| 具有序列投资的R&D联盟组织结构研究 /FONT /P |
| |
| 引用本文： | 薛明皋,龚朴.具有序列投资的R&D联盟组织结构研究 /FONT /P[J].科研管理,2008,29(4):82-88. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 薛明皋 龚朴 |
| |
| 作者单位： |
华中科技大学管理学院，湖北 武汉430074 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 本文研究开发了两阶段序列投资道德风险模型。基于价格和成本这两个影响R&D项目价值的关键因素，建立道德风险模型，并比较专有权、共同所有权和期权合同（Option Contract）三种R&D联盟组织结构，分别讨论结盟的两公司的投资决策及其投资的相互依赖性，和关键的协议参数对两公司最优投资水平的影响。并证明了期权合同组织结构占优于其他所有权组织结构。从而对期权合同近年来使用越来越多的原因给出了理论解释。
|
| 关 键 词： | R& D联盟 道德风险 专有权 共同所有权 期权合同 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-5-1 |
Study on the R&D alliance governance structure with the sequential investment |
| |
| Xue Minggao,Gong Pu.Study on the R&D alliance governance structure with the sequential investment[J].Science Research Management,2008,29(4):82-88. |
| |
| Authors: | Xue Minggao Gong Pu |
| |
| Institution: | Department of finance, school of management, Huazhong University of;
Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China |
| |
| Abstract: | A two-period moral hazard model with the sequential investment in the R&;D alliance is studied. This moral hazard model is based on the price and cost that are two key factors affecting the R&;D value. The governance structures in R&;D alliance under exclusive or joint ownership and option contracts are analyzed and compared, the investment decisions of firm A and firm B, and the effect of key parameters on their first-best investment levels are discussed. Finally, it is proved that option contract strictly dominates other ownership structure. The results offer a theoretical explanation why partners in the R&;D alliance frequently use contingent ownership structures to govern their relationship, and why their initial arrangement is often modified over the time. |
| |
| Keywords: | R& D alliance moral hazard exclusive ownership joint ownership option contract |
| 本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《科研管理》浏览原始摘要信息 |
| 点击此处可从《科研管理》下载免费的PDF全文 |
