共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 562 毫秒
1.
三方博弈的纳什均衡求解 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
纳什均衡以其一致预测性在非合作博弈中占有十分关键的作用和地位,本文将分析完全信息静态博弈中的最简单多数博弈,即存在三个博弈方的情况,并列举几个典型例子归纳求解纳什均衡的一般方法. 相似文献
2.
3.
纳什均衡以其一致预测性在非合作博弈中占有十分关键的作用和地位，本文将分析完全信息静态博弈中的最简单多数博弈，即存在三个博弈方的情况，并列举几个典型例子归纳求解纳什均衡的一般方法。 相似文献
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
本文以博弈论作为分析工具研究政府,电子政务建设主管部门与开发商三方之间的合作及非合作博弈,在理性经济人和风险中性假设下．建立三方博弈模型．通过求解纳什均衡，给出各参数变量的政策含义，进而给出寻租，腐败班象的治理对策．[编者按] 相似文献
9.
突发事件造成的供应中断已经引起越来越多的重视。研究在信息不对称和供应中断风险下分别由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两条供应链之间产量竞争问题。对合作竞争博弈、混合竞争博弈、非合作竞争博弈这三种情况下的最优订货量和期望收益进行分析和求解,讨论在收益共享契约和奖励-惩罚契约下决策者的选择,得出供应链协调的条件。 相似文献
10.
以制造商和供应商为研究对象,运用博弈理论先后比较了当双方处于3种博弈均衡（Nash均衡、Stackelberg均衡和合作均衡）时合作创新的利润差异,证明了合作博弈具有帕累托优势,并利用Shapley值法和Nash讨价还价法解决了合作后利润的分配问题。研究结果表明：制造商与供应商合作创新的动力源于自身产品的边际收益;制造商与供应商的相互合作可以实现帕累托改进,从而为供应链企业增进自身收益乃至整个供应链的收益提供了重要的理论借鉴。 相似文献
11.
产业集群竞争优势的来源——企业合争机制 总被引：4，自引：0，他引：4
从竞争优势上看,产业集群的主要优势在于资源的聚集效应和协同效应所带来的成本优势、专业化分工优势、技术创新优势、区域营销优势和集群内价值链网络协同优势。本文通过对集群企业间合争机制的博弈分析,从理论上说明产业集群优势的发挥是以企业间独特的合争机制为基础,这种合争机制既有利于获得规模经济,同时又有利于互动式学习和技术扩散,它将原本孤立、松散的各种要素有效地组织了起来,从而形成了产业集群的整体竞争优势。 相似文献
12.
战略联盟内部企业竞合关系研究 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
针对竞争合作组织--战略联盟的竞合关系,综合以往研究的结果对联盟内部企业的竞舍关系进行深入分析.在此基础上,分别从竞争强度和合作强度入手,提出反映联盟企业竞合关系的二维模型以及战略联盟内部企业竞合关系进行有效评估的衡量指标. 相似文献
13.
在生态学Lotka-Volterra理论和产业集群生态位整合的Logistic模型基础上建立产业集群生态网络竞合模型。结合产业集群的竞合特征,通过调节竞合系数来讨论企业间的竞合模式,并针对企业不同生态位的表现提出"生态位确立——生态位拓展——生态位巩固——生态位整合——生态位分离"的产业集群生态网络应对战略。最后对产业集群生态网络在竞争和合作的过程中提出注意点,使得生态网络生态位保持稳定。 相似文献
14.
基于价值网这种非线性拓扑结构,建立了具有直接供需关系的多个制造商和供应商之间合作竞争的两阶段动态博弈模型,在上下游企业之间采取四种策略组合(非合作—非合作、合作—非合作、非合作—合作和合作—合作)的情况下,对制造商同时独立进行产量决策和联合进行产量决策的情况进行了对比分析,并对制造商独立进行产量决策和联合进行产量决策的情况进行了纵向比较。结果表明,在制造商独立决策的情况下,合作—非合作策略的集体效率最高;在制造商联合决策的情况下,只有合作—合作策略组合有可能成为提高集体效率的有效途径。 相似文献
15.
16.
Coopetition, i.e., cooperation between competing actors, has become a pervasive strategy for innovative firms. The primary focus of studies investigating coopetition centers on inter-firm relationships, highlighting the benefits, limits and configurational patterns of cooperative relationships between competing firms. Only a small, emerging group of studies seeks to extend the concept to the intra-firm level, stressing the existence and effects of competition and cooperation between units that are part of the same organization. This paper contributes to this latter group by investigating the effects of internal coopetition on knowledge and innovation sharing and highlighting the fundamental role of knowledge brokers in managing the resulting tensions. Based on a qualitative case study of the video game publisher Ubisoft, we stress how the tensions raised by internal coopetitive settings limit knowledge sharing between units, and we analyze the mechanisms through which the knowledge broker helps to overcome these limits. We identify three main functions of this knowledge broker that allow the promotion of knowledge and innovation transfer to occur between coopeting units: (1) protecting the unit’s competitive advantage by introducing a lagging principle in the transfer process, (2) reducing sharing costs by standardizing innovative solutions, and (3) enhancing awareness of and trust in innovative solutions by centralizing knowledge diffusion. 相似文献
17.
Coopetition analyses the simultaneity of competitive and cooperative behaviours between rival firms. Scholars have focused their attention on strategic alliances, but specific coopetition issues are seldom addressed through in-depth studies. On the basis of inter-organizational relationships, coopetition provides partners with a competitive advantage by enhancing their knowledge creation and transfer, but exposes firms to the risk that rivals may capture their own knowledge. In this, it becomes necessary for firms to mix knowledge creation and transfer strategies with knowledge protection practices. This paper reports on a qualitative study of 37 firms and sheds light on the specific knowledge development process for the partners engaged in coopetition. 相似文献
18.
In this paper, an interventional bipartite consensus problem is considered for a high-order multi-agent system with unknown disturbance dynamics. The interactions among the agents are cooperative and competitive simultaneously and thus the interaction network (just called coopetition network in sequel for simplicity) is conveniently modeled by a signed graph. When the coopetition network is structurally balanced, all the agents are split into two competitive subgroups. An exogenous system (called leader for simplicity) is introduced to intervene the two competitive subgroups such that they can reach a bipartite consensus. The unknown disturbance dynamics are assumed to have linear parametric models. With the help of the notation of a disagreement state variable, decentralized adaptive laws are proposed to estimate the unknown disturbances and a dynamic output-feedback consensus control is designed for each agent in a fully distributed fashion, respectively. The controller design guarantees that the state matrix of the closed-loop system can be an arbitrary predefined Hurwitz matrix. Under the assumption that the coopetition network is structurally balanced and the leader is a root of the spanning tree in an augmented graph, the bipartite consensus and the parameter estimation are analyzed by invoking a common Lyapunov function method when the coopetition network is time-varying according to a piecewise constant switching signal. Finally, simulation results are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed control strategy. 相似文献
19.