| 基于临时团队的信息安全众测平台知识共享演化博弈研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 熊强,肖广涛.基于临时团队的信息安全众测平台知识共享演化博弈研究[J].科技管理研究,2020,40(11):134-141. |
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| 作者姓名： | 熊强 肖广涛 |
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| 作者单位： | 江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江 212013;江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江 212013 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究规划“第三方平台信息安全知识共享：参与动机和披露机制对共享行为的影响研究”(编号：16YJA630001) |
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| 摘 要： | 运用演化博弈理论,基于临时团队构建众测平台中有限理性的白帽子间安全知识共享的复制动态模型,分析不同的参数对进化稳定策略的影响及实现知识共享的均衡条件。研究结果表明,临时团队内白帽子间进行安全知识共享与安全知识共享成本、信任度、固有安全知识量、安全知识增值率、安全知识漏洞转化率、团队平均漏洞奖励率和获得团队奖励的概率等有关;降低知识共享成本、提高白帽子的共享能力和意愿。
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| 关 键 词： | 临时团队 知识共享 信息安全众测平台 演化博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019/7/29 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2019/8/20 0:00:00 |
Evolutionary Game Research on Knowledge Sharing of Information Security Crowd-Testing Platform Based on Temporary Team |
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| Xiong Qiang,Xiao Guangtao.Evolutionary Game Research on Knowledge Sharing of Information Security Crowd-Testing Platform Based on Temporary Team[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2020,40(11):134-141. |
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| Authors: | Xiong Qiang Xiao Guangtao |
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| Institution: | (School of management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China) |
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| Abstract: | The global network threat is becoming more and more serious. Information security vulnerabilities have gradually become an important part of Cyberspace Security Strategies of various countries. As an important way to exploit vulnerabilities, information security crowd-testing platform is of great significance to improve its operational efficiency. Based on evolutionary game theory and temporary team, this paper constructs a replication dynamic model of security knowledge sharing among white hats who are limited rational on crowd-testing platform and analyses the influence of different parameters on evolutionary stability strategy and the equilibrium conditions for knowledge sharing. The results show that security knowledge sharing among white hats in temporary teams is related to cost, trust, intrinsic security knowledge, value-added rate of security knowledge, conversion rate of security knowledge vulnerabilities, average team vulnerability reward rate and the probability of team reward, etc. It can reduce the cost of knowledge sharing, improve the ability and willingness of sharing white hats, and establish an effective system. The reward and punishment mechanism can obviously promote the sharing of security knowledge among the temporary teams of the public information security platform. |
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| Keywords: | Temporary Team Information Security Crowd-Testing Platform Knowledge Sharing Evolutionary Game |
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