| 行政环境优化、偏向性投资与企业技术创新 |
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| 引用本文： | 徐浩,祝志勇,叶芸.行政环境优化、偏向性投资与企业技术创新[J].科研管理,2006,41(2):73-82. |
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| 作者姓名： | 徐浩 祝志勇 叶芸 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西南大学经济管理学院,重庆400715;
2. 西南大学经济研究中心,重庆400715;
3. 西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西 西安710061 |
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| 摘 要： | 厘清行政环境（行政治理、法治水平）对技术创新的作用机制是我国经济高质量发展面临的重大问题。首先,本文系统剖析了行政环境优化、偏向性投资和技术创新间的作用机制,其次,以2005-2016年我国97个地级市数据为样本,结合动态空间计量模型（SEM）进行了实证检验。结果发现：（1）地方政府偏向性投资对技术创新具有显著的负向挤出效应,且该效应在西部地区最强;（2）行政环境优化对技术创新具有直接的正向推动作用,该效应在东部地区最强;（3）十八大后,偏向性投资的挤出效应有所下降,行政环境优化的推动效应有所上升。进一步的机制分析表明,（4）行政环境优化通过提升地方政府“经济政治人”诉求的机会成本,弱化了偏向性投资对技术创新的负向技术效应。中介效应模型检验发现,中介效应可以解释行政环境优化促进技术创新总效应的8.51%。最后,本文认为进一步深化“放管服”改革、推动基层司法部门的省级直管是改善行政环境,进而提升营商环境的重要路径之一。
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| 收稿时间： | 2019-04-11 |
Administrative environment optimization,biased investment and technological innovation |
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| Xu Hao,Zhu Zhiyong,Ye Yun.Administrative environment optimization,biased investment and technological innovation[J].Science Research Management,2006,41(2):73-82. |
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| Authors: | Xu Hao Zhu Zhiyong Ye Yun |
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| Abstract: | In recent years, with the marginal returns decline of factor inputs and the environmental carrying capacity tending to the limit, the traditional economic growth mode that relies on the expansion of the factor inputs is difficult to sustain. In contrast, technological innovation is the key to achieve long-term and high-quality economic development. On December 18, 2018, in the "Speech at the Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of Reform and Opening-up", Xi Jinping re-emphasized that "innovation is the first driving force, talent is the first resource, and innovation-driven development strategy is implemented. We need improve the national innovation system and accelerate the independent innovation of core technologies." This shows that, how to promote technological innovation has become a major problem in China′s current economic and social development. Institutional economists believe that a good institutional environment plays an important role on technological innovation performance. Researchers have done much work on the relationship between external environment and technological innovation.
The existing literatures mainly discuss the relationship between institutional and technological innovation from three perspectives, micro-enterprises, the meso-market and the macro-level. From the perspective of micro-enterprise governance, scholars mainly examine the impact of factors such as corporate ownership, management structure, board structure and shareholding structure on the technological innovation output of enterprises. From the perspective of competition in the external market, the existing researches mainly analyze the impact of the enterprise control rights and the product market competition on technological innovation. From the perspective of macro-national institutions, scholars not only examine the impact of property rights protection, institutional changes, environmental regulation policy etc. on technological innovation, but also explore the role of China′s special institutional mechanisms on technological innovation. They found that the promotion competition between local governments induces the GDP quantity growth competition, which makes the local governments tend to accumulate economic scale quickly, and input mass production factors to the short, fast and low-tech production projects. The biased investment behaviors of local governments have became the institutional root of China′s economic innovation and transformation difficulties. Some empirical researches support these ideas, which provides a useful reference for understanding the relationship between local government behavior and technological innovation in China.
However, above papers don′t portray local government′s biased investment behavior clearly, because local government not only has the motivation of “politic man” under the promotion demand, but also has the “economic man” motivation to obtain economic benefits from power. The latter one is more likely to be one of the most important reasons for the local economic innovation and transformation difficulty. At the same time, these studies have failed to point out how to weak the biased investment tendency of local governments, thus failing to propose an effective path to promote innovation and transformation. Therefore, this article attempts to make up the shortcomings and try to explore the following three questions, (1) what are the “economic and politic man” motivation, legal and resource guarantee for local governments to implement biased investment and squeeze out technological innovation rationally? (2) what is the direct mechanism of administrative environment optimization effect technological innovation? (3) how can the administrative environment optimization promoted by the central government guide local governments to allocate more investment to the field of technological innovation rather than the traditional low-tech production field, thus promoting innovation and transformation?
Firstly, this paper analyzes the motivation, law and resource guarantee of local government′s rational biased investment behavior, and then extends the logical chain to the institutional level, and analyzes the direct, indirect influences and the intermediary channels between administrative environment and technological innovation. We find that under the dual attributes of “economic and politic man”, local governments and local judicial departments have strong motivation for maximizing their own economic and political interests during their shorter term. They tend to input large amounts of economic resources in low-tech production projects, which has squeezed out technological innovation. Administrative environment optimization directly promotes technological innovation by improving the quality and efficiency of public service, reducing innovation risks and other ways, which encourage enterprises to invest more time and money to technological innovation. More importantly, administrative environment optimization can make the local government put more investment to technological innovation to promote the innovation transformation indirectly. Secondly, based on the China′s regional financial eco-environment index and marketization process index, this paper constructs a new administrative environmental indicator system based on the characteristics of technological innovation activities. Then, empirical analyses are conducted with the spatial error model, unconditional maximum likelihood estimation method and the data of China′s 97 cities from 2005 to 2016. We find that the local government′s biased investment in low-tech production projects has a significant crowding out effect on technological innovation, administrative environment optimization has a direct positive promoting effect on technological innovation. After the 18th National Congress, the “crowding out effect” to technological innovation has decreased, and the “positive promoting effect” to technological innovation has enhanced, administrative environment optimization also indirectly promotes the technological innovation by weakening the incentives of local government investment bias. This mediation effect can explain 8.51% of the total enhancement of technological innovation.
The conclusions of this paper can provide theoretical basis and policy enlightenment on the business environment optimization, (1)the “economic and politic man” attribute is the fundamental driving force of local government′ biased investment behavior. Therefore, the promotion evaluation of local governments should be shifted from focusing on GDP growth to technological innovation outcome, which will make local governments input more financial resources to technological innovation. (2) optimizing the administrative environment can weak the “crowding out effect” of local government′s biased investment on technological innovation. Therefore, on the one hand, we should deepen the reform of “delegate powers, and improve regulation and services” and spread the excellent experience of “running at most once” in Zhejiang to reduce the rent-seeking space of local governments, on the other hand, we should extend the “provincial management of grassroots judicial departments” pilot, which will effectively increase the opportunity cost of government biased investment behavior, which can create a more fair and equitable market order and guide the factors to high-tech fields. |
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