| 企业年金市场进入规制的质量效应和数量效应 |
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| 引用本文： | 郭磊,苏涛永.企业年金市场进入规制的质量效应和数量效应[J].预测,2012(1):44-48. |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭磊 苏涛永 |
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| 作者单位： | 同济大学经济与管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 中国保险学会研究项目(IICKT201013) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文考察企业年金市场进入规制对企业年金基金管理机构进入数量、服务质量和福利的影响。在最低质量标准理论的基本框架下,建立一个包含进入决策和质量决策的两阶段博弈,引入集体声誉刻画企业年金基金管理机构的搭便车行为和市场对良好声誉的溢价,比较自由进入和进入规制条件下的机构进入数量和服务质量,并进行数值模拟。研究发现,由于搭便车行为,机构自由进入,数量增加会导致平均质量下降,达不到社会最优;适度的进入规制将提高平均质量和行业声誉,增加机构数量,提升社会福利。
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| 关 键 词： | 集体声誉 最低质量标准 进入规制 企业年金 |
The Quality and Quantity Effect of Entry Regulation for Enterprise Annuity Market |
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| GUO Lei,SU Tao-yong.The Quality and Quantity Effect of Entry Regulation for Enterprise Annuity Market[J].Forecasting,2012(1):44-48. |
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| Authors: | GUO Lei SU Tao-yong |
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| Institution: | (School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China) |
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| Abstract: | The paper explored the effects of entry regulation on entry,service quality and welfare of funds management institutions in enterprise annuity market.A two-stage game with entry decision and quality decision was set up under the minimum quality standards theory.The paper introduced collective reputation which incurred free ride and price premium.Then the paper compared free entry with entry under regulation and gave a numerical simulation.It shows that free entry is not social optimal because free ride leads to quality decrease with entry increase and the proper entry regulation will improve social welfare when it increases quality and reputation to induce more entry. |
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| Keywords: | collective reputation minimum quality standards entry regulation enterprise annuity |
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