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1.
Theory of mind is the understanding that other people have mental states that drive their actions and that those mental states can be different from one’s own. Without understanding theory of mind and being able to take others’ perspectives, it could be difficult for children to read and understand narrative texts. This paper posits that children’s understanding of others’ minds may be a potential missing piece in current accounts of reading comprehension. Indeed, the typical progression of children’s theory of mind abilities across childhood is closely aligned with the development of narrative processing skills. Furthermore, emerging evidence shows that both narrative processing and theory of mind are predictive of children’s reading comprehension, both concurrently and longitudinally. We present a possible explanation for why such a link exists and propose a causal framework of this relation in which increased ToM leads to increased understanding of and inferencing about characters’ mental states. Understanding characters’ mental states then leads to better reading comprehension. The framework makes novel, testable predictions and provides directions for future research.  相似文献   

2.
Researchers have long been interested in the relation between emotion understanding and theory of mind. This study investigates a cue to mental states that has rarely been investigated: the dynamics of valenced emotional expressions. When the valence of a character's facial expression was stable between an expected and observed outcome, children (= 122; = 5.0 years) recovered the character's desires but did not consistently recover her beliefs. When the valence changed, older but not younger children recovered both the characters’ beliefs and desires. In contrast, adults jointly recovered agents’ beliefs and desires in all conditions. These results suggest that the ability to infer mental states from the dynamics of emotional expressions develops gradually through early and middle childhood.  相似文献   

3.
Two studies investigated 4- to 7-year-olds’ knowledge about pretending. In Study 1, children (N = 66) defined pretending and described examples of own and others’ pretending. In Study 2, children (= 52) defined pretending and then completed a battery of measures that examined their understanding that pretending involved mental states. In Study 1, older children articulated more defining features of pretending than younger children. When describing how they or others pretended, children focused on action or appearance, regardless of whether they had included more defining features in their definitions of pretending. In Study 2, the more defining features children articulated, the better their performance on the battery. We discuss the implications of these data for the role of pretending in children's developing theory of mind.  相似文献   

4.
Neuroimaging studies with adults have identified cortical regions recruited when people think about other people's thoughts (theory of mind): temporo-parietal junction, posterior cingulate, and medial prefrontal cortex. These same regions were recruited in 13 children aged 6–11 years when they listened to sections of a story describing a character's thoughts compared to sections of the same story that described the physical context. A distinct region in the posterior superior temporal sulcus was implicated in the perception of biological motion. Change in response selectivity with age was observed in just one region. The right temporo–parietal junction was recruited equally for mental and physical facts about people in younger children, but only for mental facts in older children.  相似文献   

5.
This study assessed children's (= 236) ability to introspect the mental states of seeing and knowing relative to their ability to attribute each state to others. Children could introspect seeing 10 months before they could introspect knowing. Two‐ and 3‐year‐olds correctly reported their own seeing states, whereas 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds correctly reported their own knowing states. For each mental state, there was a 7‐month difference before children could correctly attribute that state to another. These findings indicate that knowing is more difficult to introspect than seeing and that the ability to introspect each mental state emerges prior to the ability to correctly attribute them to others. Theoretical implications for self–other differences in theory‐of‐mind development are considered.  相似文献   

6.
Children gradually develop interpretive theory of mind (iToM)—the understanding that different people may interpret identical events or stimuli differently. The present study tested whether more advanced iToM underlies children’s recognition that map symbols’ meanings must be communicated to others when symbols are iconic (resemble their referents). Children (6–9 years; N = 80) made maps using either iconic or abstract symbols. After accounting for age, intelligence, vocabulary, and memory, iToM predicted children’s success in communicating symbols’ meaning to a naïve map‐user when mapping tasks involved iconic (but not abstract) symbols. Findings suggest children’s growing appreciation of alternative representations and of the intentional assignment of meaning, and support the contention that ToM progresses beyond mastery of false belief.  相似文献   

7.
Seriation, conservation, and theory of mind abilities were examined in individuals with autism ( N = 16), mental retardation ( N = 16), and in normally developing children ( N = 16). Seriation tasks included seriation of tubes, blocks, and flat squares. Conservation tasks included conservation of area, number, substance, quantity, and weight. Theory of mind tasks involved predicting false belief and understanding value and fact beliefs. Participants with autism performed better than participants with mental retardation on seriation, while no differences emerged between these groups on conservation and false belief. Individuals with autism performed less well than individuals with mental retardation on the value and fact belief tasks; however, when verbal ability was held as a covariant, the difference was no longer significant. Normally developing children performed better than the other two groups on all tasks. These results suggest that autism does not involve a specific impairment in theory of mind and that theory of mind deficits are not unique to autism.  相似文献   

