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1.
Research Findings: Emotion regulation is a strong predictor of both short- and long-term peer relationships and social competence and is often targeted in preschool curricula and interventions. Pretense is a natural activity of childhood that is thought to facilitate the development of socialization, perspective taking, language, and possibly emotion regulation. This study investigated whether fantasy-oriented children, who engage in more pretense, demonstrate higher levels of emotion regulation. Prekindergartners (n = 103) and teachers were given a battery of measures assessing children’s emotion regulation, fantasy orientation, theory of mind, and language. Results from hierarchical regression analyses indicated that children’s proclivity toward fantastical play (their fantasy orientation) uniquely predicted 24% of the variance in their emotion regulation skills over and above typical predictors: age, theory of mind, and language skills. That is, children who participated in more fantasy pretense demonstrated better emotion regulation skills than their peers. Practice or Policy: The present study suggests that future research, curriculum, and interventions should focus on targeting fantastical pretense to assess causal mechanisms of emotion regulation development. Teachers and parents should encourage children’s fantastical pretense, as research suggests it may be an important contributor to the development of critical socialization skills such as emotion regulation.  相似文献   

2.
Preschoolers' Attributions of Mental States in Pretense   总被引：3，自引：0，他引：3  
When young children appear to recognize that someone else is engaging in make-believe play, do they infer what the pretender is thinking? Are they aware that the pretender is thinking about a pretend scenario yet knows what the real situation is? Preschoolers ages 3–5 ( N = 45) viewed scenes from the Barney & Friends television series depicting either make-believe or realistic actions. Children were questioned concerning the presence of pretense and the thoughts and beliefs of the TV characters. The children where also presented with false belief and appearance/reality theory of mind tasks. Children who identified when TV characters were engaging in pretend play did not necessarily infer the pretenders thoughts and beliefs. Inferring pretenders' thoughts was related to performance on false belief and appearance/reality tasks, but simply recognizing pretense was not. These data support the view that children initially learn to recognize pretense from contextual cues and are able to infer pretenders' beliefs only with further development of metarepresentational ability.  相似文献   

3.
自闭症儿童的心理理论发展及其与言语能力的关系   总被引：6，自引：1，他引：6  
研究用5个信念任务测量心理理论能力,用皮博迪图片词汇测验测量言语能力,比较12名自闭症儿童和同等言语能力的28名正常儿童的表现,并分析了心理理论和言语能力的相关。结果表明:(1)自闭症儿童的心理理论发展显著落后于同等言语智力的正常儿童;(2)自闭症和正常儿童的信念理解发展序列基本一致;(3)心理理论和言语能力保持中度相关,但控制年龄因素后的偏相关不显著。本研究支持心理理论发展的领域特殊性观点。  相似文献   

4.
Even when they have good language skills, many children with hearing loss lag several years behind hearing children in the ability to grasp beliefs of others. The researchers sought to determine whether this lag results from difficulty with the verbal demands of tasks or from conceptual delays. The researchers related children's performance on a nonverbal theory of mind task to their scores on verbal aptitude tests. Twelve French children (average age about 10 years) with severe to profound hearing loss and 12 French hearing children (average about 7 years) were evaluated. The children with hearing loss showed persistent difficulty with theory of mind tasks, even a nonverbal task, presenting results similar to those of hearing 6-year-olds. Also, the children with hearing loss showed a correlation between language level (lexical and morphosyntactic) and understanding of false beliefs. No such correlation was found in the hearing children.  相似文献   

5.
A number of studies have reported that most children with autism fail theory of mind tasks. It is unclear why certain children with autism pass such tests and what might be different about these subjects. In the present study, the role of age and verbal ability in theory of mind task performance was explored. Data were pooled from 70 autistic, 34 mentally handicapped, and 70 normal young subjects, previously tested for a number of different studies. The analysis suggested that children with autism required far higher verbal mental age to pass false belief tasks than did other subjects. While normally developing children had a 50% probability of passing both tasks at the verbal mental age of 4 years, autistic subjects took more than twice as long to reach this probability of success (at the advanced verbal mental age of 9-2). Possible causal relations between verbal ability and the ability to represent mental states are discussed.  相似文献   

