| 退耕还林生态补偿契约设计及效率问题研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 李国平,张文彬.退耕还林生态补偿契约设计及效率问题研究[J].资源科学,2014,36(8):1670-1678. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李国平 张文彬 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学经济与金融学院, 西安710061;西安交通大学经济与金融学院, 西安710061 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金重大攻关项目：“完善生态补偿机制研究”（批准号：12&ZD072）。 |
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| 摘 要： | 退耕还林生态补偿政策一般通过政府和农户签订委托——代理契约的形式实施,设计最优的激励契约成为后退耕还林时期退耕还林生态补偿政策研究的重点。本文主要研究信息对称和不对称信息条件下不同类型农户退耕还林生态补偿契约的设计问题,探讨政府与高技术农户和低技术农户之间生态补偿契约的效率问题。研究显示,政府和农户经济收益信息的不对称会使高技术农户低报自己的收益以获得信息租金,获得高于标准支付的生态补偿支付,增加契约的激励成本;而低技术农户获得低于标准支付的生态补偿支付,影响农户退耕还林的意愿,增加契约的摩擦成本。最后讨论退耕还林生态补偿政策如何减少生态补偿契约效率损失的对策,提出退耕还林生态补偿契约的设计应根据当地高技术农户和低技术农户的比例和生态环境产品的关注度进行权衡和选择,以减少契约效率的损失。
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| 关 键 词： | 生态补偿 退耕还林 不对称信息 契约效率 |
| 修稿时间： | 5/7/2014 12:00:00 AM |
Contract Design and Efficiency of Ecological Compensation Under the Grain for Green Project |
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| LI Guoping and ZHANG Wenbin.Contract Design and Efficiency of Ecological Compensation Under the Grain for Green Project[J].Resources Science,2014,36(8):1670-1678. |
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| Authors: | LI Guoping and ZHANG Wenbin |
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| Institution: | School of Economics and Finance, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710061, China;School of Economics and Finance, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710061, China |
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| Abstract: | The Grain for Green policy is implemented by signing a principal-agent contract between the government and farmers, and designing optimal contracts is necessary after a period of Grain for Green Project implementation. Here, we examine the problem of ecological compensation contract design for different types of farmers under symmetric information and asymmetric information conditions. Analysis of the efficiency of ecological compensation contracts under asymmetric information shows that economic income information asymmetry between government and farmers will make high technology farmers understate their income to obtain information rent, so that the payment received by high technology farmers is more than standard ecological compensation, increasing the incentive cost. The payment received by low technology farmers is less than standard ecological compensation, reduces their willingness to return farmland to forests and increases the friction cost. We discuss the Grain for Green policy to reduce the loss of efficiency of ecological compensation contracts, advocate for optimal contract design in accordance with the proportion of two kinds of farmers and environmental product attention. |
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| Keywords: | ecological compensation grain for green asymmetrical information contract efficiency |
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