| 司法官员更替与民营企业研发投入 |
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| 引用本文： | 周洲,李雅梦,冉戎.司法官员更替与民营企业研发投入[J].科研管理,2021,42(11):137-146. |
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| 作者姓名： | 周洲 李雅梦 冉戎 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.重庆大学 公共管理学院，重庆400044；
2.重庆大学中国公共服务评测与研究中心，重庆400044 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金面上项目：“司法保护促进我国消费的机制与实证研究”（19BJL021，2019.06—2021.12）；自然科学基金面上项目：“行政问责及治理政策工具影响企业非市场战略配置”（72074035，2020.06—2023.06）；重庆市研究生科研创新项目：“司法保护对企业创新的影响研究—基于中国上市公司数据的实证分析”（CYS19024，2019.06—2021.06）；中央高校基本科研业务费科研专项资助项目（2019CDJSK01XK09、2019CDSKXYGG0042，2019.06—2021.12）。 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文基于行为信号理论，以2009—2016年中国高院院长更替数据匹配民营上市企业研发数据，证实了地方司法部门领导人更替具有“凸显效应”，通过缓解民营企业融资约束和技术信息约束，在短期内使民营企业产生正向心理偏差并增加研发投入。对于在高科技行业、竞争激烈行业中、无政治关联、处于成长期的民营企业，司法官员更替对其研发投入的正向作用更加显著；来自其他政法部门的司法官员对民营企业的研发具有最显著的促进效应；籍贯为外省、在政法系统长期任职的司法官员对民营企业研发有更大的促进作用；省委书记和司法官员同年更替不利于民营企业的研发投入。本文对推进中国司法体制改革和创新战略实施具有启示性含义。
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| 关 键 词： | 司法官员更替 民营企业 研发投入 行为信号理论 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-09-11 |
| 修稿时间： | 2021-02-08 |
Turnover of judicial officials and private enterprises′ investment on research and development |
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| Zhou Zhou,Li Yameng,Ran Rong.Turnover of judicial officials and private enterprises′ investment on research and development[J].Science Research Management,2021,42(11):137-146. |
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| Authors: | Zhou Zhou Li Yameng Ran Rong |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Public Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;
2. China Evaluation and Research Center of Public Service, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China; |
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| Abstract: | To promote China′s high-quality development process, a series of policies have been put forward emphasizing that it is necessary to constantly create a better environment for the development of the private enterprises and let the sources of innovation of the private enterprises flow fully. In this regard, the research on how to promote R&D investment of private enterprises has a certain practical significance. The improvement of the court-centered judicial environment is an important part of encouraging the reform and innovation of private enterprises. China′s court organization system is different from western countries. There are the Supreme People′s Court, the Higher People′s Courts, the Intermediate People′s Courts, and the Basic-level People′s Courts. It′s mainly the responsibility of the Higher People′s Courts to formulate and implement directional judicial guidelines and policies. In addition, China′s court management system has a strong administrative and bureaucratic color. The president of the Higher People′s Court has a certain influence on the judicial efficiency of the courts and the trial of cases. Therefore, this paper discusses the relationship between the turnover of the presidents of the Higher People′s Courts and the choice of innovation strategies of private enterprises, hoping to provide a theoretical reference for China′s judicial reform and the implementation of innovation strategies.
Based on the analysis of behavioral signal theory and "prominent effect", this paper hypothesizes that under the influence of information asymmetry and limited rationality, the turnover of the presidents of the Higher People′s Courts will make private enterprises have a positive psychological bias on the judicial environment and change their short-term innovation decisions. What′s more, based on resource perspective, theoretical assumptions are made on the role of the intermediate mechanism of financing constraints and technical information constraints. Using the data of the turnover of president of the Higher People′s Courts collected by hand to match the data of R&D of private manufacturing listed enterprises from 2009 to 2016, this paper provides an empirical evidence on the assumptions above.
The empirical result shows that the behavioral signal of the turnover of presidents of the Higher people′s Courts causes positive psychological deviation and increase R&D investment of private enterprises via the "highlight effect". In addition, it alleviates the financing constraints and technical information constraints of private enterprises by promoting commercial credit, expanding the size of regional technology trading markets and foreign direct investment to increase private enterprises′ R&D investment indirectly. Further research shows that for private enterprises that are in the high-tech industries, in the fiercely competitive industries, not politically connected and in the growth stage, the affect is more significant; Compared with who from the court or other government departments, the presidents of the Higher People′s Courts from other departments of politics and law have the most significant promotion effect on the innovation of private enterprises; The presidents of the Higher People′s Courts who are natives of the province and have longer served in the departments of politics and law have greater roles in promoting the innovation of private enterprises; If the secretaries of the Provincial Party Committee and the presidents of the Higher People′s Courts have replaced in the same year, it is not conductive to R&D investment of private enterprises.
Based on the research results, this paper draws the following policy implications: First, China should make the judicial information public, reduce the information asymmetry between the judicial departments and private enterprises, and stabilize and boost the market′s confidence in the judicial environment. Second, it′s better to overcome judicial localization externally and prevent judicial administration internally. Finally, it′s necessary to improve the governance system of judicial officials, for example, raising the professional threshold for judicial officials.
Compared with the existing research, the innovation of this paper lies in: First, it discusses the impact of the turnover of judicial officials on micro-enterprise innovation behavior for the first time, enriches and expands related researches in the field of law and innovation and official governance. Secondly, this paper reinforces the content dimensions of signal theory from the perspective of behavioral signal theory and "highlighting effect", and expands signal theory to the macro level of research. In the context of China, the embodiment of the behavior signal of the turnover of the presidents of the Higher People′s Courts in the field of corporate innovation is verified. |
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| Keywords: | turnover of judicial officials private enterprise R&D investment behavioral signal theory |
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