Content valuation strategies for digital subscription platforms     

Kübler  Raoul  Seifert  Rouven  Kandziora  Michael 《Journal of Cultural Economics》2021,45(2):295-326

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Correction to: Content valuation strategies for digital subscription platforms     

Kübler  Raoul  Seifert  Rouven  Kandziora  Michael 《Journal of Cultural Economics》2021,45(2):327-327

Journal of Cultural Economics - A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10824-021-09408-5  相似文献   

Controlling innovative projects with moral hazard and asymmetric information     

Rouven Bergmann  Gunther Friedl 《Research Policy》2008,37(9):1504-1514

We study optimal incentive contracts offered to a research and development (R&D) manager, who can propose an innovative project and is in charge of conducting this project. The manager has private information about the project profitability and he exerts unobservable levels of different kinds of effort in order to increase the feasibility of successfully completing the project in terms of meeting product specifications. In particular, we analyze a situation, in which two interrelated performance measures on different hierarchical levels are available for contracting purposes. We show how asymmetric information about the project and further characteristics of the project influence the weights of the performance measures. We also make a number of empirical predictions about the composition of compensation contracts for R&D managers.  相似文献