| 分税制：中央与地方之间的压制和反弹 |
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| 引用本文： | 洪江.分税制：中央与地方之间的压制和反弹[J].宁波广播电视大学学报,2008,6(3):26-31. |
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| 作者姓名： | 洪江 |
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| 作者单位： | 泉州市地税局,福建泉州,362000 |
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| 摘 要： | 中央通过分税制改革掌握了绝对的收入管理权限，致使中央与地方之间以及地方政府之间的财政自给能力都出现方向变化。地方政府为了应对这一变化开始脱离正常的轨道寻求其它出路。因此分税制改革的实质使演变成了中央与地方之间的变相的博弈。目前只有通过调整收入管理权限、改进省以下分税制和完善转移支付制度，才能使博弈迈上正常的轨道。
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| 关 键 词： | 分税制 压制 反弹 |
Tax Distribution System: Repression and Rebound between Central Govemment and Local Governments |
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| HONG Jiang.Tax Distribution System: Repression and Rebound between Central Govemment and Local Governments[J].Journal of Ningbo Radio & TV University,2008,6(3):26-31. |
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| Authors: | HONG Jiang |
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| Institution: | HONG Jiang (Quanzhou Municipal Local Taxation Bureau, Quanzhou 362000, Fujian, China) |
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| Abstract: | Through the reform of Tax Distribution System,the Central holds the absolute authority ofincome administration, resulting in the direction change on the self-financing capacity between the central government and local governments as well as among local governments.To cope with this change,local governments began to seek alternatives away from the normal track. Therefore,the reform of Tax Distribution System has evolved into the game between the central and local governments in disguised form.Currently,only ... |
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| Keywords: | Tax Distribution System repression rebound |
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