| 技术创新的互补性专利竞赛决策分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 夏轶群,陈俊芳.技术创新的互补性专利竞赛决策分析[J].科学学研究,2008(Z2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 夏轶群 陈俊芳 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572103) |
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| 摘 要： | 当两家企业竞争研发一个创新产品,而且该产品的研发过程涉及多个互补性技术创新,则两家企业的专利竞赛有两种决策:一种是互补性技术创新分开申请专利,即每完成一个创新立刻为之申请专利,另一种是等所有的互补性技术创新完成后捆绑申请一个产品专利。分散成本和期望研发耗时是影响决策的两个关键因素。用博弈论方法分析包含两个互补性技术创新的专利竞赛,结果表明:分散成本不高时,企业都会坚持参与全部互补性技术创新,研发耗时长适用分开申请专利策略,否则适用捆绑专利策略。而分散成本高时,如果折现率高、研发耗时短则采用捆绑专利的策略;如果研发耗时长,或者折现率低,则采用分开申请专利的策略,且未赢得第一个技术创新专利的企业放弃第二个技术创新。
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| 关 键 词： | 技术创新 专利竞赛 互补性 动态博弈 |
Decisions analysis for complementary patent race of technology innovation |
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| XIA Yi-qun,CHEN Jun-fang.Decisions analysis for complementary patent race of technology innovation[J].Studies in Science of Science,2008(Z2). |
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| Authors: | XIA Yi-qun CHEN Jun-fang |
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| Institution: | Antai College of Economy and Management;Shanghai Jiaotong University;Shanghai 200052;China |
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| Abstract: | There were two kinds of decision for the patent race when two firms competed in inventing a new product which consisted of complementary technology innovations.One was applying patent for the complementary innovations separately,namely apply patent for any one of these complementary innovations immediately when it was completed.The other was bundling them until both of complementary innovations were completed,in order to apply a whole product patent.The scattering cost and the expected time to achieve the i... |
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| Keywords: | technology innovation patent race complementary dynamic game |
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