| 基于公平偏好理论的激励机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 蒲勇健,郭心毅,陈斌.基于公平偏好理论的激励机制研究[J].预测,2010,29(3). |
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| 作者姓名： | 蒲勇健 郭心毅 陈斌 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044
2. 香港大学,经济与金融学院,香港,999077 |
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| 摘 要： | 传统经济学的理性人假设在许多情况下与现实不符,行为人并非单纯追求自身利益的最大化,而是还会关注收益的公平性.本文研究引入行为经济学中行为人具有公平偏好的研究结论,运用心理规律弱化理性假设,改进并构建新的委托-代理模型,研究代理人关注物质效用和公平分配情况下的最优激励契约和激励效率.模型分析结果表明,公平偏好会改变最优契约的报酬结构形式,影响激励的效率;在公平条件下建立的新互惠契约是一种帕累托改进,并且是激励、保险、公平三者之间相互平衡的契约.
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| 关 键 词： | 激励机制 委托-代理 公平偏好 契约理论 |
On Incentive Mechanism Based on Fairness Preference |
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| PU Yong-jian,GUO Xin-yi,CHEN Bin.On Incentive Mechanism Based on Fairness Preference[J].Forecasting,2010,29(3). |
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| Authors: | PU Yong-jian GUO Xin-yi CHEN Bin |
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| Institution: | PU Yong-jian1,GUO Xin-yi1,CHEN Bin2(1.College of Economics , Business Administration,Chong Qing University,Chongqing 400044,China,2.School of Economics , Finance,The University of Hong Kong,Hong Kong 999077,China) |
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| Abstract: | The traditional economics was based on the hypothetical proposition of which an agent is pure rational,and in many cases,this proposition against to the actual situation.The empirical studies on behavioral economics indicated that all people are not egoistical,but they not only pursue their private profits but also are concerned about whether they get a fair income.According to this fairness-preference premise of behavioral economics,this paper uses psychological regularity to weaken rational assumption of ... |
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| Keywords: | incentive mechanism principal-agent fairness preference contract theory |
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