| Abstract: | Our theme is that parent-child talk about the mental world plays a central role in the development of children's social understanding. This view is supported by Wittgenstein's argument that public criteria are necessary for learning the meaning of mental state terms. We propose that children, mainly in talk, learn the patterns of interaction that are criterial for the use of mental state terms. Two examples of empirical research illustrate this proposal. The first, a qualitative analysis of how criteria for psychological terms are displayed in mother-child talk, revealed that criteria were variously displayed and were presented in temporal, cause and effect sequences. The second, a quantitative analysis of key elements for understanding false beliefs present in mother-child talk, compared dyads in which children Failed (N = 14) or Passed (N = 10) false belief tests. In both Fail and Pass dyads, mothers elicited the vast majority of elements but produced about the same number as children. Only Pass children produced elements without mothers eliciting them. There were no instances of child-elicited/mother-produced elements. Overall, Fail children were less competent at recognizing and commenting on important aspects of a situation of false belief. We conclude that the development of talk and social understanding are inextricably intertwined. |
