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1.
Professor Whitty has endorsed the consensus that research into education is empirical social science, distinguishing ‘educational research’ which seeks directly to influence practice, and ‘education research’ that has substantive value but no necessary practical application. The status of the science here is problematic. The positivist approach is incoherent and so supports neither option. Critical educational science is virtually policy‐inert. The interpretive approach is empirically sound but, because of the value component in education, does not support education research either, or account for this component. A solution to the latter problem is sought in the debate between Carr and Hirst on the relationship between philosophy and education. This shows Carr making claims that rely on a conception of philosophy that he rejects, while Hirst insists on this conception, uses it to justify practical claims, but denies that this is possible. To achieve a practically relevant analysis of educational research, both need to include second‐order, normative, conceptual enquiry into the philosophies that drive educational policy‐making and partly regulate teaching methodology. Deweyan, first‐order, ‘reflective practice’ needs, then, to be supplemented with second‐order reflection. Educational research is philosophy‐ not science‐driven, and is value‐led. Consequently, it has the status not of scientific discovery but of practical recommendation.  相似文献   

2.
This symposium begins with a critique by Paul Hirst of Wilfred Carr's 'Philosophy and Education' (Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2004, 38.1) , where Carr argues that philosophy of education should be concerned with 'practical philosophy' rather than 'theoretical philosophy'. Hirst argues that the philosophy of education is best understood as a distinctive area of academic philosophy, in which the exercise of theoretical reason contributes critically to the development of rational educational practices and their discourse. While he acknowledges that these practices and their discourse must of their nature be directly developed in the exercise of practical reason, or phronesis, the notion of 'practical philosophy' is rejected as ultimately incoherent and illusory. In his reply to Hirst's critique, Carr identifies three central claims in Hirst's argument and takes issue with each of these. He reaffirms the need to draw upon the resources afforded by the Aristotelian tradition of practical philosophy in order to identify inadequacies in our present understanding of how philosophy is related to education. He suggests that it is only through bringing their own 'prejudices' into critical confrontation with this tradition that philosophers of education will be able to assess whether practical philosophy is incoherent and illusory, as Hirst claims, or whether it is indispensable to the future development of their discipline. In a rejoinder to Carr, Hirst, defends the claim that philosophy of education is a social practice concerned with developing justifiable propositional accounts of the conceptual relations, justificatory procedures and presuppositions of educational practices. He rejects the argument that this 'theoretical philosophy' approach must be replaced by that of a new 'practical philosophy'.  相似文献   

3.
This article examines the benefits and burdens of the debate between Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr over a set of issues to do with philosophy and education specifically and theory and practice more generally. Hirst and Carr, in different ways, emphasise the importance of Aristotelian practical philosophy as an antidote to the theory‐oriented confined method of ‘conceptual analysis’ that has haunted the philosophy of education. Despite their proper recognition of the irreducible character of practice to theory, they fail to provide a satisfying account of their interpenetrating relation. Hirst falls into error by fencing off ‘forms of theoretical knowledge’ from ‘forms of practice’; Carr's dismissive attitude to theory is saturated with internal tensions in his own discourse. This article contends that what is left unaddressed both in Hirst's and Carr's arguments is the most fundamental sense of ‘social’, which is prior to relative differences in the standards of knowledge among societies and which reminds us that theory is not a socially disembodied enterprise. A lively appreciation of this point encourages us to see the prevailing outlook towards the relation between philosophy and education quite differently.  相似文献   

4.
When Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr squared up to each other a few years ago on the issue of the role of philosophical theory in educational practice, it became clear that theory itself had become a troubled term. The very fact that Wilfred Carr could argue for the end of educational theory recalls Paul Feyerabend's fiery argument for the end of theory in natural science and simply deepened the attack that had already appeared in Carr and Kemmis's book, Becoming Critical (1986). In response, Hirst insisted that theory, and particularly the philosophical theory of education, should be defined as a discrete area of study in itself, governed and structured by the axioms of logic. In this way, he argued, the philosophy of education would be no different from philosophy in general (at least in its analytic formulation). Carr, on the other hand, preferred to consider educational theory as a flexible event that took its shape from the landscape explored, and hence precisely not the kind of study that Hirst supported, but one based in action research and reflective practitioner experience. This debate is as yet unresolved. In this piece I begin by making several remarks about the current context for raising the question Hirst and Carr address, and I go on to consider other possible understandings of theoria in a Greek sense before developing this idea through a reading of Aristotle. I eventually conclude that each of the protagonists in the debate has taken a step too far.  相似文献   

