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1.
ABSTRACT

Recent reflection on the professional knowledge of teachers has been marked by a shift away from more reductive competence and skill-focused models of teaching towards a view of teacher expertise as involving complex context-sensitive deliberation and judgement. Much of this shift has been inspired by an Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom (phronesis) also linked by Aristotle to the development of virtue and character. This has in turn led recent educational philosophers and theorists – inspired by latter-day developments in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology – to investigate the contribution of various forms of virtue to the effective practice of teaching. In this light, the present paper undertakes further exploration of the logical geography of virtue, character and practical deliberation in teaching.  相似文献   

2.
Abstract

This article will derive a definition and account of the physically educated person, through an examination of the philosophy of Andrew Reid, Richard Peters and Aristotle. Initially, Reid’s interpretation of Peters’ views about the educational significance of practical knowledge (and physical education) will be considered. While it will be acknowledged that Peters was rather disparaging about the educational merit of some practical activities in Ethics and Education, it will be argued that he elsewhere suggests that such practical activities could be educationally worthwhile in and of themselves. In Education and the educated man he specified that practical activities should be regarded as educationally important if they are either transformed by theoretical understanding and/or pursued to the point of excellence. In suggesting that education involves the cultivation of both theoretical and practical human excellences it is argued that Peters’ philosophy of education begins to take on a more Aristotelian bent. After exploring Aristotle’s notion of virtue (human excellence) and his discussion of physical training in The politics, it is claimed that physical education activities might be most worthwhile when they extend the moral habits and/or modes of thought of pupils, towards excellence. It is concluded that physically educated persons should be defined as those who have learned to arrange their lives in such a way that the physical activities they freely engage in make a distinctive contribution to their long-term flourishing.  相似文献   

3.
This article examines some central aspects of Kristján Kristjánsson’s book, Aristotelian Character Education, beginning with the claim that contemporary virtue ethics provides methodological, ontological, epistemological, and moral foundations for Aristotelian character education. It considers three different formulations of what defines virtue ethics, and suggests that virtue ethical moral theory has steered character educators away from important aspects of Aristotle’s views on character education. It goes on to suggest a broadening of attention to psychology beyond personality and the psychological status of virtues, and it concludes with an examination of Kristjánsson’s understanding of phronesis.  相似文献   

4.
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5.
The psychological construct of ‘generativity’ was introduced by Erik Erikson in Childhood and Society in 1950. This rich and complex notion encompasses the constellation of desires, concerns and commitments that motivate individuals and societies to pass on legacies to future generations. ‘Flourishing,’ which means, very roughly, living life well, is another rich and complex notion, interpretations of which are found in ancient philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. In this article I relate interpretations of these two concepts by arguing that certain forms of generativity can be considered an Aristotelian-type virtue, and that the virtue of generativity is necessary, but not sufficient, for flourishing in the Aristotelian sense. In other words, one can be generative without flourishing. The reverse, however, does not seem true: it is hard to see how one can fully flourish without being generative.  相似文献   

6.
In contrast to ancient times, friendship is rarely discussed nowadays as a resource in moral education. Even within Aristotle-inspired character education, where it could naturally claim pride of place, its coverage is miniscule compared, say, to that of the emulation of moral exemplars. The aim of the present article is to retrieve friendship as a moral educational concept: to explain how moral educational goals define and sustain deep friendships, and how the thorny issue of when friendships should be terminated is best understood in terms of considerations as to whether they have exhausted their educational potential. By arguing that education is the raison d'être of deep friendship, Kristján Kristjánsson shows how friendship is developmentally constituted and, in its most complete form as “character friendship,” educationally executed. There is no such thing as friendship per se, but rather friendship at a certain developmental niveau (or level), with its specific developmental assets and liabilities: qualitatively differentiated according to its educational affordances. While operating within a broad Aristotelian framework, Kristjánsson devotes two sections to charting the moral educational liabilities that may dissipate even the most complete friendships, a topic mostly overlooked by Aristotle himself.  相似文献   

7.
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8.
ABSTRACT

Full virtue and practical wisdom comprise the end of neo-Aristotelian moral development, but wisdom cannot be cultivated straight away through arguments and teaching. Wisdom is integrated with, and builds upon, habituation: the acquisition of virtuous character traits through the repeated practice of corresponding virtuous actions. Habit formation equips people with a taste for, and commitment to, the good life; furthermore it provides one with discriminatory and reflective capacities to know how to act in particular circumstances. Unfortunately, habituation is often understood primarily as a method suitable only for children. This article examines whether Aristotle limited habituation to children and, if not, what the relationship between habituation and wisdom beyond childhood might look like. This article concludes that wisdom-guided habituation is also possible for adults who continue and confirm their already established virtuous habits. The implications of this for professional moral education are subsequently discussed.  相似文献   

