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基于Stackelberg博弈的R&D联盟知识转移决策模型
引用本文:王智生,李慧颖.基于Stackelberg博弈的R&D联盟知识转移决策模型[J].科研管理,2016,37(6):74-83.
作者姓名:王智生  李慧颖
作者单位: 1华侨大学工商管理学院,福建 泉州362021; 2厦门大学管理学院,福建 厦门361005
基金项目:中央高校基本科研业务费·华侨大学哲学社会科学青年学者成长工程项目(13SKGC-QG11);中央高校基本科研业务费专项(Supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities)(20720151175);福建省社会科学规划青年项目(FJ2015C116);福建省软科学计划项目(2016R0056).
摘    要:RD联盟合作知识创新逐渐得到学者们的关注,其中联盟企业的知识转移决策对联盟合作创新结果具有重要影响。借鉴知识生产函数将RD联盟合作创新的动态演进过程抽象为一个两阶段的知识转移决策Stackelberg博弈模型,从是否考虑前期知识投入对RD联盟知识转移决策进行博弈分析,得到盟主企业愿意将知识转移到联盟中的比率与其自身的知识边际收益正相关,与合作伙伴知识边际收益负相关,一定条件下盟主企业知识转移意愿、前期知识投入与知识边际收益三者正相关。

关 键 词:R&D联盟  知识转移  合作知识创新  Stackelberg博弈
收稿时间:2013-12-03

A knowledge transfer decision model of R&D alliance based on the Stackelberg game
Wang Zhisheng,Li Huiying.A knowledge transfer decision model of R&D alliance based on the Stackelberg game[J].Science Research Management,2016,37(6):74-83.
Authors:Wang Zhisheng  Li Huiying
Institution:1. College of Business Administration, Huaqiao University, Quanzhou 362021, Fujian, China; 2. School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, China
Abstract:Collaborative knowledge creation between R&D alliance has received considerable attention in recent literature. For any collaborative endeavor to succeed, knowledge transfer decision of R&D alliance participants is important. Learning from knowledge production function and using the game theoretic framework, we modeled the dynamic evolution process of collaborative innovation as a two-stage Stackelberg leader–follower game of knowledge tranfer decisions. Specifically, we modeled two scenarios, the first in which consortia participants take current efforts into account only, and the second in which consortia participants have expanded the prior knowledge input. The equilibrium values of current efforts in knowledge creation, the leader’s knowledge transfer rate, and the total expected system gain in both of two scenarios were determined. It is found that the leader’s knowledge transfer rate is positively related to its knowledge marginal revenue, and negatively related to the follower’s marginal revenue. Furthermore, in certain conditions, the leader's intention of knowledge tranfer is positively related to prior knowledge input and knowledge marginal revenue.
Keywords:R&D alliance  knowledge transfer  collaborative knowledge creation  Stackelberg game
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