| 基于博弈模型的专利联营许可行为研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘利,朱雪忠.基于博弈模型的专利联营许可行为研究[J].科研管理,2011,32(11):63-70. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘利 朱雪忠 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 华中科技大学 管理学院,湖北 武汉 430074;
2. 中南民族大学 法学院,湖北 武汉 430074 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金重点项目“促进我国自主创新的知识产权管理研究”(70633003,2007-01~2010-12) |
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| 摘 要： | 专利联营许可是专利联营的核心问题,专利联营各类许可过程实质是许可双方之间的博弈过程,博弈结果为是否签订许可契约。本文基于博弈模型,分别从两个侧面探讨专利联营各类许可行为的内在机理,认为无论哪一类许可,博弈双方之间均为竞合关系,其焦点是如何最大化各自利润。只有双方都达到利润预期,才能出现博弈均衡。在此基础上,为我国企业正确对待专利联营许可提供启示。
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| 关 键 词： | 专利联营 许可 博弈 利润 竟合 |
| 收稿时间： | 2010-11-12 |
| 修稿时间： | 2011-03-24 |
Licensing behavior of patent pools based on the game models |
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| Liu Li,Zhu Xuezhong.Licensing behavior of patent pools based on the game models[J].Science Research Management,2011,32(11):63-70. |
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| Authors: | Liu Li Zhu Xuezhong |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China;
2. School of Law, South-Central University for Nationalities, Wuhan 430074, China |
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| Abstract: | As the core problem of patent pools,patent licensing of all kinds is the gaming process between the two parties in essence with the result is weather for not the contract for licensing is signed.Based on game models,the inner mechanism of patent pool licensing behavior is discussed from two aspects.Regardless of the kind of patent licensing,the relationship between the two parties is both competition and cooperation with the aim at maximizing their own profits.Only when the two parties gain their expected p... |
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| Keywords: | patent pool licensing game profit competition and cooperation |
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