| 委托代理问题的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 蔡伟新.委托代理问题的博弈分析[J].温州职业技术学院学报,2004,4(3):8-9,20. |
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| 作者姓名： | 蔡伟新 |
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| 作者单位： | 温州职业技术学院,浙江,温州,325035 |
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| 摘 要： | 委托代理问题一直是我国财经界研究的热点和难点问题之一。本文拟建立委托代理的博弈模型，从企业委托人和代理人博弈角度对这一问题进行策略分析，并以此提出相应的对策设想。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 博弈分析 激励机制 监督机制 信息不对称 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-4326(2004)03-0008-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年6月30日 |
An Analysis on Trust and Agency Issue from the Point of Game Theory |
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| CAI Wei-xin.An Analysis on Trust and Agency Issue from the Point of Game Theory[J].Journal of Wenzhou Vocational & Technical College,2004,4(3):8-9,20. |
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| Authors: | CAI Wei-xin |
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| Abstract: | Trust and agency issue keeps being a hot but difficult topic in our financial field. The author in this thesis tries to set up the game model of trust-agency, to discuss the issue from the point of game theory: the enterprise trustor and the agent. It goes on making suggestions on coping with this issue. |
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| Keywords: | Game theory Strategy Suggestions |
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