| 两类控制方式下创业企业剩余控制权、特定控制权配置机理——以金融工具为载体的创业投资两阶段投资分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 王雷.两类控制方式下创业企业剩余控制权、特定控制权配置机理——以金融工具为载体的创业投资两阶段投资分析[J].科研管理,2014,35(5):107-117. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王雷 |
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| 作者单位： | 江南大学商学院, 江苏 无锡 214122 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金青年基金项目(71102093;2012-2014);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630241;2010-2013);江苏省社会科学研究青年基金项目(10GLC012;2010-2013);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助重点项目(JUSRP51330B;2013-2015)阶段性成果;江苏高校人文社会科学校外研究基地:中国物联网发展战略研究基地资助 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章分析了创业企业控制权类型、控制权收益构成及其之间的对应关系,通过建立控制权共享收益函数将人力资本专有性与专用性、投资专用性、信任度纳入统一的分析框架。构建了以金融工具为载体的两类控制方式下,两类控制权的两阶段配置模型,分析各因素对不同控制权配置的作用机理,并运用Mathematica软件对理论模型分析结论进行数据模拟。研究发现,受两类控制方式下企业家与投资家控制权收益不同的影响,关键因素对企业剩余控制权配置的作用机理存在显著差异,但对特定控制权配置的影响基本一致。具体表现为,随着创业企业绩效的改善与创新项目成功概率的增加,人力资本专用性、投资专用性、信任度与投资家获得的剩余控制权在联合控制方式下呈先增后减的非线性变化关系,在相机控制方式下呈先减后增的非线性变化关系;人力资本专有性与投资家获得的剩余控制权在联合控制方式下呈先减后增的非线性变化关系,在相机控制方式下呈先增后减的非线性变化关系。
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| 关 键 词： | 创业企业 控制方式 控制权 金融工具 |
| 收稿时间： | 2012-10-15 |
Mechanism of residual control rights and special control rights allocation under two kinds ofcontrol structure in venture capital-backed firms: Based on the perspective of financial instruments-supported two-stage investment |
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| Wang Lei.Mechanism of residual control rights and special control rights allocation under two kinds ofcontrol structure in venture capital-backed firms: Based on the perspective of financial instruments-supported two-stage investment[J].Science Research Management,2014,35(5):107-117. |
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| Authors: | Wang Lei |
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| Institution: | School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi 214122, Jiangsu, China |
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| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the type and benefits of control right in venture capital-backed firms, as well as the corresponding relationship between them. In order to put exclusiveness and specificity of human capital, investment specificity and trust into a unified analysis framework, this paper establishes a control rights shared benefits function. The paper establishes a model of two kinds of control rights allocation in two-stage Investment and two kinds of control structure under the support of financial instruments, and uses the software of Mathematica for data simulation of theory model analysis. The study shows that, because of the difference among benefits of control rights, which obtained by entrepreneurs and investors under two kinds of control structure, the key factors exist significant differences mechanism on residual control right allocation, but the effect on the allocation of specific control right is similarity. The specific performance is that, with the increasing improvement of firm performance and innovation project success probability, there are nonlinear relationship between specificity of human capital, investment specificity and trust with the investor obtains the residual of control right, which is first increased and then decreased in joint control, and first decreased and then increased in contingent control. There are nonlinear relationship between exclusiveness of human capital with the investor obtains the residual of control right, which is first decreased and then increased in joint control, and first increased and then decreased in contingent control. |
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| Keywords: | venture capital-backed firms control structure control rights financial instruments |
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