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会计信息违规性失真及其治理的经济学分析
引用本文:田淑萍.会计信息违规性失真及其治理的经济学分析[J].科学.经济.社会,2010,28(1):66-69.
作者姓名:田淑萍
作者单位:兰州商学院会计系,甘肃,兰州,730020
摘    要:委托代理双方效用函数的不一致性和信息不对称,是会计信息违规性失真的客观基础,因信息不对称而产生的败德行为是会计信息违规性失真的主观原因。因此,会计信息最低质量保证金及供给临界点机制的形成是治理会计信息违规性失真的有效途径。

关 键 词:会计信息违规性失真  委托代理  信息不对称  最低质量保证金  供给临界点机制

A Economic Analysis of the Rule-violating Distortion of Accounting Information and Its' Government
TIAN Shu-ping.A Economic Analysis of the Rule-violating Distortion of Accounting Information and Its'' Government[J].Science Economy Society,2010,28(1):66-69.
Authors:TIAN Shu-ping
Institution:Accounting Department/a>;Lanzhou University of Finance and Economics/a>;Lanzhou 730020/a>;China
Abstract:The inconsistency of principal-agent utility function and the asymmetry of information,are the objective backgrounds of violation of distortion of accounting information,and moral hazard behaviors caused by asymmetric information are the subjective reasons.Therefore,the bail of the accounting information's lowest quality and the critical point of supply are effective ways to gavern the rule-violating distortion of distortion of accounting information.
Keywords:the rule-violating distortion of accounting information  principal-agent relationship  asymmetric information  bail of the lowest quality  critical point of supply  
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