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1.
Children (3.5–8.5 years; = 105) heard claims about the occurrence of improbable or impossible events, then were asked whether the events could really happen. Some claims were based on informants' first‐hand observations and others were hearsay. A baseline group (= 56) reported their beliefs about these events without hearing testimony. Neither first‐hand claims nor hearsay influenced beliefs about impossible events, which remained low across the age range. Hearsay (but not first‐hand claims) did influence beliefs about improbable events. Preschoolers expressed greater belief following hearsay, compared to their beliefs following first‐hand claims and compared to the baseline group's beliefs. By contrast, older children expressed less belief following hearsay, compared to their beliefs following first‐hand claims and compared to the baseline group's beliefs.  相似文献   

2.
Existing evidence suggests that children, when they first pass standard theory‐of‐mind tasks, still fail to understand the essential aspectuality of beliefs and other propositional attitudes: such attitudes refer to objects only under specific aspects. Oedipus, for example, believes Yocaste (his mother) is beautiful, but this does not imply that he believes his mother is beautiful. In three experiments, 3‐ to 6‐year‐olds' (N = 119) understanding of aspectuality was tested with a novel, radically simplified task. In contrast to all previous findings, this task was as difficult as and highly correlated with a standard false belief task. This suggests that a conceptual capacity more unified than previously assumed emerges around ages 4–5, a full‐fledged metarepresentational scheme of propositional attitudes.  相似文献   

3.
An important part of children's social and cognitive development is their understanding that people are psychological beings with internal, mental states including desire, intention, perception, and belief. A full understanding of people as psychological beings requires a representational theory of mind (ToM), which is an understanding that mental states can faithfully represent reality, or misrepresent reality. For the last 35 years, researchers have relied on false-belief tasks as the gold standard to test children's understanding that beliefs can misrepresent reality. In false-belief tasks, children are asked to reason about the behavior of agents who have false beliefs about situations. Although a large body of evidence indicates that most children pass false-belief tasks by the end of the preschool years, the evidence we present in this monograph suggests that most children do not understand false beliefs or, surprisingly, even true beliefs until middle childhood. We argue that young children pass false-belief tasks without understanding false beliefs by using perceptual access reasoning (PAR). With PAR, children understand that seeing leads to knowing in the moment, but not that knowing also arises from thinking or persists as memory and belief after the situation changes. By the same token, PAR leads children to fail true-belief tasks. PAR theory can account for performance on other traditional tests of representational ToM and related tasks, and can account for the factors that have been found to correlate with or affect both true- and false-belief performance. The theory provides a new laboratory measure which we label the belief understanding scale (BUS). This scale can distinguish between a child who is operating with PAR versus a child who is understanding beliefs. This scale provides a method needed to allow the study of the development of representational ToM. In this monograph, we report the outcome of the tests that we have conducted of predictions generated by PAR theory. The findings demonstrated signature PAR limitations in reasoning about the mind during the ages when children are hypothesized to be using PAR. In Chapter II, secondary analyses of the published true-belief literature revealed that children failed several types of true-belief tasks. Chapters III through IX describe new empirical data collected across multiple studies between 2003 and 2014 from 580 children aged 4–7 years, as well as from a small sample of 14 adults. Participants were recruited from the Phoenix, Arizona metropolitan area. All participants were native English-speakers. Children were recruited from university-sponsored and community preschools and daycare centers, and from hospital maternity wards. Adults were university students who participated to partially fulfill course requirements for research participation. Sociometric data were collected only in Chapter IX, and are fully reported there. In Chapter III, minor alterations in task procedures produced wide variations in children's performance in 3-option false-belief tasks. In Chapter IV, we report findings which show that the developmental lag between children's understanding ignorance and understanding false belief is longer than the lag reported in previous studies. In Chapter V, children did not distinguish between agents who have false beliefs versus agents who have no beliefs. In Chapter VI, findings showed that children found it no easier to reason about true beliefs than to reason about false beliefs. In Chapter VII, when children were asked to justify their correct answers in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. Similarly, in Chapter VIII, when children were asked to explain agents’ actions in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. In Chapter IX, children who were identified as using PAR differed from children who understood beliefs along three dimensions—in levels of social development, inhibitory control, and kindergarten adjustment. Although the findings need replication and additional studies of alternative interpretations, the collection of results reported in this monograph challenges the prevailing view that representational ToM is in place by the end of the preschool years. Furthermore, the pattern of findings is consistent with the proposal that PAR is the developmental precursor of representational ToM. The current findings also raise questions about claims that infants and toddlers demonstrate ToM-related abilities, and that representational ToM is innate.  相似文献   

