| 公司治理对高管薪酬激励敏感度的影响 |
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| 引用本文： | 赵息,杜玉鹏.公司治理对高管薪酬激励敏感度的影响[J].软科学,2009,23(11):92-95,113. |
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| 作者姓名： | 赵息 杜玉鹏 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072 |
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| 摘 要： | 以2004年为研究窗口,筛选出沪深两地1001家上市公司作为研究样本,选取2004～2007年四年年度财务数据,从公司治理的角度,选取大股东持股比例、薪酬委员会、高管持股和独立董事制度四个特征,考察了公司治理对高管薪酬敏感度的影响。研究发现,在控制了公司规模和年度效应之后,大股东持股比例、高管持股与高管薪酬敏感度负相关,表明大股东持股比例和高管持股可以减轻委托代理关系,降低薪酬激励的水平;薪酬委员会制度在薪酬方面相比于独立董事制度更相关,薪酬委员会设立可以提高薪酬敏感度,而独立董事与薪酬敏感度没有相关性,这似乎说明独立董事制度尚待加大执行力度。
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| 关 键 词： | 上市公司 公司治理 高管薪酬敏感度 |
The Impact of Corporate Governance on Sensitivity of Executive Compensation Incentives |
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| ZHAO Xi,DU Yu-peng.The Impact of Corporate Governance on Sensitivity of Executive Compensation Incentives[J].Soft Science,2009,23(11):92-95,113. |
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| Authors: | ZHAO Xi DU Yu-peng |
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| Abstract: | This paper,using a sample of 1001 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2004 to 2007,investigates the impact of corporate governance on executive compensation incentives with regards of four characteristics,namely proportion of share held by the biggest shareholders,compensation committee,executive shareholdings and independent director system.It is found that there is negative relationship between sensitivity of executive compensation and share proportion held by the biggest shareholders as well as shares held by executives,i.e.,share proportion held by the biggest shareholders and executive share holders can reduce the principal-agent relationships.The system of compensation committee is more significant than independent director system;the establishment of compensation committee can raise the compensation sensitivity;there is little relevance between independent directors and compensation sensitivity,which seems to show that independent director system needs to be implemented more strongly. |
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| Keywords: | listed companies corporate governance sensitivity of executive compensation |
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