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| 水利风景资源开发的利益博弈及规制机制 | |
| 引用本文： | 胡咏君,谷树忠,王礼茂,詹卫华,周洪.水利风景资源开发的利益博弈及规制机制[J].资源科学,2013,35(2):284-295. |
| 作者姓名： | 胡咏君 谷树忠 王礼茂 詹卫华 周洪 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所,北京100101;中国科学院大学,北京100049 2. 国务院发展研究中心资源与环境政策研究所,北京,100010 3. 中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所,北京,100101 4. 水利部综合事业局,北京,100053 |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目(编号:70873119;40871253) |
| 摘 要： | 水利风景资源的开发会产生外部不经济性,政府试图通过对水利旅游项目的监管来规范水利风景资源的合理开发和利用.在政府监管的背景下,对水利风景资源开发利益相关者的收益、损失、成本进行分析的基础上,构建各利益相关者的净收益函数,确定监管有效空间和最优监管力度,根据均衡监管力度的在不同监管空间的动态变化,对各方博弈关系进行分类,并建立博弈模型,对现实存在的各方博弈进行分析,以期为水利风景资源规制提供理论依据.模型分析结果表明:水利旅游项目的均衡监管力度集与各相关方的利益博弈有关,是一个动态的过程,均衡监管力度决策集应趋向最优监管力度决策集；现实的水资源管理体制下各方的利益博弈是水利旅游项目监管工作阻力重重的原因,政府很难单方面通过监管来解决水利旅游资源开发的外部性问题；加大惩罚力度、提高监管的重视程度、提高渎职惩罚力度可以降低旅游企业的违规可能性；有效的举报处理机制将会促进社会监督,降低政府监管成本.因此,调整各利益相关者的利益再分配是解决目前解决水利风景资源开发问题的关键,建议政府应从水利风景资源开发相关方的利益出发,寻求责任和利益的整合,在水利风景资源开发的利益相关方之间形成互动的规制机制. |
| 关 键 词： | 水利风景资源 利益相关方 博弈 规制 |
Stakeholder Interests during Development of Water Scenery Resources and Regulation Implications |
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| HU Yongjun,GU Shuzhong,WANG Limao,ZHAN Weihua and ZHOU Hong.Stakeholder Interests during Development of Water Scenery Resources and Regulation Implications[J].Resources Science,2013,35(2):284-295. | |
| Authors: | HU Yongjun GU Shuzhong WANG Limao ZHAN Weihua and ZHOU Hong |
| Institution: | Institute of Geographic Sciences and Nature Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China;University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;Institution of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy, Development Research Center of the State Council, Beijing 100010, China;Institute of Geographic Sciences and Nature Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China;Bureau of Comprehensive Development Ministry of Water Resources, Beijing 100053, China;Institute of Geographic Sciences and Nature Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China;University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China |
| Abstract: | The government supervises tourism projects to facilitate the protection and rational utilization of water scenery resources,but excessive and unordered development of water scenery resources remains common. To determine whether tourism project supervision and government regulation are valid,stakeholder interests during development need to be understood. Game theory provides a useful method for this. Here,we analyze stakeholder revenue,losses and costs during the development of water scenery resources,while considering the degree of supervision as an independent variable. We construct a cost-revenue model of stakeholders,and determine the optimal supervision degree and effective supervision interval. The model indicates that balanced supervision is a dynamic process related to stakeholder interest and gambling. Five types of government supervision were classified according to dynamic changes in balanced supervision, and three kinds of game playing relationships exist between tourism entrepreneurs and government, tourism entrepreneurs and local people,and superior and local water administrators. Gambling model analysis revealed that Chinese water resource management faces difficulties with project supervision,and negative externalities during development require government supervision. Increasing the penalties for environmental damage,paying greater attention to supervision and enhancing punishments can reduce illegal activity. As a consequence,the adjustment or redistribution of stakeholder interests is needed to resolve problems around water scenery development. An interactive interest-based regulation mechanism founded in law is needed to achieve balance between resources environmental responsibilities and interests. |
| Keywords: | Water scenery resources Game playing relations Stakeholders Regulations |
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