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1.
Abstract

Kant held that the moral vocation of the human species was to strive toward moral perfection. But in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, he at least entertained as part of the human condition a rationalist version of the Christian doctrine of original sin: that human beings have a universal, innate and inextirpable propensity to evil. Are these two Kantian doctrines inconsistent, or at least in tension with each other? If they are, the tension is a creative one. This chapter will explain the Kantian doctrine of the radical human propensity to evil and relate it to Kant's theory of the acquisition of virtue and the struggle toward moral perfection. We will see that this struggle for Kant must be social, not merely individual, and that it involves both the development of moral character and the cultivation of empirical inclinations that harmonize with morality.  相似文献   

2.
Abstract

This paper considers the role of ‘vices of culture’ in Immanuel Kant’s account of radical evil and education. I argue that Kant was keenly aware of a uniquely human tendency to allow a self-centered concern for status to misunderstand or co-opt the language of dignity and equal worth for its own purposes. This tendency lies at the root of the ‘vices of culture’ and ‘aggravated vices’ that Kant describes in the Religion and Doctrine of Virtue, respectively. When it comes to moral education, then, it will be crucial that the developing agent have a clear understanding of the shared dignity of rational agents and the particular duties (e.g. gratitude and beneficence) that are defined, in part, by their tendency to alter (a different kind of) status among agents. I argue that the casuistical questions that Kant attaches to these discussions in the Doctrine of Virtue are an example of a pedagogical device that might help pupils to overcome this tendency so closely associated with radical evil.  相似文献   

3.
Abstract

Kant’s commitment to autonomy raises difficult questions about the very possibility of Kantian moral education, since appeal to external pedagogical guidance threatens to be in contradiction with autonomous virtue. Furthermore, moral education seems to involve getting good at something through repetition; but Kant seems to eschew the notion of repeated natural activity as antithetical to autonomy. Things become even trickier once we remember that Kant also views autonomous human beings as radically evil: we are capable of choosing rationally and autonomously, but, left to our own devices, that same capacity for reason might tempt us to choose only out of a concern to satisfy our happiness. We thus need a moral education which realizes autonomy while dodging the dual bullets of external natural forces and internal evil forces. Ultimately, his concerns about external natural forces and internal evil forces do not lead Kant to reject either moral education or a role for repeated activity in it. Rather, he advocates a carefully circumscribed appeal to repeated activities within a course of Socratic moral education focused on encouraging the student, subjectively and first-personally, to claim her autonomy, resulting in the cheerful and vigilant exercise of virtue as an aptitude.  相似文献   

4.
Abstract

To perfect human beings with an innate propensity for radical evil is a formidable task. Kant explicitly says that the propensity for evil is not eradicable; it is rooted in human nature, specifically in the human power of choice-making. The task is to reorient the natural order of choice-making (which derives its maxim from an object of the inclinations), to the moral order that takes the moral law as its supreme principle. I explicate the role of a specific capacity of the human subjective side of judging in this process; namely, of ‘mind’ in its sense as Gemüt. While human willing and choice-making are subject to the influence of sensuousness (the inclinations and passions), Gemüt is a capacity of sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) that allows the human subject to enjoy the feeling of being pleased in the fulfillment of duty. Its four specific aesthetic preliminary concepts of responsiveness to concepts of duty – moral feeling (as respect for the law), conscience, love of humanity, and respect for oneself (self-esteem) – must be cultivated in order to make objective practical reason also subjectively practical. Thereby one secures a bulwark against the ineliminable propensity for evil whose first effect is to destroy inner moral integrity.  相似文献   

5.
Abstract

This journal recently published a special issue on Kant, evil, moral perfection and education. The essays included in the special issue discussed the vulnerably and imperfection of human beings and the role of education as facilitating such beings in their pursuit of moral perfection. The contribution of this article is to put forward a Kantian idea of hope as a response to the difficulty of holding imperfect agents to an impossibly high standard (perfect virtue). Hope plays an enabling role for human agents, mediating the seemingly unstable relationship between imperfect moral agents, characterised by radical evil, and their duty to elevate themselves to the idea of moral perfection in an uncertain world. As such, hope can be seen as a response to the editors’ call to bring attention to the need to work with the vulnerabilities and imperfections of human beings through education and social change. One practical way in which education can accomplish this task is through role modelling. A further contribution of this article is to advocate a Kantian idea of impure role modelling (the role model as imperfect but hopeful).  相似文献   

