| 私有收益与控制权转移模型分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 曾昭灶,余鹏翼.私有收益与控制权转移模型分析[J].预测,2007,26(3):65-71. |
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| 作者姓名： | 曾昭灶 余鹏翼 |
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| 作者单位： | 广东外语外贸大学,国际工商管理学院,广东,广州,510420 |
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| 基金项目： | 广东省自然科学基金;中山大学凯思海外研究项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文从我国上市公司一股独大和投资者保护较弱的制度背景出发,以博弈模型分析了股权结构、私有收益与控制权转移的关系,证明了初始股东可以以较低的持股比例保留控制权,获取私有收益,并在经营绩效下降时通过转移控制权获取新控股股东的部分私有收益;潜在的控股股东即使入主后不能提高公司的经营业绩,也可以通过协议转让形式以较低的成本获得公司控制权,以获取私有收益。本文还对我国的股权结构从私有收益的角度进行了解释。
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| 关 键 词： | 股权结构 私有收益 控制权转移 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-5192（2007）03-0065-07 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-11-15 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-11-15 |
A Model of Private Benefits and Takeover |
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| ZENG Zhao-zao,YU Peng-yi.A Model of Private Benefits and Takeover[J].Forecasting,2007,26(3):65-71. |
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| Authors: | ZENG Zhao-zao YU Peng-yi |
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| Institution: | GuangDong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou 510420, China |
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| Abstract: | This study analyzed the relationship of ownership structure,private benefits and takeover under the Chinese listed companies'institution setup of dominant shareholder and weaker investor protection.Our model showed the initial shareholder adopted an lower ownership to maintain the corporate control and sieve the private benefits alone after IPO,and she or he can sell the control to seize some of private benefits from the acquirer in the case of decrease of firm performance;because of private benefits the acquirer can made profit by way of less cost negotiated transfer even in the case of no operation performance improved.Private benefits partially account for the ownership structures of Chinese listed companied. |
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| Keywords: | ownership private benefits takeover |
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