6.
Young children show significant changes in their mental-state understanding as marked by their performance on false-belief tasks. This study provides evidence for activity in the prefrontal cortex associated with the development of this ability. Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded as adults ( N  = 24) and 4-, 5-, and 6-year-old children ( N  = 44) reasoned about reality and the beliefs of characters in animated vignettes. In adults, a late slow wave (LSW), with a left-frontal scalp distribution, was associated with reasoning about beliefs. This LSW was also observed for children who could correctly reason about the characters' beliefs but not in children who failed false-belief questions. These findings have several implications, including support for the critical role of the prefrontal cortex for theory of mind development.  相似文献   

7.
Our aim in this study was to investigate whether previous findings pointing to a delay in deaf children's theory of mind development are replicated when linguistic demands placed on the deaf child are minimized in a nonverbal version of standard false-belief tasks. Twenty-four prelingually deaf, orally trained children born of hearing parents were tested with both a verbal and a nonverbal version of a false-belief task. Neither the younger (range: 4 years 7 months-6 years 5 months) nor the older (range: 6 years 9 months-11 years 11 months) children of the final sample of 21 children performed above chance in the verbal task. The nonverbal task significantly facilitated performance in children of all ages. Despite this facilitation, we observed a developmental delay: only the older group performed significantly above chance in the nonverbal false-belief task, even though the younger children were at the average age when hearing children normally pass standard false-belief tests. We discuss these findings in light of the hypothesis that language development and conversational competence are crucial to the acquisition of a theory of mind.  相似文献   

8.
This paper describes findings of a longitudinal study that was carried out to examine relationships among different aspects of young children's cognitive development, namely, theory of mind, metacognitive vocabulary, and metamemory, which seem theoretically connected but so far have not been studied simultaneously. In total, 174 children were included in the present analyses who were about 4;6 years of age at the first measurement point. Children were tested at four time points, separated by a testing interval of approximately half a year. At the first time of testing, children completed a set of theory of mind tasks. At each of the following measurement points, measures of metacognitive vocabulary and general vocabulary as well as metamemory were given. Overall, the findings show that theory of mind performance assessed at the age of 4;6 predicts metacognitive knowledge assessed about one and a half years later. Furthermore, they point to a reciprocal relationship between metacognitive vocabulary and metamemory in that comprehension of metacognitive vocabulary predicted later metamemory and, conversely, metamemory significantly predicted later comprehension of metacognitive verbs. This research was supported by a grant from the German Research Foundation (SCHN 315 /20–7) to the German Research Group on Cognitive Development.  相似文献   

9.
This study investigated the relation between theory of mind (ToM) and metamemory knowledge using a training methodology. Sixty‐two 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children were recruited and randomly assigned to one of two training conditions: A first‐order false belief (ToM) and a control condition. Intervention and control groups were equivalent at pretest for age, parents' education, verbal ability, inhibition, and ToM. Results showed that after the intervention children in the ToM group improved in their first‐order false belief understanding significantly more than children in the control condition. Crucially, the positive effect of the ToM intervention was stable over 2 months and generalized to more complex ToM tasks and metamemory.  相似文献   

10.
The focus of the present study is on the developmental antecedents of domain-general experimentation skills. We hypothesized that false-belief understanding would predict the ability to distinguish a conclusive from an inconclusive experiment. We conducted a longitudinal study with two assessment points (t1 and t2) to investigate this hypothesis. As language, executive functioning, working memory, and intelligence have been discussed as potential influencing factors in theory of mind and scientific reasoning development, we included measures of these abilities as control variables. We recruited 161 preschool children (73 girls and 88 boys); we administered a false-belief task, an experimentation task, and the control variables at t1 when the children were 4 years old. We repeated the false-belief and experimentation tasks at t2 when the children were 5 years old. Our results show that children who solved the false-belief task correctly at age 4 were more likely to solve the experimentation task correctly at age 5, but not vice versa, even after controlling for the influence of language, executive functioning, working memory, and intelligence. The implications of these results on theories about the development of scientific reasoning and for science education concepts for young children are briefly discussed.  相似文献   