6.
Abstract

In a note introduced into the second edition of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1794), Kant assigns a systematic role to the General Remarks at the end of each Part of his book. He calls those Remarks, “as it were, parerga to religion within the boundaries of pure reason; they do not belong within it yet border on it” (RGV 6:52). As Kant sees them, the parerga are only a “secondary occupation” that consists in removing transcendent obstacles. This paper is skeptical of Kant's view. It proposes an alternative account, according to which the parerga are essential to our moral education, since they force human reason to confront its own limitations and resist the urge to take refuge in spurious religious beliefs. That urge, I argue, is linked to the propensity to evil, and uses religious orthodoxy to undermine moral religion. By clipping our dogmatic wings, the parerga encourage reason to face its own dialectical tendencies and direct its speculative interest to immanent practical use. This redirection counteracts the debilitating effects of the propensity to evil and plays a key role in our moral regeneration. To consider the parerga “derivative,” as Kant himself does, is therefore a grave mistake.  相似文献   

7.
Abstract

In this essay, I try to make sense out of Kant’s unusual concept of grace, particularly as regards its uneasy relationship to education within the context of the effort to overcome evil. The key to the puzzle, I argue, lies in what I call ‘moral receptivity’. Part of education’s job is to make us morally receptive to grace by preparing us for its possibility.  相似文献   

8.
Abstract

This paper aims to show how Emerson provides a reworking of Kantian understandings of moral education in young children’s Bildung. The article begins and ends by thinking of Emersonian self-cultivation as a form of improvisatory or wild Bildung. It explores the role of Bildung and self-cultivation in preschools through a philosophy that accounts for children’s ‘Wild wisdom’ by letting Emerson speak to Kant. The paper argues that Kant’s vision of Bildung essentially involves reason’s turn upon itself and that Emerson, particularly in how he is taken up by Cavell, shows that such a turn is already present in the processes of children inheriting, learning, and improvising with language. This improvisatory outlook on moral education is contrasted with common goals of moral education prescribed in early childhood education where the Swedish Curriculum for the Preschool Lpfö 98 is used as an example.  相似文献   

9.
Abstract

Kant argues that we have a duty to perfect ourselves morally and promote the happiness of others. He also argues that we have an innate propensity to evil. Our duty to perfect ourselves suggests that we struggle with our innate propensity to wilfully deviate from doing our duty. And we do this when we struggle against the depravation of our heart, namely our propensity to reverse ‘the ethical order as regards the incentives of a free power of choice’, namely, our propensity to wilfully comply with the principle of self-love and override the moral law. It seems, however, that education does not enable those concerned to fulfil their duties. It seems, instead, that education basically makes them efficacious with regard to desired ends and with the devised means. It seems, too, that education does not necessarily make it possible for those concerned with duty to perfect themselves morally and help others to do the same, which in turn suggests that those concerned are not being enabled to make themselves ‘as conscientious as possible in [their] moral self-examination’. I argue that education ought to enable those concerned to cultivate their moral strength to do so and enable others to do the same.  相似文献   

10.
Abstract

How can school education best bring about moral improvement? Socrates believed that the unexamined life was not worth living and that the philosophical examination of life required a collaborative inquiry. Today, our society relegates responsibility for values to the personal sphere rather than the social one. I will argue that, overall, we need to give more emphasis to collaboration and inquiry rather than pitting students against each other and focusing too much attention on ‘teaching that’ instead of ‘teaching how’. I will argue that we need to include philosophy in the curriculum throughout the school years, and teach it through a collaborative inquiry which enables children to participate in an open society subject to reason. Such collaborative inquiry integrates personal responsibility with social values more effectively than sectarian and didactic religious education.  相似文献   

