首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

我国企业做OEM的实证分析--基于博弈论的视角
引用本文:水常青,宋永高.我国企业做OEM的实证分析--基于博弈论的视角[J].中国软科学,2004(11):81-85.
作者姓名:水常青  宋永高
作者单位:1. 浙江大学,管理学院,浙江,杭州,310027
2. 浙江理工大学,经济与管理学院,浙江,杭州,310033
摘    要:本文在讨论OEM的起源、发展和利弊的基础上,用博弈论模型,对我国当前企业界和经济理论界关心和争论的OEM问题进行了数理和实证研究,并证明了如下主要结论:(1)OEM产品出口价格p1随着企业数n的增加持续下降,且当OEM的企业数充分大时,价格p1逼近国内厂商的生产成本;(2)国内做OEM的企业越多,国外公司的利润额就越大;(3)当n=1,即国内企业处于垄断地位时,做OEM的国内企业利润额最大;当n=2时,国内OEM企业的利润之和与外国公司持平;但当n大于2时,国内所有OEM企业的利润总和还不如国外公司的利润。

关 键 词:OEM  博弈论  模型  实证
文章编号:1002-9753(2004)11-0081-05
修稿时间:2004年3月10日

Empirical Study on the Domestic Firms Doing OEM with Game Theory
SHUI Chang-qing,SONG Yong-gao.Empirical Study on the Domestic Firms Doing OEM with Game Theory[J].China Soft Science,2004(11):81-85.
Authors:SHUI Chang-qing  SONG Yong-gao
Institution:SHUI Chang-qing~1,SONG Yong-gao~2
Abstract:Based on the discussions of the origin, development, advantages and disadvantages of OEM, this paper makes a theoretical and empirical study on OEM with game theory models, which is concerned and discussed by entrepreneurs and economists. The following conclusions have been testified: (1) The export price of OEM products keeps descending as the number of firms increases, and when the number becomes large enough, the price will approach the product cost of domestic firms;(2) The more domestic firms do OEM, the more profits foreign firm will get; (3) When there is only one domestic firm doing OEM , that is at a monopoly position, it will get the maximum profits; When there are two, the their total profits will be about the same as those of the foreign firms; But when the number of domestic firms is over two, all the profits of these firms will be less than those of the foreign firms.
Keywords:OEM  game theories  model  empirical study
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《中国软科学》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《中国软科学》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号