8.
An important part of children's social and cognitive development is their understanding that people are psychological beings with internal, mental states including desire, intention, perception, and belief. A full understanding of people as psychological beings requires a representational theory of mind (ToM), which is an understanding that mental states can faithfully represent reality, or misrepresent reality. For the last 35 years, researchers have relied on false-belief tasks as the gold standard to test children's understanding that beliefs can misrepresent reality. In false-belief tasks, children are asked to reason about the behavior of agents who have false beliefs about situations. Although a large body of evidence indicates that most children pass false-belief tasks by the end of the preschool years, the evidence we present in this monograph suggests that most children do not understand false beliefs or, surprisingly, even true beliefs until middle childhood. We argue that young children pass false-belief tasks without understanding false beliefs by using perceptual access reasoning (PAR). With PAR, children understand that seeing leads to knowing in the moment, but not that knowing also arises from thinking or persists as memory and belief after the situation changes. By the same token, PAR leads children to fail true-belief tasks. PAR theory can account for performance on other traditional tests of representational ToM and related tasks, and can account for the factors that have been found to correlate with or affect both true- and false-belief performance. The theory provides a new laboratory measure which we label the belief understanding scale (BUS). This scale can distinguish between a child who is operating with PAR versus a child who is understanding beliefs. This scale provides a method needed to allow the study of the development of representational ToM. In this monograph, we report the outcome of the tests that we have conducted of predictions generated by PAR theory. The findings demonstrated signature PAR limitations in reasoning about the mind during the ages when children are hypothesized to be using PAR. In Chapter II, secondary analyses of the published true-belief literature revealed that children failed several types of true-belief tasks. Chapters III through IX describe new empirical data collected across multiple studies between 2003 and 2014 from 580 children aged 4–7 years, as well as from a small sample of 14 adults. Participants were recruited from the Phoenix, Arizona metropolitan area. All participants were native English-speakers. Children were recruited from university-sponsored and community preschools and daycare centers, and from hospital maternity wards. Adults were university students who participated to partially fulfill course requirements for research participation. Sociometric data were collected only in Chapter IX, and are fully reported there. In Chapter III, minor alterations in task procedures produced wide variations in children's performance in 3-option false-belief tasks. In Chapter IV, we report findings which show that the developmental lag between children's understanding ignorance and understanding false belief is longer than the lag reported in previous studies. In Chapter V, children did not distinguish between agents who have false beliefs versus agents who have no beliefs. In Chapter VI, findings showed that children found it no easier to reason about true beliefs than to reason about false beliefs. In Chapter VII, when children were asked to justify their correct answers in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. Similarly, in Chapter VIII, when children were asked to explain agents’ actions in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. In Chapter IX, children who were identified as using PAR differed from children who understood beliefs along three dimensions—in levels of social development, inhibitory control, and kindergarten adjustment. Although the findings need replication and additional studies of alternative interpretations, the collection of results reported in this monograph challenges the prevailing view that representational ToM is in place by the end of the preschool years. Furthermore, the pattern of findings is consistent with the proposal that PAR is the developmental precursor of representational ToM. The current findings also raise questions about claims that infants and toddlers demonstrate ToM-related abilities, and that representational ToM is innate.  相似文献   

9.
听力正常家庭和聋人家庭中聋童心理理论的发展   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
聋童能否正确理解他人心理状态直接影响其正常的社会交往。已有研究表明,听力正常家庭中的聋童心理理论水平低于正常儿童,但随其语言发展和年龄增长而逐步提升。聋人家庭中的聋童心理理论处于正常水平,并随年龄增长而成熟。尽管存在心理表征能力发展的迟滞,听力正常家庭中的聋童能在一定程度上理解图片对于现实的错误表征。研究结果提示正常的社交情境可能与聋童的心理理论发展有关。  相似文献   

