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公地的悲剧:政府注资国有银行低效率的一种产权诠释
引用本文:李红坤,忤颖涛.公地的悲剧:政府注资国有银行低效率的一种产权诠释[J].科学.经济.社会,2009,27(1):43-47.
作者姓名:李红坤  忤颖涛
作者单位:山东大学,经济学院,山东,济南,250000
摘    要:为了提高国有银行的资本充足率水平,政府对国有银行进行了三个阶段的注资,从报表数据来看,基本实现了目标。但政府注资效率如何?这种补充资本充足率方式是否具有持久性?经过分析,政府注资国有银行无论是在转轨体制下还是在市场经济体制下,都具有浓厚的“公地的悲剧”色彩,具有低效性,低效性的根源就是产权不清晰。消除低效性的根本途径是明晰产权结构,建立政府与市场相结合的资本金筹集机制。

关 键 词:公地的悲剧  注资  激励相容

The Tragedy of the Commons:An Property Rights Annotation of Injected Capital in State Owned Banking Low Efficiently
LI Hong-kun,WU Ying-tao.The Tragedy of the Commons:An Property Rights Annotation of Injected Capital in State Owned Banking Low Efficiently[J].Science Economy Society,2009,27(1):43-47.
Authors:LI Hong-kun  WU Ying-tao
Institution:Economic institute;Shan Dong University;Shan Dong Province;Jinan 250000;China
Abstract:In order to increase capital abundant rate of state owned banking,the government has injected capital three phases.According to report forms,the object is realized basically.By analysis,not only in transition economy but also market economy,injected capital in state owned banking possesses dense the tragedy of the commons,its efficiency is very low.The essential route of eliminating low efficiency is perspicuity property rights and establishing capital raising mechanism integrating government and market int...
Keywords:the tragedy of the commons  injected capital  incentive-compatible  
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