4.
Numerous studies have investigated children's abilities to attribute mental states, but few have examined their ability to recruit these abilities in social interactions. Here, 6‐year‐olds (N = 104) were tested on whether they can use first‐ and second‐order false‐belief understanding to coordinate with peers. Children adjusted their decisions in a coordination game in response to either their partner's erroneous belief or their partner's erroneous belief about their own belief—a result that contrasts with previous findings on the use of higher order “theory of mind” (TOM) reasoning at this age. Six‐year‐olds are thus able to use their higher order TOM capacities for peer coordination, which marks an important achievement in becoming competent social collaborators.  相似文献   

5.
A novel task, using a continuous spatial layout, was created to investigate the degree to which (in centimeters) 3‐year‐old children's (= 63), 5‐year‐old children's (= 60), and adults' (= 60) own privileged knowledge of the location of an object biased their representation of a protagonist's false belief about the object's location. At all ages, participants' knowledge of the object's actual location biased their search estimates, independent of the attentional or memory demands of the task. Children's degree of bias correlated with their performance on a classic change‐of‐location false belief task, controlling for age. This task is a novel tool for providing a quantitative measurement of the degree to which self‐knowledge can bias estimates of others' beliefs.  相似文献   

6.
It is widely believed that race divides the world into biologically distinct kinds of people—an essentialist belief inconsistent with reality. Essentialist views of race have been described as early emerging, but this study found that young children (= 203, Mage = 5.45) hold only the more limited belief that the physical feature of skin color is inherited and stable. Overall, children rejected the causal essentialist view that behavioral and psychological characteristics are constrained by an inherited racial essence. Although average levels of children's causal essentialist beliefs about race were low, variation in these beliefs was related to children's own group membership, exposure to diversity, as well as children's own social attitudes.  相似文献   

7.
Two studies (conducted in 2013) examined whether elementary‐aged children endorse a within‐gender stereotype about sexualized girls. In Study 1, children (= 208) ages 6–11 rated sexualized girls as more popular but less intelligent, athletic, and nice compared to nonsexualized girls. These distinctions were stronger for girls and older children, and in accordance with our developmental intergroup theoretical framework, were related to children's cognitive development and media exposure. Study 2 (= 155) replicated the previous findings using more ecologically valid and realistic images of girls and further explored individual differences in the endorsement of the sexualized girl stereotype. Additional results indicated that the belief that girls should be appearance focused predicted their endorsement of the sexualized girl stereotype.  相似文献   

8.
This study investigated the relation between theory of mind (ToM) and metamemory knowledge using a training methodology. Sixty‐two 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children were recruited and randomly assigned to one of two training conditions: A first‐order false belief (ToM) and a control condition. Intervention and control groups were equivalent at pretest for age, parents' education, verbal ability, inhibition, and ToM. Results showed that after the intervention children in the ToM group improved in their first‐order false belief understanding significantly more than children in the control condition. Crucially, the positive effect of the ToM intervention was stable over 2 months and generalized to more complex ToM tasks and metamemory.  相似文献   

9.
This research introduces a new construct, gender‐based relationship efficacy, which refers to beliefs about one's ability to relate to own‐ and other‐gender peers. Study 1 investigated 204 fourth graders (M age = 9.56) and confirmed that own‐gender and other‐gender relationship efficacy represent distinguishable aspects of preadolescents' social competency beliefs that are differentially related to outcomes with own‐ and other‐gender peers, including outcome expectancies and friendships with own‐ and other‐gender peers. Study 2 provided further evidence of the distinctiveness of relationship efficacy for own‐ and other‐gender peers among 403 seventh (M age = 12.48) and 453 eighth (M age = 13.50) graders and found gender and age differences. Developmental changes and implications for research on intergroup relationships are discussed.  相似文献   

