothers read wordless storybooks to their preschool-aged children; narratives were analyzed for mental state language. Children's theory-of-mind understanding (ToM) was concurrently assessed. In Study 1, children's (N=30; M age 3 years 9 months) ToM task performance was significantly correlated with mothers' explanatory, causal, and contrastive talk about cognition, but not with mothers' simple mentions of cognition. In Study 2, the same pattern was found in an older sample of typically developing children (N=24; M age 4 years 7 months), whereas for children on the autism spectrum (N=24; M age 6 years 7.5 months), ToM task performance was uniquely correlated with mothers' explanatory, causal, and contrastive talk about emotions. 相似文献