5.
This article initially provides a brief overview of virtue epistemology; it thereafter considers some possible ramifications of this branch of the theory of knowledge for the philosophy of education. The main features of three different manifestations of virtue epistemology are first explained. Importantly, it is then maintained that developments in virtue epistemology may offer the resources to critique aspects of the debate between Hirst and Carr about how the philosophy of education ought to be carried out and by whom. Wilfred Carr's position—that educational practitioners have privileged access to philosophical knowledge about teaching practice—will in particular be questioned. It will be argued that Carr's view rests on a form of epistemology, internalism, which places unreasonably narrow restrictions upon the range of actors and ways, in which philosophical knowledge of and/or for education might be achieved. In declaring that practical wisdom regarding teaching is ‘entirely dependent’ on practitioner reflection, Carr not only radically deviates from Aristotle's notion of practical wisdom, he also, in effect, renders redundant all philosophical research about education that is not initiated by teachers in this manner. It is concluded that Aristotle's general approach to acquiring information and knowledge about the world might yet still offer a foundation for a more comprehensive philosophy of education; one that makes clear that the professional testimony and reflection of teachers, observation of teaching practice, and already existing educational philosophy, theory and policy can all be perceived as potentially valuable sources of philosophical knowledge of and for education.  相似文献   

6.
Trevor H. Maddock 《Interchange》1997,28(2-3):171-182
A recent attempt to answer questions on the scientific status of education draws on the thoughts of Jürgen Habermas. There is a tension in Habermas's work because he consigns scientific endeavour to the realm of instrumental action, while attempting to base his theory of communication on scientific results. This suggests that either his theory is wrong and science is not merely instrumental, or that his recent proposals mistake manipulation for understanding. This proposition is considered by examining the work of Wilfred Carr, who has taken up the ideas of Habermas. Carr interprets and develops Habermas's theory within an analytical framework, situating it in relation to recent developments in the philosophy of education and philosophy more generally, bringing new light on the relationship between critical theory and education, and overcoming certain limitations of previous scientific characterisations. However, it is argued here that Habermas's idea of science is too abstract to provide a sufficiently complex grounding for substantive, socially liberating, educational practise.  相似文献   

7.
上个世纪,英国学者彼得斯带动了分析的教育哲学传统,不仅影响教育哲学,也带动了教育理论的发展。其中,赫斯特扮演着重要的角色。他与奥康纳对教育理论之辩,尤为人所称道。奥康纳致力于将教育理论带往科学理论。前期,赫斯特认为教育理论是实践理论,迥异于科学理论,教育理论应该以其他学门知识的型式、领域为基础,而建构出有助于指导教育实践的原理;后期,赫斯特则更为重视隐而未现的实践意义,修正前期过于重视理性知识的立场。重审赫斯特、奥康纳之辩以及赫斯特前后期立场,将有助于我们理解教育哲学重点在于证成教育政策及开拓新的思考方式,量化研究成果在于拓展新知,质性研究则在于对实践智慧的探究。赫斯特后期念兹在兹于缄默之知等实践知识,哲学论证、量化研究、质性分析都应将之列入重要探索领域,必能有助于教育理论的精进。  相似文献   

8.
Abstract

This article will derive a definition and account of the physically educated person, through an examination of the philosophy of Andrew Reid, Richard Peters and Aristotle. Initially, Reid’s interpretation of Peters’ views about the educational significance of practical knowledge (and physical education) will be considered. While it will be acknowledged that Peters was rather disparaging about the educational merit of some practical activities in Ethics and Education, it will be argued that he elsewhere suggests that such practical activities could be educationally worthwhile in and of themselves. In Education and the educated man he specified that practical activities should be regarded as educationally important if they are either transformed by theoretical understanding and/or pursued to the point of excellence. In suggesting that education involves the cultivation of both theoretical and practical human excellences it is argued that Peters’ philosophy of education begins to take on a more Aristotelian bent. After exploring Aristotle’s notion of virtue (human excellence) and his discussion of physical training in The politics, it is claimed that physical education activities might be most worthwhile when they extend the moral habits and/or modes of thought of pupils, towards excellence. It is concluded that physically educated persons should be defined as those who have learned to arrange their lives in such a way that the physical activities they freely engage in make a distinctive contribution to their long-term flourishing.  相似文献   

