| 收益共享视角下的项目群工期激励的计算实验模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 张可,杨凯逊,丰景春,李明.收益共享视角下的项目群工期激励的计算实验模型[J].科技管理研究,2019,39(11). |
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| 作者姓名： | 张可 杨凯逊 丰景春 李明 |
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| 作者单位： | 河海大学商学院;河海大学国际河流研究中心;河海大学商学院;河海大学项目管理研究所;河海大学商学院;河海大学项目管理研究所;江苏省世界水谷与水生态文明协同创新中心,江苏南京211100 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社科基金“工程建设市场主体社会化监管机制研究”(17BGL156);国家社会科学基金青年项目“市场决定性作用下PPP项目协同监管模式研究”(15CJL023);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助“行政审批制度下工程建设政府监管机制创新”(2017B35214)。 |
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| 摘 要： | 已有项目群工期优化的激励机制主要从业主角度探讨总量激励策略,较少考虑承包商的收益共享偏好。为此,从项目群相关者收益共享视角,探讨项目群工期激励仿真的计算实验模型。首先,分析收益共享激励策略下的项目群工期优化机理;其次,引入激励总量和激励强度,构建收益共享视角下的项目群工期激励的计算实验模型;进而,通过激励总量、收益共享比例动态调整,构建不同情境下承包商行为、项目群工期及优化带来的业主收益的仿真方法。最后,以U项目为例,进行计算实验,结果表明：单独依靠激励总量存在激励效率边际递减效应;收益分享比例设计能够在激励总量基础上进一步提升承包商努力水平及业主收益;激励总量和收益分享比例的平衡是实现工期及业主收益最优的关键;收益共享激励策略的引入形成并强化了项目群工期优化的激励-努力程度的反馈回路。研究成果为揭示承包商行为及项目群工期演化规律、并且制定相关管理策略提供新的研究思路和分析方法。
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| 关 键 词： | 项目群 工期激励 Multi-Agent建模 收益共享 计算实验 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018/8/28 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2019/6/6 0:00:00 |
Computational experimental model of program schedule incentives from the perspective of revenue sharing |
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| Abstract: | The incentive mechanism for the optimization of the program schedule mainly discusses the total incentive strategy from the perspective of the owner, and the contractor"s income sharing preference is less considered. To this end, from the perspective of program shareholder revenue sharing, the computational experimental model of program incentive simulation is discussed. Firstly, the mechanism of program optimization under the revenue sharing incentive strategy is analyzed. Secondly, the total amount of incentives and incentive intensity are introduced to construct the computational experimental model of program schedule incentives from the perspective of revenue sharing. Furthermore, through the dynamic adjustment of the total amount of incentives and the proportion of revenue sharing, the simulation methods of contractor"s behavior, program schedule and the owner"s revenue are constructed in different situations. Finally, taking the U program as an example to carry out the computational experiments. The results show that: there is a marginal diminishing effect of incentive efficiency on the basis of the total amount of incentives alone; the revenue sharing ratio design can further improve the contractor"s effort level and the owner"s income on the basis of the total amount of incentives; The balance between the total incentives and the proportion of revenue sharing is the key to achieving the optimal construction period and the owner"s income. The research results provide new research ideas and analysis methods for revealing the evolution rules of contractors" behaviors and program schedule, and formulating relevant management strategies. |
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| Keywords: | program schedule incentives multi-agent modeling revenue sharing computational experiments |
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