| 企业员工工资决定的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨春瑰.企业员工工资决定的博弈分析[J].科学．经济．社会,2007,25(4):79-81. |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨春瑰 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京信息工程大学,阅江书院,南京,210044 |
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| 摘 要： | 企业与员工订立劳动合同的过程是一个联盟博弈或合作性博弈的过程:通过协议分割收益或预期收益。联盟的预期总收益为预期的劳动产量的市场实现减去员工的机会成本,预期总收益大于0为企业与员工能够进行讨价还价、形成联盟的条件。在这个博弈中,员工往往作出"空口声明",而企业则努力对员工这样的声明进行分辨。
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| 关 键 词： | 联盟博弈 工资率 员工 企业 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-2815(2007)04-0079-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年3月12日 |
A Game Model of Determining Wage between Enterprise and Employee |
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| YANG Chun-Gui.A Game Model of Determining Wage between Enterprise and Employee[J].Science Economy Society,2007,25(4):79-81. |
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| Authors: | YANG Chun-Gui |
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| Abstract: | The process of contracting between enterprise and employee is a cooperative game.Two players partition income or expectation income by labor contract.The condition of forming a coalition between the two players is that the coalition has more expecting income,which equates with income of production of new labor in market minus his opportunity cost,than zero.In the game's playing,employees often make cheep talk',and enterprises try to distinguish true information from false one. |
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| Keywords: | coalitional game wage rate employee enterprise |
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