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绩优子公司创新阻力的内在机制研究
引用本文:郑丽,陈志军.绩优子公司创新阻力的内在机制研究[J].研究与发展管理,2021,33(5):54-66.
作者姓名:郑丽  陈志军
作者单位:青岛大学,山东大学
基金项目:国家社科基金重大项目;中国博士后科学基金项目;山东省自然科学基金项目
摘    要:创新是公司维持竞争优势的重要手段,但绩效良好公司为何创新投入下降?本文以2012-2019年附属企业集团的上市子公司为样本,基于代理理论视角,探索阻碍绩优子公司技术创新的影响因素。研究发现:子公司绩效良好时,其创新投入下降;母公司的掏空行为、公司间的关联交易、高管的代理行为阻碍了绩优子公司的创新投入。进一步探索如何降低绩优子公司代理行为发现:独立董事对子公司两类代理行为的监督约束作用不明显;机构投资者能够抵制母公司对绩优子公司的利益侵占行为;外部制度环境削弱了高管的代理行为。研究从代理理论角度揭示了绩优子公司创新投入低的内在影响机制,以及从管理层、公司层、环境层三个层次为如何降低子公司代理行为,释放创新潜力提供了借鉴。

关 键 词:绩效反馈  母子公司  代理行为  技术创新
收稿时间:2020/10/9 0:00:00
修稿时间:2021/1/14 0:00:00

Internal Mechanism of Innovation Resistance of Good-Performance Subsidiaries
ZHENG Li,CHEN Zhi-jun.Internal Mechanism of Innovation Resistance of Good-Performance Subsidiaries[J].R&d Management,2021,33(5):54-66.
Authors:ZHENG Li  CHEN Zhi-jun
Abstract:Innovation is an important factor for a company to maintain its competitive advantage, but why does the company with good performance invest less in innovation? Based on the data of the listed subsidiaries from the year 2012 to 2019, exploring the influencing factors that hinder the technological innovation of the subsidiary from the perspective of agency theory, this paper finds that: the innovation input decreases when the performance of the subsidiary is good; The tunneling behavior of the headquarters, related party transactions between companies within business groups and the agency behavior of senior executives are the influencing mechanisms that hinder the technological innovation of the good-performance subsidiaries. Further study explores how to restrain the agency behavior, and finds that: The supervision impact of the independent director on the two kinds of agency behaviors of subsidiaries is not obvious; Institutional investors can restrain the tunneling behavior of headquarters to the subsidiary with good performance; The external institutional environment weakens the agency behavior of the senior executives in the good-performance subsidiaries. This study reveals the internal influencing mechanism of low innovation investment in the good- performance subsidiaries from the perspective of agency behavior, and provides some suggestion on how to restrain the agency problems of subsidiaries and reduce innovation resistance from the management level, company level and environment level.
Keywords:performance feedback  headquarters-subsidiary  agent behavior  technology innovation
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