11.
Abstract

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant has been important in education theory, especially in the historical context of the Enlightenment and its legacies on contemporary understandings of global education. Particular reference is given to Kant’s writing on Enlightenment thinking and especially to his 1803 Über Pädagogik/Lectures on pedagogy whose groundwork tends to be thought from an empirical anthropology. This paper aims to question education, though from the perspective of a Kantian understanding of aesthetic experience, a perspective developed initially from my reading of Denis J. Schmidt’s Lyrical and Ethical Subjects (2005). In the Critique of Judgement (1986), Kant develops an ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’ that offers transcendental grounds for the possibility of aesthetic experience. In doing so, he discusses, somewhat briefly, training in the fine arts and even more briefly offers, somewhat indirectly, a far-reaching transcendental ground for pedagogy. It is these two brief accounts that form the substance of this paper, requiring a somewhat extended introduction to Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement in order to develop its analysis. From this analysis, two key questions arise: if fine art cannot be learned, and if imitation would ultimately aim at producing an objectively determinable rule—via a determinable concept—for the production of art works, how does one proceed with education in the fine arts? And, secondly, as a corollary, if genius is reserved for precisely what cannot be learned but yet can be conceived and communicated, what possible purpose is served by aesthetic ideas with respect to cognition itself?  相似文献   

12.
文章通过荀子与康德人性观的比较,指出两者的差异性在于:荀子认为,人性本恶,"化性起伪"的过程,就是性恶被人自身克服的过程,人性可以由恶转善,特别强调后天社会环境对人性的教育和改造的作用,主张通过圣人来制定礼义;康德的道德实现是建立在自由意志之上,他认为,人性是由自由意志决定的,是善恶相互调和的历史过程,人性的实现是善对恶的拯救过程。这两种人性观造成了中西人格特征的基本差异。  相似文献   

13.
ABSTRACT

Wisdom, long a topic of interest to moral philosophers, is increasingly the focus of social science research. Philosophers have historically been concerned to develop a rationally defensible account of the nature of wisdom and its role in the moral life, often inspired in various ways by virtue theoretical accounts of practical wisdom (phronesis). Wisdom scientists seek to, among other things, define wisdom and its components so that we can measure them. Are the measures used by wisdom scientists actually measuring what philosophers have in mind when they discuss practical wisdom? I argue that they are not. Contemporary measures of wisdom and its components may pick out some necessary prerequisites of practical wisdom, but they do not measure a philosophically plausible practical wisdom or its components. After explaining the argument and defending it against objections, I consider its implications. Should wisdom scientists ignore the philosophical conception of practical wisdom in favor of other conceptions, revise their methods to try to measure it, or continue the interdisciplinary study of practical wisdom without expecting to measure it? I make a preliminary argument for the third option.  相似文献   

14.
Moral Motivation     
Abstract:

It is claimed that there is a highly contingent and often misleading relationship between (a) giving reasons on a questionnaire and (b) genuine moral understanding. Also, many of the causal factors in shaping moral attitudes are irrelevant to their rational‐moral justification, thus creating a lack of harmony between the two. The solution is a balanced programme that gives equal stress to moral reasoning and to opportunities for relevant emotive and evaluative experience. Aspects of Kant and Schopenhauer are discussed in order to show how reason and feeling may be constructively interdependent in moral motivation.  相似文献   

15.
ABSTRACT

This paper critiques the idea that secular education policy can neutrally recognise children’s non/religious identities at school. It also empirically analyses how one child becomes restricted by, and eludes, classed, gendered and adult-centred moral codes enacted through local school recognition. The concept of policy assemblage is first used to problematise postsecular, market-led enactments of non/religious school community recognition transnationally. I argue postsecular policy enactments in Ireland and elsewhere produce viable and non-viable forms of non/religious school community, thus containing, rather than facilitating school plurality and (re)creating social hierarchies. However, drawing on Deleuzian ideas of becoming and partial objects, I argue children are not determined by the sense-making moral codes of the policy assemblage. To demonstrate this argument, I map instances of how one girl alters and eludes the meanings of austerity, choice and authenticity moral codes. I do not privilege this girl as an example of child resistance, as I argue against using children as barometers of policy authority and secularist authenticity. Instead, I contend that alongside naming and opposing policy’s unjust effects, we need to cultivate attention to our capacity to affect and be affected by the partial objects (e.g. moral codes) and becomings of postsecular neoliberal policy assemblages.  相似文献   