10.
It is widely believed that exploration is a mechanism for young children's learning. The present investigation examines preschoolers’ beliefs about how learning occurs. We asked 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds to articulate how characters in a set of stories learned about a new toy. Younger preschoolers were more likely to overemphasize the role of characters’ actions in learning than older children were (Experiment 1, N = 53). Overall performance improved when the stories explicitly stated that characters were originally ignorant and clarified the characters’ actions, but general developmental trends remained (Experiment 2, N = 48). These data suggest that explicit metacognitive understanding of the relation between actions and learning is developing during the preschool years, which might have implications for how children learn from exploration.  相似文献   

11.
Belief revision can occur at multiple levels of abstraction, including lower-level and higher-order beliefs. It remains unclear, however, how conflicting evidence interacts with prior beliefs to encourage higher-order belief revision. This study explores how 4- and 5-year-olds (= 96) respond to evidence that directly conflicts with their causal higher-order beliefs. When shown a single event that directly violated a strongly supported prior belief, preschoolers largely maintained their initial higher-order belief. However, when the prior belief was more weakly supported and the counterevidence was stronger, children changed their minds. These findings indicate that young children can revise their higher-order beliefs and, furthermore, do so depending on the strength of both the evidence and their prior beliefs.  相似文献   

12.
Three experiments (= 130) used a minimal group manipulation to show that just perceived membership in a social group boosts young children's motivation for and learning from group‐relevant tasks. In Experiment 1, 4‐year‐old children assigned to a minimal “puzzles group” persisted longer on a challenging puzzle than children identified as the “puzzles child” or children in a control condition. Experiment 2 showed that this boost in motivation occurred only when the group was associated with the task. In Experiment 3, children assigned to a minimal group associated with word learning learned more words than children assigned an analogous individual identity. The studies demonstrate that fostering shared motivations may be a powerful means by which to shape young children's academic outcomes.  相似文献   

13.
Despite evidence that young children are sensitive to differences in angle measure, older students frequently struggle to grasp this important mathematical concept. When making judgments about the size of angles, children often rely on erroneous dimensions such as the length of the angles' sides. The present study tested the possibility that this misconception stems from the whole‐object word‐learning bias by providing a subset of children with a separate label to refer to the whole angle figure. Thirty preschoolers (= 4.86 years, SD = .53) were tested with a pretest–training–posttest design. At pretest, children showed evidence of the whole‐object misconception. After training, children who were given a novel‐word label for the whole object improved significantly more than those trained on the meaning of “angle” alone.  相似文献   

14.
Children's (5‐, 7‐ to 8‐, and 10‐ to 11‐year‐olds), and adolescents’ (13‐ to 14‐year‐olds) judgments and reasoning about same‐sex romantic relationships were examined (N = 128). Participants’ beliefs about the acceptability and legal regulation of these relationships were assessed, along with their judgments and beliefs about excluding someone because of his or her sexual orientation and the origins of same‐sex attraction. Older participants evaluated same‐sex romantic relationships more positively and used more references to personal choice and justice/discrimination reasoning to support their judgments. Younger participants were less critical of a law prohibiting same‐sex relationships and were more likely to believe it was not acceptable to violate this law. Beliefs about origins of same‐sex attraction showed age‐specific patterns in their associations with evaluations.  相似文献   

15.
The present study compared 5‐ and 10‐year‐old North American and Israeli children's beliefs about the objectivity of different categories (= 109). Children saw picture triads composed of two exemplars of the same category (e.g., two women) and an exemplar of a contrasting category (e.g., a man). Children were asked whether it would be acceptable or wrong for people in a different country to consider contrasting exemplars to be the same kind. It was found that children from both countries viewed gender as objectively correct and occupation as flexible. The findings regarding race and ethnicity differed in the two countries, revealing how an essentialist bias interacts with cultural input in directing children's conceptualization of social groups.  相似文献   

