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| 地区间策略互动与建设用地指标管控失灵 | |
| 引用本文： | 张绍阳,刘琼,欧名豪.地区间策略互动与建设用地指标管控失灵[J].资源科学,2019,41(2):268-276. |
| 作者姓名： | 张绍阳 刘琼 欧名豪 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 郑州轻工业大学政法学院,郑州 450001 2. 南京农业大学公共管理学院,南京 210095 |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目（71673141）;郑州轻工业大学博士科研基金项目（0187/13501050023） |
| 摘 要： | 对建设用地进行指标管控是中国土地管理领域的一项重要公共政策,但实践中却面临管控失灵的困境。本文从地方政府竞争的视角出发,分析了地区间在建设用地指标执行上的策略互动行为,并进一步探讨了中央监管权集中对其策略互动行为的影响,最后构建空间面板模型对理论假说进行了检验。研究发现,中国式分权体制下,地方政府会充分运用土地的政策工具来展开经济竞争,从而引发地区间在获取超额建设用地空间上的“模仿效应”,这造成指标管控的普遍性失灵;中央政府的集中监管能够削弱地区间的策略互动行为,从而有利于减轻指标管控失灵的程度。为此,本文建议应将“自上而下”的集中监管机制嵌入地方政府竞争的环境中去,以遏制地区间“竞次式”的资源管控政策执行行为。 |
| 关 键 词： | 建设用地 指标管控 失灵 策略互动 模仿效应 监管权集中 空间面板 中国 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018-03-19 |
| 修稿时间： | 2018-11-29 |
Inter-regional tactical interaction and construction land index control failure |
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| Shaoyang ZHANG,Qiong LIU,Minghao OU.Inter-regional tactical interaction and construction land index control failure[J].Resources Science,2019,41(2):268-276. | |
| Authors: | Shaoyang ZHANG Qiong LIU Minghao OU |
| Institution: | 1. College of Political Science and Law, Zhengzhou University of Light Industry, Zhengzhou 450001, China 2. College of Public Administration, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing 210095, China |
| Abstract: | The index control of construction land is an important public policy in the field of land management in China. However, in practice, it is faced with the dilemma of index control failure. From the perspective of local government competition, this study analyzed the tactical interaction on implementation of construction land index among regions and further discussed the effect of supervision centralization of central government on the tactical interaction among regions. Then, we constructed a spatial-panel model to test these theoretical hypotheses. The study found that, under the system of Chinese style decentralization, local government would take full use of land policy tools to participate in economic competition, revealing that there existed a tactical interaction on implementation of construction land index among regions, which was shown as the demonstration effect of gained excess construction land using space. It led to prevalent failure of index control. The regulatory pressure from supervision centralization of central government, which is the national system of land supervision, can impel local governments to keep the extent of index control failure within the level of their rivals when they scrambled to gain excess construction land using space. It was conducive to weaken the inter-regional tactical interaction, thus reduced the extent of construction land index control failure. The conclusion of this study means that, "top-down" supervision centralization system should be embedded in the environment of local governments’ competition to containment the "race to bottom" style behavior in the implementation of resource and environment controlling policy among regions. Specifically, this study puts forward the following policy recommendations: to move the supervision to superior government, to set up a vertical management institution, to centralize the supervision from different resource and environment sectors, and to set up a comprehensive institution in department of supervision. |
| Keywords: | construction land index control failure tactical interaction supervision centralization spatial-panel China |
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