16.
This paper examines an issue of recent Kant scholarship on education: the supposed disconnect between his theory of morals and his theory of character. While the debate is often couched in terms of Kant’s ‘phenomenal–noumenal’ distinction, or the distinction between moral theory and culture, I follow scholarship suggesting the best way to understand Kant’s distinction is by following his account of the ‘conduct of thought.’ Doing so demonstrates the Lectures on Logic and particularly, his account of prejudice, as playing a large role in the articulation of what it is to think subjectively. We also see the importance of conducting our thinking from the subjective standpoint to an objective (moral) one in order to fulfill our obligations to both think and act morally.  相似文献   

17.
任丑 《教育学报》2007,3(4):77-82
康德认为，纯粹德性是人类的本性，它要求出于义务来遵守，而且是趋向于善的唯一动机，因此是可教的。这就是对道德教育的方法如何可能的问题的回答。在此基础上，康德提出了他的道德教育方法：道德判断力的训练、敬重义务的训练、合道德性的道德教育程序的建构、伦理共同体的联合等。康德的这一思想，给我们进行道德教育以如下几个方面的启迪：注重道德教育方式本身的道德性，进行以德性为目的的榜样教育，发挥感性实践的重要作用，以自由和谐丰富集体主义道德原则的内涵，培育自由的道德人。  相似文献   

18.
在康德哲学特别是在其道德哲学中,＂实践理性＂是一个基础性的概念,在通常的理解模式中,人们会将其与＂思辨理性＂来进行对照性的理解。然而,这往往致使我们忽视了＂实践理性＂概念在康德道德哲学内部所具有的独立特征和丰富意蕴。因此,该文将视线集中于这一概念自身,厘清出它的三重基本维度：内在、先验和超验,并从中梳理出康德进行实践理性论证所展现出来的自由的理念（意志自由）——自由的法则（道德法则）——自由的世界（道德王国）的逻辑线索,在深化对实践理性自身理解的同时,勾勒出康德道德哲学体系的全景。  相似文献   

19.
Relational equality is broadly understood to be about relating to others as moral equals. I consider three questions of relational equality as applied to education: what, how, and why? Relational equality is important on a macro (societal) level, a meso (school) level structuring of relationships, and a micro (interpersonal relationships) level. I focus on micro level relational equality in schools, and connect theoretical perspectives from two neighbouring fields: education and humanistic counselling, suggesting that we might usefully draw on theory from humanistic counselling to inform our understanding of how egalitarian interpersonal relationships might manifest in education. I emphasise the importance of considering what we are trying to communicate through our behaviour and suggest that in order to treat someone as a moral equal, educators should work towards communicating empathy, unconditional positive regard, and congruence. Such an understanding gives a clearer focus for increasing equality than broader understandings of relational equality, and greater scope for challenging inequality than distributive accounts.  相似文献   

20.
Abstract

What do we mean when we say we want to put children at the centre of policy? What are the moral justifications for this approach? Has it become harder for us to understand this concept, when in practice paid work has been at the centre? In part confusion arises because the unpaid work of caring for children is invisible until it is marketized. In turn, the underlying problem is that we have forgotten our traditions of egalitarianism and adopted a powerful mindset that is proving to be paralyzing. Exploring New Zealand family policies such as paid parental leave (PPL), early childhood education, child tax credits (CTC) suggests that there is much room for improvement if the needs of children are to come first. But first and foremost we must have a very different, child-centric, colour-blind, non-judgmental change of heart.  相似文献   

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