16.
When tested in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm, children typically exhibit fewer false memories than do adolescents or adults. Here, participants’ moods and the valence of word lists were manipulated to explore the mechanism responsible for this developmental reversal in memory performance. Children (7‐ to 8‐year‐olds), adolescents (11‐ to 12‐year‐olds), and young adults (18‐ to 22‐year‐olds; N = 270) were assigned to one of three induced mood conditions and were presented with emotional word lists. In negative moods, adolescents and adults falsely recalled more negative information than did children, showing the typical developmental reversal effect. This effect, however, was eliminated when participants were in positive moods. The findings provide support for associative‐activation theory and have important implications for our understanding of the development of emotional false memories.  相似文献   

17.
The development of self‐regulation has been studied primarily in Western middle‐class contexts and has, therefore, neglected what is known about culturally varying self‐concepts and socialization strategies. The research reported here compared the self‐regulatory competencies of German middle‐class (= 125) and rural Cameroonian Nso preschoolers (= 76) using the Marshmallow test (Mischel, 2014). Study 1 revealed that 4‐year‐old Nso children showed better delay‐of‐gratification performance than their German peers. Study 2 revealed that culture‐specific maternal socialization goals and interaction behaviors were related to delay‐of‐gratification performance. Nso mothers’ focus on hierarchical relational socialization goals and responsive control seems to support children's delay‐of‐gratification performance more than German middle‐class mothers’ emphasis on psychological autonomous socialization goals and sensitive, child‐centered parenting.  相似文献   

18.
Adults implicitly judge people from certain social backgrounds as more “American” than others. This study tests the development of children's reasoning about nationality and social categories. Children across cultures (White and Korean American children in the United States, Korean children in South Korea) judged the nationality of individuals varying in race and language. Across cultures, 5‐ to 6‐year‐old children (= 100) categorized English speakers as “American” and Korean speakers as “Korean” regardless of race, suggesting that young children prioritize language over race when thinking about nationality. Nine‐ and 10‐year‐olds (= 181) attended to language and race and their nationality judgments varied across cultures. These results suggest that associations between nationality and social category membership emerge early in life and are shaped by cultural context.  相似文献   

19.
Children’s naive theories include misconceptions which can interfere with science learning. This research examined the effect of pairing anomalies with alternative theories, and their order of presentation, on children’s belief revision. Children believe that heavy objects sink and light ones float. In a pre-, mid-, and post-test design, 5-year-olds (N = 96) were assigned to one of two conditions, where they were either exposed to an alternative theory about buoyancy and then observed anomalies (Explanation-First), or the reverse (Anomalies-First). At mid-test, children were more likely to revise their beliefs after exposure to an alternative theory than anomalies alone. At post-test, children revised their naïve belief when they had access to an alternative theory before the anomalous evidence than in the opposite order.  相似文献   

20.
Research Findings: We examined associations among Anglo acculturation, Latino enculturation, maternal beliefs, mother–child emotion talk, and emotion understanding in 40 Latino preschool-age children and their mothers. Mothers self-reported Anglo acculturation, Latino enculturation, and beliefs about the value/danger of children's emotions and parent/child roles in emotion socialization. Mother–child emotion talk was observed during a Lego storytelling task. Children's emotion understanding was measured using 2 age-appropriate tasks. Correlations showed that mothers' Latino enculturation was associated with mothers' stronger belief in guiding children's emotions and children's lower emotion understanding. Anglo acculturation was associated with mothers' lower belief that emotions can be dangerous and children's better emotion understanding. Mothers with a stronger belief in guiding children's emotions more frequently labeled emotions. Mothers with a stronger belief that emotions can be dangerous less frequently explained emotions. Regressions controlling for child age and maternal education demonstrated that mothers with a stronger belief that children can learn about emotions on their own and mothers with greater Latino enculturation had children with lower emotion understanding, whereas mothers with greater Anglo acculturation had children with better emotion understanding. Practice or Policy: Results suggest that understanding both family acculturation and family enculturation will be helpful for early childhood researchers and educators seeking to assess and promote children's socioemotional development.  相似文献   

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