11.
This study investigates the relationship between theory of mind (ToM) skills in deaf children and input from their hearing mothers. Twenty-two hearing mothers and their deaf children (ages 4-10 years) participated in tasks designed to elicit talk about the mind. The mothers' mental state talk was compared with that of 26 mothers with hearing children (ages 4-6 years). The frequency of mothers' mental talk was correlated with deaf children's performance on ToM tasks, after controlling for effects of child language and age. Maternal sign proficiency was correlated with child language, false belief, and mothers' talk about the mind. Findings are discussed in relation to experiential accounts of ToM development and roles of maternal talk in children's social understanding.  相似文献   

12.
Using four traditional false-belief tasks, I investigated deaf children's age and expressive language skills in relation to their theory of mind development. The children's parents who signed reported on their own knowledge of a mental sign vocabulary. The results indicate age of the child to be strongly related to theory of mind development. Deaf children demonstrated an ability to pass the theory of mind assessment battery between the ages of 7 and 8 years, on average. In comparison, hearing children have consistently demonstrated the ability to perform such tasks between the ages of 4 and 5 years. Therefore, the results indicate deaf children are delayed by approximately 3 years in this cognitive developmental milestone. Expressive language skills of the children and sign language skills of the parents who signed were not found to be significantly related to the children's theory of mind development.  相似文献   

13.
Knowledge about the mind: links between theory of mind and later metamemory   总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1  
This longitudinal study combined, in a single study, different aspects of children's knowledge about mental phenomena and thus could investigate relations among the development of language, theory of mind, and later metamemory. In total, 183 German children were tested at ages 3, 4, and 5. Each time of testing included a set of theory-of-mind tasks, a battery of language development, and additionally, at Time 3, a set of metamemory questions. The findings demonstrate strong relationships between children's language abilities and their theory of mind (both first- and second-order false beliefs). Moreover, both theory-of-mind and language competencies significantly predicted later metamemory, with their relative contribution changing over time. Language may influence metamemory developmentally both directly and indirectly (through theory of mind).  相似文献   

14.
本研究采用了实验的方法,以言语、非言语性任务,意外转移与表征变化任务为变量,考察了不同语言能力的88名3-4岁幼儿的错误信念理解能力。研究结果发现,降低错误信念任务对语言能力的要求并不能改变幼儿在错误信念理解上的年龄特征;在3岁和4岁两个年龄组中,语言能力超常的幼儿在各项实验任务上的表现均好于语言能力一般的幼儿。  相似文献   

15.
Seriation, conservation, and theory of mind abilities were examined in individuals with autism ( N = 16), mental retardation ( N = 16), and in normally developing children ( N = 16). Seriation tasks included seriation of tubes, blocks, and flat squares. Conservation tasks included conservation of area, number, substance, quantity, and weight. Theory of mind tasks involved predicting false belief and understanding value and fact beliefs. Participants with autism performed better than participants with mental retardation on seriation, while no differences emerged between these groups on conservation and false belief. Individuals with autism performed less well than individuals with mental retardation on the value and fact belief tasks; however, when verbal ability was held as a covariant, the difference was no longer significant. Normally developing children performed better than the other two groups on all tasks. These results suggest that autism does not involve a specific impairment in theory of mind and that theory of mind deficits are not unique to autism.  相似文献   

16.
The current longitudinal study examined the development of general cognitive abilities of 4–6-year-old children of low-income, ethnic-minority families in preschool over two and a half years by determining the changes in general, and in verbal and fluid cognitive abilities, relative to age norms, using an intelligence test. The results revealed significant increases over time, relative to age norms, in full scale and in both verbal and fluid intelligence test scores of disadvantaged children, with medium effect sizes. These gains in measured intelligence were moderated by children's home language and age. Children who gained most also profited most from their increased abilities with respect to emergent school skills. Gains in verbal intelligence predicted emergent school vocabulary, but gains in fluid intelligence did not. Overall, gains in fluid intelligence predicted emergent math skills, and gains in verbal intelligence predicted emergent math skills only among older children.  相似文献   

