| 员工薪酬粘性改善企业创新效率吗？--基于高管—员工薪酬粘性差距的调节作用 |
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| 引用本文： | 翟淑萍,张晓琳,王鹤洁.员工薪酬粘性改善企业创新效率吗？--基于高管—员工薪酬粘性差距的调节作用[J].研究与发展管理,2020,32(4):162-175. |
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| 作者姓名： | 翟淑萍 张晓琳 王鹤洁 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.天津财经大学 会计学院，天津 300222;2.天津科技大学 经济与管理学院，天津 300222 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金面上项目“交易所问询监管的影响因素及治理效应——基于财务报告问询函的证据”（71972140）；国家自然科学基金青年项目“环境不确定性、管理者自信与企业创新投资：影响机理与经济后果”（71502119）。 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于员工薪酬粘性具有宽容失败、增进公平的柔性激励特征，本文理论分析了员工薪酬粘性对企业创新效率的影响以及高管—员工薪酬粘性差距对该影响的调节作用。以2010—2017年A股上市公司为样本，利用随机前沿模型进行实证检验，研究结果表明：员工薪酬粘性能够发挥容错激励效应，从而显著提高企业创新效率；同时，高管—员工薪酬粘性差距作为分配规则非公平性的体现，显著抑制了员工薪酬粘性对企业创新效率的积极作用。进一步研究发现，只有较低的员工可支配收入水平、高新技术的行业背景以及较高的市场竞争程度才有助于员工薪酬粘性发挥对企业创新效率的正向作用，且高管—员工薪酬粘性差距对上述影响具有负向调节作用。研究结论拓展了企业创新效率影响因素及薪酬粘性经济后果的研究，并深化了薪酬粘性与创新效率关系的情景因素分析，也为企业薪酬机制的设计和安排提供了经验支持。
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| 关 键 词： | 员工薪酬粘性 高管—员工薪酬粘性差距 企业创新效率 容错激励 公平感 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019/6/25 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2020/3/29 0:00:00 |
Does Employee Compensation Stickiness Improve Corporate Innovation Efficiency? |
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| ZHAI Shu-ping,ZHANG Xiao-lin,WANG He-jie.Does Employee Compensation Stickiness Improve Corporate Innovation Efficiency?[J].R&d Management,2020,32(4):162-175. |
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| Authors: | ZHAI Shu-ping ZHANG Xiao-lin WANG He-jie |
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| Institution: | 1.School of Accounting, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China;2.College of Economic and Management, Tianjin University of Science and Technology, Tianjin 300222, China |
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| Abstract: | Based on the flexible incentive characteristic of employee compensation stickiness, which tolerates failure and promotes fairness, it theoretically analyzed the influence of employee compensation stickiness on corporate innovation efficiency and the moderating effect of executive-employee compensation stickiness gap between them. Moreover, it took A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017 as samples and conductd empirical test with stochastic frontier analysis model. It finds out that employee compensation stickiness exerts fault tolerance incentive effect, and significantly improves corporate innovation efficiency; meanwhile, as a reflection of the unfairness of the distribution rules, the stickiness gap between executives and employees significantly inhibits the improvement of employees'' stickiness on corporate innovation efficiency. After a series of robustness tests, the above conclusions are still valid. Further analysis shows that low disposable income level of employees, high and new technology industry background and high level of market competition help employees'' compensation stickiness play a role in improving corporate innovation efficiency, and the gap of executive-employee salary stickiness has a negative moderating effect on the above effects. The conclusions expand the research perspective of corporate innovation efficiency and economic consequences of compensation stickiness, and enrich the study of situational factors of compensation stickiness and innovation efficiency. It also provides empirical support for the design and arrangement of corporate compensation system. |
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| Keywords: | employee compensation stickiness executive-employee compensation stickiness gap corporate innovation efficiency fault-tolerant incentive fairness |
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