| 独立董事激励模型与代理成本研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王晓辉,王安民.独立董事激励模型与代理成本研究[J].技术与创新管理,2007,28(2):86-88. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王晓辉 王安民 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安电子科技大学经济管理学院,陕西,西安,710071 |
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| 摘 要： | 我国的独立董事制度存在种种缺陷,关键一点是没有解决独立董事的激励机制问题。利用数学方法建立了独立董事的最优激励模型。设计独立董事激励方案时,股东必须考虑激励独立董事的成本与股东利益的一致性,而且还要考虑收益与成本的均衡。
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| 关 键 词： | 独立董事 契约 激励模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-7312（2007）02-0086-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-09-21 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年9月21日 |
A Model of Incentive Mechanism of Independent Directors and Agent Cost Based on Contract Risk |
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| WANG Xiao-hui,WANG An-min.A Model of Incentive Mechanism of Independent Directors and Agent Cost Based on Contract Risk[J].Technology and Innovation Management,2007,28(2):86-88. |
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| Authors: | WANG Xiao-hui WANG An-min |
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| Abstract: | Chinese independent director systems has various defects in effectiveness,the key is the incentive mechanism problem of the independent directors has not yet been solved.The optimal incentive contracts between stockholders and independent directors through mathematic analytic methods is analyzed.When designing the incentive scheme,the stockholders should consider not only consistency of the cost of incentive independent director and his profit but also equilibrium of himself in income and cost. |
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| Keywords: | independent director contract incentive model |
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