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基于信号博弈的员工续聘过程分析及对策
引用本文:陈佳妮,孙绍荣.基于信号博弈的员工续聘过程分析及对策[J].科技与管理,2014,16(6):122-125.
作者姓名:陈佳妮  孙绍荣
作者单位:上海理工大学管理学院,上海,200093
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目,上海市教委科研创新重点项目,上海市哲学社会科学规划课题项目,上海市一流学科建设项目
摘    要:在人力资源竞争越来越激烈的现代社会,续聘作为人力资源管理的重要组成部分,越来越受到关注.通过建立博弈模型,分析续聘过程中处于信息优势的续聘者与处于信息劣势的企业之间动态信号博弈,最后提出了优化续聘合同,建立综合性的薪酬体系和科学的绩效考核制度是企业将续聘市场成功分离的有效途径.

关 键 词:续聘  信息不对称  信号博弈  薪酬制度  绩效考核

Analysis of further employment process and measure based on signaling game
CHEN Jia-ni,SUN Shao-rong.Analysis of further employment process and measure based on signaling game[J].Science-Technology and Management,2014,16(6):122-125.
Authors:CHEN Jia-ni  SUN Shao-rong
Institution:(School of Management, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China)
Abstract:With the competition of human resource becoming more and more fierce, the further employment, as an important part of human resource management, catches more and more attention. Through the establishment of game model, the paper analyzes the dynamic signal game between the employee in information superiority and the enterprise in information disadvantage during the further employment process. Finally, it is concluded that the ef- fective way to successfully separate the further employment market is optimizing the renewed contract, establishing a comprehensive compensation system and a scientific performance appraisal system.
Keywords:further employment  information asymmetry  signaling game  salary system  performance appraisal
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