| 高管团队薪酬激励影响创新投入的实证分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 朱琪,关希如.高管团队薪酬激励影响创新投入的实证分析[J].科研管理,2019,40(8):253-262. |
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| 作者姓名： | 朱琪 关希如 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.华南师范大学华南市场经济研究中心,广东 广州510006;;
2.华南师范大学经济管理学院,广东 广州510006 |
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| 摘 要： | 高管团队薪酬激励是否促进了企业创新投入？本文以企业高管团队薪酬激励政策与创新研发投入行为的关系为切入点,选取A股2009-2013年3862家上市公司作为观测样本,运用倾向得分法（PSM）克服样本选择偏误和内生性问题,综合采用多种匹配方法进行实证分析。研究发现：（1）整体而言,薪酬水平差距的提高并不能提高创新研发投入,但是股权激励却能对创新研发投入有显著正相关影响。（2）主板中股权激励对创新研发投入有显著正向影响,而薪酬水平差距在主板和创业板中都没有显著效果。（3）所有制性质对薪酬水平差距的影响不显著,但在非国有上市公司中股权激励变量与创新研发投入有显著正相关关系。（4）高新技术行业企业实施股权政策显著增加了企业创新研发投入,而薪酬水平差距则没有显著效果。（5）无风险投资参与的企业较有风险投资参与的企业对创新研发投入有显著正向效果。稳健性检验证实结论是可靠的。最后提出了高管团队薪酬激励创新投资的政策含义。
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| 收稿时间： | 2016-05-06 |
An empirical analysis of the effect of compensation incentive of top management team on corporate innovation input |
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| Zhu Qi,Guan Xiru.An empirical analysis of the effect of compensation incentive of top management team on corporate innovation input[J].Science Research Management,2019,40(8):253-262. |
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| Authors: | Zhu Qi Guan Xiru |
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| Institution: | 1. South China Research Center for Market Economy, South China Normal University, Guangzhou 510006, Guangdong, China;
2. College of Economics and Management,South China Normal University, Guangzhou 510006, Guangdong, China |
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| Abstract: | Since China’s reform and opening up in 1978, China has made remarkable achievements in politics, culture, society and economy. Especially in the past 40 years, China has become the second largest economy in the world after the United States, and is generally considered to be still the fastest growing economy in the world. However, behind this dazzling glory, we need to think clearly and realize that the driving factor of high economic growth is not only high investment and savings, but also technological innovation. However, have we ever thought about the driving factors of technological innovation? As the cell of national economy, the success or failure of enterprise’s production and operation is related to the development of social economy. In the national innovation system, enterprises are in the core position. They are not only the main force of R&D innovation activities and investment, but also the direct undertaker of productivity and products by applying science and technology to practice. Therefore, if we want to make our country prosperous, strong and sustainable, fundamentally improve the competitiveness at the national level and achieve the level of leading the world, we should start with "cells" to enhance enterprises’ independent innovation ability at the micro level. However, whether innovation can be implemented and whether enterprises can develop are ultimately decided by senior managers. Senior managers are the main body of decision-making about technological innovation, and play a vital role in the process of technological innovation activities. R&D input in technological innovation is a long-term, high-cost, high-uncertainty activity. For executives, technological innovation requires high capital investment, which focuses on the long-term interests of the enterprise, rather than the short-term goals of the enterprise. The unknown success or failure of R&D investment results will make executives worry about making R&D investment decisions. They are afraid of putting greater pressure on the company’s short-term financial objectives and the high failure rate behind the high risk of technological innovation. So, if we increase the compensation of senior managers or implement equity incentives, we can play a role in encouraging morale and confidence, so that senior managers are more willing to encourage enterprise innovation? But is it necessary for our country to try to control the executive compensation of state-owned enterprises?Therefore, the relationship between executive compensation and R&D investment in innovation has always been a hot issue in academic research. Foreign scholars have studied the relationship between compensation incentive and R&D investment earlier than domestic scholars. Because R&D investment has the characteristics of high investment, high unknown and high risk, and these characteristics will affect the short-term benefits of enterprises, enterprise managers usually show different preferences when making investment decisions on R&D activities. The relationship between compensation incentive policy and enterprise innovation investment has been supported by many theoretical and empirical studies. The current domestic research situation is as follows: (1) Domestic research focuses on the effect of compensation on performance, but there are few studies on the investment decision-making of compensation incentive policy, especially on R&D investment. (2) Previous studies on compensation gap mostly focused on the gap between internal executive and non-executive compensation levels, and rarely used the internal executive group. The compensation gap between teams is taken as an index. (3) There are few empirical studies on team compensation by domestic scholars. (4) The predecessors did not take into account the heterogeneity of the industry and the impact of venture fund investment on R&D investment, and seldom classified the data according to these two factors. (5) In terms of research methods, in measuring the impact of compensation incentives, previous studies rarely consider and solve the problem of sample selection error proposed by Heckman in 1979. In other words, companies that have the ability to make innovative investments may be large-scale companies with good performance, and they may be more inclined to increase the remuneration of some executives. This makes it impossible to judge whether the difference depends on the compensation incentive, even if we observe that listed companies that implement incentives investment more in innovation. Therefore, this paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies in China as the research object, and uses the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method to study the relationship between the compensation gap of senior management team and technological innovation investment. We will consider the venture capital behavior and the nature of the enterprise in the study, and classify the data in detail, and analyze the impact of executive team compensation gap on enterprises’ R&D investment under these categories.By studying the relationship between compensation gap and R&D investment of enterprises, I hope to provide readers with a better understanding of the two, and also hope to provide empirical cases for the study of the relationship between compensation gap of top managers and R&D investment of enterprises in China. It has very important theoretical and practical significance for improving the compensation incentive setting of enterprises and promoting R&D investment of technological innovation of Chinese enterprises.Therefore, this paper is to probe on the relationship between compensation incentive policy (which includes compensation gap incentive and ownership incentive) and R&D input, and then make corresponding suggestions according to the results. In order to solve problems of sample selection bias and endogenous, we adopt an advanced method, which is called Propensity Score Matching method (PSM) to do our tests. As for Robustness, we use one to one matching, one to four nearest neighbor matching, the radius matching, and kernel matching for each test, for finding each company a matched object. The basic conclusions are as follows: (1)overall, equity incentive is significantly positively associated with R&D input while the compensation gap isn’t. (2) equity incentive only has a significantly positive effect on innovation R&D input in the main board while the compensation gap shows no similar results in both the main board and the start-up board. (3) the innovation R&D input has an significantly positive effect on the equity incentive in non-state-owned listed companies whereas it has no significant relation between ownership properties and compensation gap. (4) For different industrial nature, innovation R&D input has been strongly enhanced by equity incentive implemented by listed companies in high-tech industries but compensation gap has no significant effect. (5)Compared with the non-VC backed companies, VC backed companies have remarkably significant impact on innovation R&D input. For this sake, we give the following four suggestions: (1) Stock ownership incentive should be a prior choice when selecting incentive policy. (2) The holdings of state-owned shares ought to be cut down to an appropriate amount and then to introduce new competition mechanism in order to stimulate the investment on R&D activities. (3) We should pay more attention to innovative result and take it into account during the performance evaluation. (4) The government should launch more supportive policy to encourage enterprises to innovate or even invent.
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