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特许经营模式下跨境物流联盟技术授权博弈分析
引用本文:杜志平,付帅帅,王丹丹.特许经营模式下跨境物流联盟技术授权博弈分析[J].科技管理研究,2019(21).
作者姓名:杜志平  付帅帅  王丹丹
作者单位:北京物资学院物流学院,北京,101149;南京航空航天大学经济管理学院,江苏南京,210016
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(面上项目,基于云平台技术跨境物流联盟运作机制与决策优化研究,71772016)
摘    要:以特许经营模式下的跨境物流联盟内技术授权为研究视角,考虑各博弈主体进行技术授权时的非理性心理因素及风险偏好影响,将前景理论与演化博弈理论相结合,运用前景价值函数完善支付矩阵的相关参数,以此对联盟内企业技术授权过程进行演化博弈分析,并运用仿真分析各影响因素对联盟内企业进行授权成功与否的影响。研究结果表明:在特许经营模式下的联盟内企业进行技术授权时,其成功与否受双方授权成本、风险及直接收益等因素影响,其授权技术是否存在潜在无形收益决定了技术引进企业的决策,但技术引进企业对其潜在无形收益的大小并不敏感。

关 键 词:跨境物流联盟  技术授权  前景理论  演化博弈
收稿时间:2018/10/7 0:00:00
修稿时间:2019/11/9 0:00:00

Game Analysis of Technology Authorization of Cross-border Logistics Alliance under Franchise Mode
Abstract:Taking the technology authorization in the cross-border logistics alliance under the franchise mode as the research perspective, considering the irrational psychological factors and risk preference of each game subject in the process of technology authorization, combining the prospect theory with the evolutionary game theory, using the foreground value function to improve The relevant parameters of the payment matrix are used to conduct an evolutionary game analysis of the enterprise technology authorization process within the alliance. The simulation analysis is used to analyze the impact of various influencing factors on the success of the enterprises in the alliance. The results show that the success of the enterprises in the alliance under the franchise mode is subject to the authorization costs, risks and direct benefits. The influence of factors, whether the potential intangible income of the authorized technology determines the decision of the technology introduction enterprise, but the technology introduction enterprise is not sensitive to the size of its potential intangible income.
Keywords:cross-border logistics alliance  technology authorization  Prospect theory  evolutionary game
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