| 工程监理的信息经济学分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 廖萍萍,林丹.工程监理的信息经济学分析[J].福建师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005(4):25-28. |
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| 作者姓名： | 廖萍萍 林丹 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 福建师范大学经济学院,福建,福州350007
2. 福建京闽工程顾问公司,福建,福州350001 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文关注监理双重角色和开发商主动披露信息自发需求不足的问题,并从信息经济学的角度,对监理市场的供求进行分析.指出监理质量提高的关键是提高P或收窄P1 ＞P＞P2的区域,即与开发商是否利用信息不对称盈利有关;各种监管力度无法充分反映建筑物最终用户的需求时,P只可能在P2附近摆动,监理市场帕累托改进就无法实现.
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| 关 键 词： | 工程监理 信息披露 自发需求不足 激励悖论 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-5285(2005)04-0025-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 04 12 2005 12:00AM |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年4月12日 |
Analysis on Supervision to Construction Projects From a Perspective of Information Economics |
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| LIAO Ping-ping.Analysis on Supervision to Construction Projects From a Perspective of Information Economics[J].Journal of Fujian Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edtion),2005(4):25-28. |
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| Authors: | LIAO Ping-ping |
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| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the demand and supply of supervision to the construction projects, viewing it as one of the information disclosure sectors from a perspective of information economics. It shows under what kinds of condition in the market the dual roles of the supervisors are separated or united. It also shows under what kinds of condition in the market the building suppliers have deficient or sufficient demands for the supervisors. This paper gives key points in the governmental control and the solutions to the existing problems in the construction field as well as in all the information disclosure sectors. |
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| Keywords: | supervision to construction projects information disclosure deficiency in inner (demands) incentive paradox |
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