10.
Parental mentalizing, which is the capacity to understand behavior in terms of mental states and to reflect this back to a child through speech, is a key construct in child development. Adults with high mentalization promote children’s secure attachment, mentalization and self-regulation. This study describes this competency in a sample of teachers from Chilean nurseries in interaction with 12-month-old children during a storytelling scenario and compares it with the children’s mothers. The sample comprised 208 adults (104 teachers and 104 mothers). The adults were asked to tell 2 stories to the children, and these situations were recorded, transcribed, and codified using guidelines that identified 4 references to mental states (desires, cognitions, emotions, and attributes) and 4 references to nonmental states (causal and factual talk, physical states, and connections with the child’s life). Research Findings: The results showed significant differences between the educational staff and the mothers, and the teachers performed better than the mothers in terms of both greater mentalization and a greater number of references to desires, causal talk, emotions, and physical states. Practice or Policy: The results provide evidence regarding the supportive role played by educational staff in children’s development, especially in underprivileged sectors.  相似文献   

11.
We examined theory of mind (ToM; mental state understanding) and language in children with epilepsy (EP; n = 10; mean age = 9.92, SD = 2.34) and with typical development (TD; n = 20; mean age = 10.05, SD = 2.08). The EP group demonstrated worse ToM compared to the TD group (t(28) = ?1.11, p = .28, d = .44) but differences did not persist when controlling for language. Syntactic language was correlated with ToM in the EP group (rho (10) = .79, p < .01). This study confirms language is important for ToM in a group of children with a neurological disorder and indicates that children with epilepsy are at risk for difficulties in understanding the mental states of others due to their language deficits. This may help to explain the social difficulties these children have with their peers.  相似文献   

12.
This study of 241 parent–child dyads from the United Kingdom (= 120, Mage = 3.92, SD = 0.53) and Hong Kong (= 121, Mage = 3.99, SD = 0.50) breaks new ground by adopting a cross‐cultural approach to investigate children's theory of mind and parental mind‐mindedness. Relative to the Hong Kong sample, U.K. children showed superior theory‐of‐mind performance and U.K. parents showed greater levels of mind‐mindedness. Within both cultures parental mind‐mindedness was correlated with theory of mind. Mind‐mindedness also accounted for cultural differences in preschoolers’ theory of mind. We argue that children's family environments might shed light on how culture shapes children's theory of mind.  相似文献   

13.
Research Findings: Emotion regulation is a strong predictor of both short- and long-term peer relationships and social competence and is often targeted in preschool curricula and interventions. Pretense is a natural activity of childhood that is thought to facilitate the development of socialization, perspective taking, language, and possibly emotion regulation. This study investigated whether fantasy-oriented children, who engage in more pretense, demonstrate higher levels of emotion regulation. Prekindergartners (n = 103) and teachers were given a battery of measures assessing children’s emotion regulation, fantasy orientation, theory of mind, and language. Results from hierarchical regression analyses indicated that children’s proclivity toward fantastical play (their fantasy orientation) uniquely predicted 24% of the variance in their emotion regulation skills over and above typical predictors: age, theory of mind, and language skills. That is, children who participated in more fantasy pretense demonstrated better emotion regulation skills than their peers. Practice or Policy: The present study suggests that future research, curriculum, and interventions should focus on targeting fantastical pretense to assess causal mechanisms of emotion regulation development. Teachers and parents should encourage children’s fantastical pretense, as research suggests it may be an important contributor to the development of critical socialization skills such as emotion regulation.  相似文献   

14.
Research Findings: In this study, we investigated associations among social cognition skills (specifically, emotion knowledge and theory of mind), language abilities, and 3 varieties of prosocial behavior (helping, sharing, and comforting) in early childhood. The effects of age and gender were also taken into account. Participants were 149 Italian children between 24 and 47 months of age (M = 35.6 months, SD = 6.77 months). We adopted a multitrait mixed-methods research design, using direct measures of emotion knowledge, theory of mind, and language as well as naturalistic observations of children’s free play with peers to detect the frequency with which they engaged in prosocial behaviors. Ordinal logistic regression analyses showed that helping behaviors were especially accounted for by emotion knowledge and gender, whereas variance in sharing behaviors was mostly explained by theory-of-mind ability and language. Practice or Policy: The findings encourage those involved in early childhood education to develop training and intervention programs to enhance children’s emotional, linguistic, and cognitive skills. Given that these results were obtained with children as young as 2 and 3 years, preventive intervention should be implemented during the earliest years of life.  相似文献   

