A psycho-logic of motion |
| |
Authors: | Jon Ogborn Joan Bliss |
| |
Institution: | 1. Institute of Education, Bedford Way, WC1 HO AL, London 2. Center for Educational Studies, King’s College London, University of London, Cornwall House Annexe, Waterloo Road, SE1 8TX, London
|
| |
Abstract: | In this paper we set out a theoretical account of how we suppose commonsense reasoning about motion may develop. We identify some of the most primitive building blocks necessary to the construction of a psycho-logic of motion. Our analysis shows how such primitive elements could combine together to provide schemes of motion, recognisable in psychological accounts of infancy, which themselves generate both prototypes of and rules for motion used in commonsense reasoning. The theory takes as fundamental the basic (essentially Kantian) categories of commonsense reasoning: action, object, space, cause, time and movement. We also start with Piaget’s intuition that action and movement are primitive and fundamental to all development. A number of levels are suggested from the initial primitive schemes, emerging rules and prototypes, new prototypes from combinations, projection of prototypes onto other objects and elaboration. Examples are given of prototypes which are the link between the deep seated ways of thinking and commonsense reasoning. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|