9.
In this interview with Harvey Siegel, Israel Scheffler reflects on his career in philosophy of education. Beginning with his unusual entry into the field, he discusses the connections between his own early projects and that of R. S. Peters and Paul Hirst to make philisophy a central part of teacher education programmes, and articulates his view of the importance of general philosophy for work in philosophy of education. He reaffirms his longstanding commitment to the central importance of rationality in education, and reconsiders the fact/value distinction and the place of analysis in philosophy of education. He discusses the enduring legacy of Dewey, and assesses changing trends in the philosophy of education and the current state of the subject.  相似文献   

10.
In this essay, Mark Jonas argues that there are three broadly held misconceptions of Plato's philosophy that work against his relevance for contemporary moral education. The first is that he is an intellectualist who is concerned only with the cognitive aspect of moral development and does not sufficiently emphasize the affective and conative aspects; the second is that he is an elitist who believes that only philosopher‐kings can attain true knowledge of virtue and it is they who should govern society; the third is that he affirms the realm of the Forms as a literal metaphysical reality and believes that for individuals to attain virtue they must access this realm through contemplation. The goal of this essay is to correct these misconceptions. The rehabilitation of Plato's reputation may enable future researchers in moral education to discover in his philosophy new avenues for exploring how best to cultivate virtues in students.  相似文献   

11.
What does it mean to educate for self‐awareness? How does this fit within education, with its other objectives, and other learning processes? These are key questions for more comprehensive versions of the mindful education movement. In order to provide some responses to these questions from a cohesive philosophical position, this article examines the philosophy of education of Mori Akira (1915–1976). It closely analyses his philosophy of self‐awareness (jikaku), while drawing comparisons with other Kyoto School philosophers. In order to fully understand Mori's particular conception of self‐awareness, it traces how this idea developed throughout his entire career: from his first book, The Philosophical Quest for Educational Ideals (1948), which focusses on the questing self‐awareness of the teacher, to the early–middle period (particularly The Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 1955, and Philosophical Anthropology of Education, 1961), which develops a systematic view of the self‐awareness of students, and to his final book, The Fundamental Principles of Human Formation (1977), which re‐examines generativity in light of uncertainty and death. What this trajectory shows is a view of education centred on self‐awareness and dynamically wrestling with key educational paradoxes, potentially deepening the philosophical grounding of mindful education.  相似文献   

12.
In this article I discuss the philosophy of John MacMurray, and in particular, his little‐examined writings on discipline and emotion education. It is argued that discipline is a vital element in the emotion education MacMurray thought central to learning to be human, because for him it takes concerted effort to overcome the human tendency toward egocentricity. It is maintained that MacMurray's philosophy of education is of contemporary significance for at least two reasons. On the one hand it suggests an alternative vision for humanistic education. While liberal educationists such as Oakeshott and Peters stressed that the pursuit of knowledge and understanding was the main way in which persons could develop their humanity MacMurray instead emphasised that persons can only learn to become human by pursuing other‐centred relationships. On the other hand his philosophy can also reveal the limitations in much contemporary debate in emotion education which critics (such as Ecclestone and Clack) suggest increasingly aims at little more than helping pupils feel better about themselves. According to MacMurray a genuine emotion education can enlarge humanity by supporting persons to feel and act for the sake of others rather than think about themselves. Despite sympathy for MacMurray's account of the purposes of education it is nonetheless concluded that the pursuit of knowledge as an end in itself does not necessarily constitute a negative expression of human agency (as MacMurray asserts)—but rather that the disciplined pursuit of knowledge may also form part of any education concerned to enrich human life.  相似文献   

13.
Abstract

Paul Hirst claimed that Richard Peters ‘revolutionised philosophy of education’. This does not accord with my experience in the Antipodean periphery. My experience of the work of Wittgenstein, Austin and Kovesi before reading Peters and Dewey, Kuhn and Toulmin subsequently meant that Peters was a major but not revolutionary figure in my understanding of philosophy of education.  相似文献   

14.
This paper is the second of two parts and continues the conversation which had called for a shift in the conceptual focus of science education towards philosophy of education, with the requirement to develop a discipline-specific “philosophy” of science education. In Part I, conflicting conceptions of science literacy were identified with disparate “visions” tied to competing research programs as well as school-based curricular paradigms. The impasse in the goals of science education and thereto, the contending views of science literacy, were themselves associated with three underlying fundamental aims of education (knowledge-itself; personal development; socialization) which, it was argued, usually undercut the potential of each other. During periods of “crisis-talk” and throughout science educational history these three aims have repeatedly attempted to assert themselves. The inability of science education research to affect long-term change in classrooms was correlated not only to the failure to reach a consensus on the aims (due to competing programs and to the educational ideologies of their social groups), but especially to the failure of developing true educational theories (largely neglected since Hirst). Such theories, especially metatheories, could serve to reinforce science education’s growing sense of academic autonomy and independence from socio-economic demands. In Part II, I offer as a suggestion Egan’s cultural-linguistic theory as a metatheory to help resolve the impasse. I hope to make reformers familiar with his important ideas in general, and more specifically, to show how they can complement HPS rationales and reinforce the work of those researchers who have emphasized the value of narrative in learning science.  相似文献   