15.
Why are some children more socially anxious than others? One theory holds that socially anxious children are poor mindreaders, which hampers their social interactions; another that socially anxious children are advanced mindreaders leading to heightened self-consciousness in social situations. To test these theories simultaneously, this study (= 105, ages 8–12) assessed children's mindreading (accuracy in detecting mental states from the eye region), self-consciousness (indexed as physiological blushing during public performance), and social anxiety levels. Results support both theories, showing a quadratic relation between mindreading and social anxiety. Low mindreading was related to clinical levels of social anxiety. High mindreading was related to subclinical levels of social anxiety through blushing. Our findings suggest two social-cognitive pathways to heightened social anxiety.  相似文献   

16.
ABSTRACT— The cognitive control of behavior is critical for success in school. The emergence of self-control in development has been linked to the ability to represent one's own and others' mental states (theory of mind and metacognition). Despite rapid progress in exploring the neural correlates of both mind reading and executive function in recent years, to date, the implications of these high-level cognitive processes for issues relevant to education have hardly been addressed. The present special issue brings together developmental perspectives on the relation of self-control, theory of mind, and metacognition; theoretical and empirical contributions on the implications of theory of mind and self-control for teaching and learning; and brief reviews of the state of the art in cognitive neuroscience on these high-level cognitive processes in adolescents and adults.  相似文献   

17.
One important socio-cultural medium through which young children’s moral understanding is cultivated is parent/child discourse. Of particular interest to us was young children’s use of basic (‘thin’) evaluative concepts (good, bad, right and wrong), which are ubiquitous in everyday discourse and serve as a potential bridge from the non-moral to the moral domain. We investigated 14 2–5-year-old children’s (and their parents’) use of thin evaluative concepts and found that while they frequently used good and bad to morally evaluate other people’s and their own psychological/dispositional states and behaviors—as well as, less frequently, to highlight relevant standards, expectations and rules—they did not use right and wrong. In contrast, a sample of US written and spoken public conversation revealed that adults did. Reasons for this are discussed, along with the frequency of different types of moral evaluations, differences between children and their parents, and age-related trends.  相似文献   

18.
Curiosity is fundamental to scientific inquiry and pursuance. Parents are important in encouraging children’s involvement in science. This longitudinal study examined pathways from parental stimulation of children’s curiosity per se to their science acquisition (SA). A latent variable of SA was indicated by the inter-related variables of high school science course accomplishments, career interest, and skill. A conceptual model investigated parental stimulation of children’s curiosity as related to SA via science intrinsic motivation and science achievement. The Fullerton Longitudinal Study provided data spanning school entry through high school (N?=?118). Parental stimulation of curiosity at age 8 years comprised exposing children to new experiences, promoting curiosity, encouraging asking questions, and taking children to a museum. Intrinsic motivation was measured at ages 9, 10, and 13 years, and achievement at ages 9, 10, and 11 years. Structural equation modelling was used for analyses. Controlling for socio-economic status, parental stimulation of curiosity bore positive and significant relations to science intrinsic motivation and achievement, which in turn related to SA. Gender neither related to stimulation of curiosity nor contributed to the model. Findings highlight the importance of parental stimulation of children’s curiosity in facilitating trajectories into science, and relevance to science education is discussed.  相似文献   

19.
帮助儿童学会反思——来自心理理论研究的启示   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
作为朴素理论的一个核心领域,儿童心理理论研究是目前发展心理学研究中的前沿课题之一.研究表明,儿童不仅能发现人是有心智的,是由各种心理状态构成的,而且能发现可以通过影响一个人的想法而改变他的行为.教育者应该把儿童看成是拥有各种心理状态的、会思考的个体,在教育过程中提供相应的教育策略,帮助儿童成长为真正意义上的能思考、会反思的人.  相似文献   

20.
A number of studies have reported that most children with autism fail theory of mind tasks. It is unclear why certain children with autism pass such tests and what might be different about these subjects. In the present study, the role of age and verbal ability in theory of mind task performance was explored. Data were pooled from 70 autistic, 34 mentally handicapped, and 70 normal young subjects, previously tested for a number of different studies. The analysis suggested that children with autism required far higher verbal mental age to pass false belief tasks than did other subjects. While normally developing children had a 50% probability of passing both tasks at the verbal mental age of 4 years, autistic subjects took more than twice as long to reach this probability of success (at the advanced verbal mental age of 9-2). Possible causal relations between verbal ability and the ability to represent mental states are discussed.  相似文献   

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