17.
In two studies, we compared young children's performance on three variations of a nonverbally presented calculation task. The experimental tasks used the same nonverbal mode of presentation but were varied according to response type: (1) putting out disks (nonverbal production); (2) choosing the correct number of disks from a multiple-choice array (nonverbal recognition); and (3) giving a number word (verbal production). The verbal production task required children to map numerosities onto the conventional number system while the nonverbal production and nonverbal recognition tasks did not. Study 1 showed that the performance of 3-, 4- and 5-year-old middle-income children (N = 72) did not vary with the type of response required. Children's answers to nonverbally presented addition and subtraction problems were available in both verbal and nonverbal forms. In contrast. Study 2 showed that low-income children (3- and 4-year-olds; N = 48) performed significantly better on both nonverbal response type tasks than on the verbal response type task. Analysis of individual data indicated that a number of the low-income children were successful on the completely nonverbal calculation tasks, even though they had difficulty with verbal counting (i.e., set enumeration and cardinality). The findings suggest that the ability to calculate does not depend on mastery of conventional symbols of arithmetic.  相似文献   

18.
In this study of two hundred and thirty 8‐ to 13‐year‐olds, a new “Silent Films” task is introduced, designed to address the dearth of research on theory of mind in older children by providing a film‐based analogue of F. G. E. Happé's (1994) Strange Stories task. Confirmatory factor analysis showed that all items from both tasks loaded onto a single theory‐of‐mind latent factor. With effects of verbal ability and family affluence controlled, theory‐of‐mind latent factor scores increased significantly with age, indicating that mentalizing skills continue to develop through middle childhood. Girls outperformed boys on the theory‐of‐mind latent factor, and the correlates of individual differences in theory of mind were gender specific: Low scores were related to loneliness in girls and to peer rejection in boys.  相似文献   

19.
Sobel DM 《Child development》2004,75(3):704-729
This study investigated 3- and 4-year-old's understanding of the relationship between pretense and mental awareness. In Experiments 1 and 2, only a subset of 4-year-olds recognized that sleeping characters and characters ignorant of their appearance were not pretending. However, these experiments had certain linguistic demands, which potentially influenced performance. In Experiments 3, these demand characteristics were reduced; under these circumstances, 3- and 4-year-olds recognized that pretenders were aware of their actions or appearance. However, Experiment 4 showed that even using this modified procedure, 3- and 4-year-olds do not completely understand the relationship between pretense and awareness. These data support the hypotheses that by the age of 4, children have some, but not a complete, understanding of the relationship between pretense and mental awareness.  相似文献   

20.
Research suggests that young children may see a direct and one-way connection between facts about the world and epistemic mental states (e.g., belief). Conventions represent instances of active constructions of the mind that change facts about the world. As such, a mature understanding of convention would seem to present a strong challenge to children's simplified notions of epistemic relations. Three experiments assessed young children's abilities to track behavioral, representational, and truth aspects of conventions. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-old children (N = 30) recognized that conventional stipulations would change people's behaviors. However, participants generally failed to understand how stipulations might affect representations. In Experiment 2, 3-, 5-, and 7-year-old children (N = 53) were asked to reason about the truth values of statements about pretenses and conventions. The two younger groups of children often confused the two types of states, whereas older children consistently judged that conventions, but not pretenses, changed reality. In Experiment 3, the same 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 42) participated in tasks assessing their understanding of representational diversity (e.g., false belief). In general, children's performance on false-belief and "false-convention" tasks did not differ, which suggests that conventions were understood as involving truth claims (as akin to beliefs about physical reality). Children's difficulties with the idea of conventional truth seems consistent with current accounts of developing theories of mind.  相似文献   

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