| 市政公用企业市场竞争行为的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张勇,张世英,刘建新.市政公用企业市场竞争行为的博弈分析[J].天津大学学报(英文版),2002,8(1). |
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| 作者姓名： | 张勇 张世英 刘建新 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学管理学院,天津,300072
2. 天津地铁总公司,天津,300040 |
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| 摘 要： | 提出了针对经营性市政公用企业建立市场竞争机制的基本思想 ,建立了具有产品差异性的市政公用企业价格竞争模型 ,对其进行了静态和动态博弈分析 .结果表明 ,对于经营性市政公用企业 ,可以通过引入市场竞争机制来达到调动企业积极性 ,提高效率的目的 ;政府可以通过调整补贴额度的经济手段来调控市场价格 ;企业同时进入市场、同时选择价格比先后进入市场对消费者更为有利 (均衡价格更低 ) ;“跟随企业”具有“后发优势” ;提高同类产品间的差异性可以增加企业的利润
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| 关 键 词： | 市政公用企业 价格竞争 博弈分析 |
Competition Game Analysis Between Public Enterprises |
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| ZHANG Yong,ZHANG Shiying,LIU Jianxin.Competition Game Analysis Between Public Enterprises[J].Transactions of Tianjin University,2002,8(1). |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Yong ZHANG Shiying LIU Jianxin |
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| Abstract: | Municipal public utilities reform is an important part of the economic system structural reform of cities. In this paper a kind of market competition mechanism for commercial municipal public enterprises is proposed; a price competition model of municipal public enterprises with similar products is founded; its static and dynamic game analysis is offered and a comparison between them is made. The results show that,for the business type of municipal public enterprise market competition mechanism can be introduced to mobilize the enterprise activity to raise the end of efficiency; the government may control the market price through the economic measures of regulating the amount of subsidy;that enterprises enter the market and select the price simultaneously is more advantageous than entering the market one after another in general, information among the municipal enterprises is symmetrical (the equilibrium is lower); "following enterprises" gets "second mover advantage";to raise the difference of the same product will increase the profit of enterprise. |
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| Keywords: | public enterprises price competition game analyss |
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