| Abstract: | In the 1980s, the Government believed that the extra demand for new graduates would need to be met by making higher education institutions more 'business–like'. This change was aimed at making these institutions more responsive to the country's economic needs by improving access, quality and efficiency. One consequence of the move to more 'business–like' organisations was the imposition, under The Education Reform Act (1988) and The Further and Higher Education Act (1992), of newly constituted boards of governors upon the new universities and colleges of higher education.
These new boards were structured so that the majority of their membership consisted of 'independent members', defined in the 1988 Act as 'persons appearing to the appointing authority to have experience of, and to have shown capacity in industrial, commercial, or employment matters or the practice of any profession'. These boards were expected to lead, or at least to act as catalysts for, the necessary change process. The paper argues that boards of governors could be said to be very efficient but not necessarily very effective and suggests that more needs to be known about the corporate governance process in the new universities and colleges of higher education. |