9.
In this article, I argue that although the Aristotelian ideal of leading a virtuous life for its own sake is admirable, conventional Aristotelian and neo‐Aristotelian accounts of how it might be realised are empirically inadequate: Habituation is unlikely to produce ‘a love of virtue’, practical experience cannot then produce practical judgement or phronesis, and Aristotle's conception of a virtuous life excludes all but an idealised elite. Instead, I argue that two conceptually distinct aspects of moral development can be identified: the ‘Aristotelian’ and the ‘Humean’. In the former, the desire to lead a virtuous life for its own sake is produced through certain forms of challenging experience which, by disturbing and decentring the egoistic self, evoke a personal moral transformation. In the latter, the capacity to act well in specific social situations is the outcome of a process of socialisation, first in upbringing and later through initiation into the practices of adult life. Both aspects should be promoted in moral education for together they produce something akin to full virtue in the Aristotelian sense: Practical wisdom and practical judgement—or phronesis. Moreover, ‘the good life’ is best conceived as encompassing a variety of transcendent goods. To live a virtuous life for its own sake constitutes one good or form of human flourishing; but it is not the only one.  相似文献   

10.
ABSTRACT

Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory claims that admiration for a person is a necessary condition for her to be a moral exemplar. I argue that this claim is empirically unsupported. I provide two counterexamples, astronauts and brain data. I demonstrate that they play the role of exemplars well but receive no admiration and, accordingly, are entitled to be called nonadmirable moral exemplars. I conclude that my argument suggests why Aristotle, distinct from Zagzebski, does not emphasise the role of the praiseworthiness of virtue in his theory of virtue development in the Nicomachean Ethics.  相似文献   

11.
ABSTRACT

This article reports on a pilot study aiming to examine a role-modelling character education project through an Aristotelian framework, by adopting a virtue-led approach. Aristotle famously believed virtues should be taught to children at a young age through habituation, which gradually develops into phronesis-guided virtuosity, and he considered what nowadays is referred to as ‘role modelling’ as having a large influence on children through the emotion of emulation (zēlos). Therefore, the pilot study aims to answer the question to what extent a virtue-led role modelling intervention in character education can influence students’ moral development. The intervention teaches school-appropriate virtues to students in a primary school in Saudi Arabia. While the study is just starting, this article focuses on some pertinent and problematic preliminary questions about conceptual assumptions and research design.  相似文献   

12.
亚里士多德伦理学体系的建构是对他整个思想体系的极大充实,在其著作《尼各马可伦理学》中,他构建了一个德性的体系,公正作为最重要的德性之一得到了重点论述,我们所要做的即是从中获取在现代社会中继续前进的光芒。  相似文献   

13.
ABSTRACT

This essay introduces the present special issue on wisdom and moral education, which draws on a conference held in Oxford in 2017. Some of the seven contributions (by Sanderse; Ferkany; and Hatchimonji et al.) make use of the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, or practical wisdom, while others focus more on the wisdom concept as it has developed in contemporary psychology (Huynh and Grossman; Ardelt; and Brocato, Hix and Jayawickreme). One (by Swartwood) straddles the distinction between the two. All the contributions, however, address in different ways practical questions about how wisdom can be evaluated and how it relates to issues of moral development and education.  相似文献   

14.
Despite the Aristotelian renaissance in the philosophy of education, the development of virtue has not received much attention. This is unfortunate, because an attempt to draft an Aristotelian model of moral development can help philosophers to evaluate the contribution Aristotelian virtue ethics can make to our understanding of moral development, provide psychologists with a potentially richer account of morality and its development, and help educators to understand the developmental phase people are in. In the article, it is argued that the Aristotelian categories of the ‘morally indifferent’, ‘un‐self‐controlled’, ‘self‐controlled’ and ‘properly virtuous’ can be interpreted as the successive stages or levels of a comprehensive developmental model. For each stage, it will be made clear whether people are committed to virtue, whether they act virtuously or not, whether they act with pleasure or pain, and which desires and reasons they have for acting. The article closes with suggestions about what needs to be done if the proposed Aristotelian account of moral development is to become psychologically more realistic and educationally useful.  相似文献   

