| 对职业体育市场委托——代理关系的探究 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄兆媛,韩开成.对职业体育市场委托——代理关系的探究[J].吉林体育学院学报,2007,23(1):44-45. |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄兆媛 韩开成 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 长春师范学院体育学院,吉林,长春,130032
2. 郑州大学体育学院,河南,郑州,450044 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过对我国职业体育市场中的委托-代理关系及委托-代理问题的分析和研究,揭示我国职业体育市场上某些特殊的委托-代理问题的产生根源与表现,力图从经济学的角度来阐释我国职业体育市场的某些问题,旨在促进我国职业体育市场的健康发展.
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| 关 键 词： | 职业体育市场 委托 代理 信息不对称 道德风险 激励约束机制 职业 体育市场 代理关系 Market Sport Professional Chinese Relation Problems Analysis 发展 健康 代理问题 阐释 经济学 表现 产生根源 研究 分析 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-10-08 |
Economics Analysis on the Problems Of Princrpal-Agent Relation of Chinese Professional Sport Market |
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| Huang Zhaoyuan,Han Kaicheng.Economics Analysis on the Problems Of Princrpal-Agent Relation of Chinese Professional Sport Market[J].Journal of Jilin Institute of Physical Education,2007,23(1):44-45. |
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| Authors: | Huang Zhaoyuan Han Kaicheng |
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| Institution: | 1.Sports Institute of Changchun Normal College,Changchun,130032,Jilin,China;2.P.E.College of Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou,450044,Henan,China |
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| Abstract: | Applying the knowledge of micro-economics,the paper analyzes the basic modes of Principal-agent relations and causes of Principal-agent problems of Chinese professional sport market,discusses the problems of the equilibrium contracts between professional sport association and professional sport clubs,constructs the referee's Moral Hazard model,and points out that a referee can realize his the largest net return when MRM is equal to MCM.The goals of incentive system are to let an agent be an honest person and acts honestly. |
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| Keywords: | professional sport principal-agent problem asymmetric information moral hazard incentive-constraint system |
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