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论克里普克的先验偶然命题与后验必然命题
引用本文:李章吕.论克里普克的先验偶然命题与后验必然命题[J].鸡西大学学报,2008,8(6):35-37.
作者姓名:李章吕
作者单位:重庆师范大学初等教育学院,重庆,400700
摘    要:自康德以来,人们,特别是康德主义者和逻辑实证主义者等总以为“先验的”就等同于“必然的”,“后验的”就等同于“偶然的”,也就是说,“先验命题一定是必然命题,后验命题一定是偶然命题”。但是,克里普克却提出了“先验偶然命题”和“后验必然命题”,也就是说,“先验的”并不一定是“必然的”,“后验的”也并不一定是“偶然的”。显然,克里普克的这个理论是与传统经验论观点相矛盾的,是对传统经验论的彻底打破,具有非常深远的历史意义。

关 键 词:克里普克  先验性  必然性  先验偶然命题  后验必然命题

Chreaps' Prior Accidental Proposition and the Apodictic Proposition
Li Zhanglv.Chreaps' Prior Accidental Proposition and the Apodictic Proposition[J].JOurnal of Jixi University:comprehensive Edition,2008,8(6):35-37.
Authors:Li Zhanglv
Abstract:Since Conde, a famous philosopher, people always thinks that there is a identity between the inevitable and accidentally. The prior proposition is certainly taken as the apodictic proposition. Chreap proposed the prior accidental proposition and the apodictic proposition . It is obvious that this theory is contrast to the traditional empiricism. But the theory is a break to the traditional philosophy and it has the extremely profound historical significance.
Keywords:Chreap  apriority  inevitability  prior accidental proposition  apodictic proposition
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