| 寻租、逆向选择与国有企业改革 |
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| 引用本文： | 唐任伍,雷晓宁.寻租、逆向选择与国有企业改革[J].北京师范大学学报(社会科学版),2003(1):23-30. |
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| 作者姓名： | 唐任伍 雷晓宁 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京师范大学 管理学院,北京,100875 |
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| 摘 要： | 部分国有企业长期在扭曲的体制中生存,形成了逆向生存选择机制和逆向投资选择机制,不仅自身效率难以提高,还产生了较大的外部负效应。原因是部分国有企业改革始终没有解决代理人寻租激励过大的问题,孤军深入的产权改革无助于减少寻租行为,反而制造了更多的寻租机会。十六大以后,国有企业产权改革与重组要获得成功,关键在于产权改革是否与国有企业的内、外约束机制相配套,是否有效遏制寻租行为。因而,激励相容的公司治理结构和完善的市场经济基础建设是产权改革的前提和保障,产权的重组与转让必须在尊重市场规则,有严格的外部监督的基础上进行,否则,将成为内部的一些人再次瓜分国有资产的"盛宴"。
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| 关 键 词： | 国有企业 寻租 委托-代理 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-0209(2003)01-0023-08 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002年12月10日 |
Rent-seeking, Adverse Selection and Reform of State Enterprises |
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| Abstract: | Over a long time,state enterprises live in an abnormal institution.It gives rise to adverse living selection mechanism and adverse investment selection mechanism. For this cause ,not only themselves are inefficient, but also bring a large outside unfavourable effect. What leads to the result is that they haven't resolve the rent-seeking problem from beginning to end. To reform the ownership separately can't help to reduce the rent-seeking actions.On the contrary, it has made more rent-seeking chances. After the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC, the key of state enterprise reform is whether it can restrain the rent-seeking actions. So before we reform the ownership of state enterprises, we should build a management mechanism of incentive compatibility , and the transferring of ownership must be under the marketable rules, at the same time , it should be supervised strictly. |
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| Keywords: | state enterprise rent-seeking principal-agent problem |
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