15.
This article explores what it means for teachers to engage in and evaluate students’ character education, by examining the connections between action research and Aristotelian virtue ethics. These connections are explored in two ways. Firstly, the article examines what perspective action research has on how moral education, understood in an Aristotelian way, can be implemented and evaluated. While character education may be hot in educational theory, academic advances have not always reached teachers, heads of school, policy-makers and politicians. Secondly, a specifically Aristotelian approach to action research is explored that may help teachers to understand how action research about character education in schools can best be conducted. After a comparison of the three major action research paradigms, ‘Aristotelian action research’ is described as a kind of dialogical enquiry that contributes to the growth of teachers’ practical wisdom, which, in turn, has an effect on children’s character development. The article ends with suggestions as to how research about character education could be improved if we shift our attention from making character programmes more ‘effective’ to extending and refining teachers’ own practical wisdom and virtue.  相似文献   

16.
While honesty is clearly a virtue of some educational as well as moral significance, its virtue‐ethical status is far from clear. In this essay, following some discussion of latter‐day virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, David Carr argues that honesty exhibits key features of both moral and epistemic virtue, and, more precisely, that honesty as a virtue might best be understood as the epistemic component of Aristotelian practical wisdom. In the wake of arguments to be found in Plato's Laws, as well as in those of more modern philosophers such as Jean‐Jacques Rousseau and Iris Murdoch, Carr then traces the main roots of moral dishonesty to various forms of vain and self‐delusive ego attachment. In this light, he argues in the final section of the essay that literature and the arts may provide a powerful educational antidote to such attachment.  相似文献   

17.
A bstract .  A recent trend in moral education, social and emotional learning, incorporates the mantra of emotional intelligence (EI) as a key element in an extensive program of character building. In making his famous claim that the good life would have to include appropriate emotions, Aristotle obviously considered the schooling of emotions to be an indispensable part of moral education. However, in this essay Kristján Kristjánsson casts doubt on the assumption that Aristotelians should approve of the clarion call for EI, as understood by Daniel Goleman and the proponents of social and emotional learning, in the classroom. Various marked differences between EI and Aristotelian emotional virtue are highlighted and explored. Kristjánsson argues that the claims of EI lack moral ballast and that when this fact is added to an existing heap of educational problems attached to the implementation of EI programs, educators had better rethink their reliance on EI as a model of emotion cultivation, and perhaps revert to the teachings of Aristotle himself.  相似文献   

18.
Abstract

In the Republic, Plato developed an educational program through which he trained young Athenians in desiring truth, without offering them any knowledge-education. This is not because he refused to pass on knowledge but because he considered knowledge of the Good as an ongoing research program. I show this by tracing the steps of the education of the Philosopher-Kings in Plato’s ideal state, to establish that the decades-long educational regime aims at training them in three types of virtue: (i) Moral Virtue; (ii) the Cognitive Virtue of Abstraction; (iii) the Cognitive Virtue of Debate.

Plato’s theory of education has much to teach us about intellectual character education today. The Platonic educational program does not advocate the direct transmission of knowledge from teacher to learner but rather focuses on building the learners’ epistemic dispositions. Building upon the Socratic Method, Plato’s educational program does not ‘spoon-feed’ knowledge to the learners but rather fosters the growth of intellectual virtues through problem-solving.

I explain ways in which fostering intellectual virtues through problem-solving could be applied in classrooms today. I conclude that Plato’s rigorous educational program is of definite merit for contemporary virtue education, especially since Aristotle offers us surprisingly little on how to educate for intellectual virtues.  相似文献   

19.
Aristotle discussed various forms of rationality in the Organon and other works. Aristotle held that in making judgments, the soul used five means— intelligence, episteme (scientific knowledge), sophia (theoretical wisdom), techne (art), and phronesis (practical wisdom). The nature of rhetoric as a techne employed in persuasion and grounded in probabilities distinguishes it from discourse in natural science, metaphysics, and philosophy. Aristotle's comparative study of the reasoning used by each of these means enables us to recognize rhetoric's uniqueness.  相似文献   

20.
The recent turn in teacher education reform in the United States toward hyper "professionalization" and assessment-based accreditation, spearheaded by the largest accrediting agency, the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE), has moved beyond codifying knowledge and skills to codifying the internal existence of those who desire to become teachers. The reform movement has entered into the territory of the virtue ethic with its emphasis on the notion of "dispositions." Whereas before college of education faculty were accountable for proving each preservice teacher had mastered certain "knowledge and skills," they now must also find ways to measure and assess whether the teacher candidate is the "right sort" of person, to borrow a phrase from ethical philosopher Edmund Pincoffs (1986). In this article I explore how "professionalism" retains some residue of the Aristotelian philosophical labor on dispositions but resituates and rewrites it into a different economy of thought, one built by tools of quantification, enumeration, and accountability rather than the practical wisdom of which Aristotle spoke.  相似文献   

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