15.
While Kant's pedagogical lectures present an account of moral education, his theory of freedom and morality seems to leave no room for the possibility of an education for freedom and morality. In this paper, it is first shown that Kant's moral philosophy and his educational philosophy are developed within different theoretical paradigms: whereas the former is situated within a transcendentalist framework, the latter relies on a teleological notion of human nature. The second part of this paper demonstrates that the core ideas of Kant's moral philosophy are also present in his pedagogy. This means that the problem of moral education must be solved within the transcendentalist framework. It is finally claimed that Kant himself outlines a solution to this problem in his pedagogical lectures.  相似文献   

16.
赫尔巴特的教育学理论使教育学成为一门独立的学科,并由此建立了一个严密完整的教育学体系。他的理论体系是建立在他的实践哲学（伦理学）和心理学基础上的。无疑,这将有助于我们更好的理解和继承他的教育思想。  相似文献   

17.
In his 2001 article ‘Teaching to Lie and Obey: Nietzsche on Education’, Stefan Ramaekers defends Nietzsche's concept of perspectivism against the charge that it is relativistic. He argues that perspectivism is not relativistic because it denies the dichotomy between the ‘true’ world and the ‘seeming’ world, a dichotomy central to claims to relativism. While Ramaekers' article is correct in denying relativistic interpretations of perspectivism it does not go far enough in this direction. In fact, the way Ramaekers makes his case may actually encourage the charge of relativism, especially when it comes to his appropriation of perspectivism for education. This article proposes to pick up where Ramaekers left off. It will argue that Nietzsche's denial of the opposition between the ‘true’ world and the ‘seeming’ world opens up the possibility for the reestablishment of truth, albeit in a modified form. After examining Nietzsche's modified ‘realist’ epistemology, the paper will explore the implications of it for his philosophy of education. It will be argued that Nietzsche's educational philosophy is founded on his concept of perspectivism in so far as he demands that students be rigorously inculcated into a pedagogical framework that teaches students to discriminate between ‘true’ and ‘false’ perspectives. This framework is essential for the development of an intellectually robust and life‐affirming culture.  相似文献   

18.
建设中国特色社会主义事业迫切需要造就一大批教育家型校长。而拥有独特的教育理念和个性化的办学思想是教育家型校长的重要特征。本文主要围绕中学校长＂凝炼教育理念和办学思想的必要性、理念的内涵、以及如何提炼教育理念和形成办学思想＂等方面进行了论述。  相似文献   

19.
张琨 《外国教育研究》2005,32(7):6-9,33
弗莱雷(Freire Paulo)提出的对话教育是他的解放教育思想中的核心，我们不能将他的对话简单地理解为一种教学方法。“对话”深刻地反映了弗莱雷的哲学思想和民主实践思想。文章拟从几个方面来论述弗莱雷的对话教育中所包含的独特的思想。  相似文献   

20.
Abstract

The outcomes of educational assessments undoubtedly have real implications for students, teachers, schools and education in the widest sense. Assessment results are, for example, used to award qualifications that determine future educational or vocational pathways of students. The results obtained by students in assessments are also used to gauge individual teacher quality, to hold schools to account for the standards achieved by their students, and to compare international education systems. Given the current high-stakes nature of educational assessment, it is imperative that the measurement practices involved have stable philosophical foundations. However, this article casts doubt on the theoretical underpinnings of contemporary educational measurement models. Aspects of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and Bohr’s philosophy of quantum theory are used to argue that a quantum theoretical rather than a Newtonian model is appropriate for educational measurement, and the associated implications for the concept of validity are elucidated. Whilst it is acknowledged that the transition to a quantum theoretical framework would not lead to the demise of educational assessment, it is argued that, where practical, current high-stakes assessments should be reformed to become as ‘low-stakes’ as possible. This article also undermines some of the pro high-stakes testing rhetoric that has a tendency to afflict education.  相似文献   

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