| Abstract: | Greece became an EEC member in 1981, following a parliamentaryvote in the then New Democracy (conservative)–controlledparliament. Opinion polls indicated though that were a referendumheld at the time, membership would have been rejected, as thegovernment had lost its popular support (and lost power in thecourse of that year) and an across-the-board anti-western majorityhad emerged in a country whose people's national identity wasfirst defined during and as a defense against the crusades.Ten years later, there exists in Greece a very large consensusin favor of EEC membership which includes even the communistleft, at least programmatically. The spectacular, and unprecedentedamong Community countries, pro-EEC conversion is the subjectof this paper. First, using the European Commission's Eurobarometerand Eurodim's Helleno-barometer data, the evolution of Greekpublic opinion towards the EEC is documented. Secondly, thetrend data in the various voting groups show that this conversionis basically the result of the transformation of the socialistelectorate from anti-EEC to pro-EEC, but with a lag behind thesimilar change in the party's (PASOK) policies during its eight-yearrule (1981–9). Thirdly, evidence is provided that anti-westernismhas not died out in Greece, but that it has both mellowed andbecome ‘selective’. So, we conclude that the pro-EECconversion was not the result of some general ‘Westernization’of Greek public opinion, but the outcome of a ‘learningexperience’: during their country's ten-year EEC membership,the Greeks discovered that the benefits from this internationalcommitment far outweighed the costs. In fact, it is argued thatthe pro-EEC conversion of Greek public opinion has contributedto the mellowing of its anti-westernism: whereas the crusadeswere instrumental in cutting the Greeks from Europe, the EECappears now the vehicle of their reintegration into a worldin whose development they have historically played a major role. |
