| 不完美信息扩展博弈下的理性秘密共享协议 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 孙富玲 周展飞 俞扬 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 中国科学院信息工程研究所信息安全国家重点实验室, 北京 100195 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家重点实验室基金(Y1Z0081102)资助 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 主要研究理性秘密共享协议过程中,由于参与者的序贯行动所引起的不可置信威胁的问题. 给出一个更加通用的满足计算k-resilient纳什均衡的(m,n)理性秘密共享协议(k
|
| 关 键 词： | 秘密共享 博弈论 扩展博弈 序贯均衡 |
| 收稿时间： | 2012-09-24 |
| 修稿时间： | 2013-01-07 |
Rational secret sharing protocol in the context of extensive game with imperfect information |
| |
| Authors: | SUN Fu-Ling ZHOU Zhan-Fei YU Yang |
| |
| Institution: | State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, China Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100195, China |
| |
| Abstract: | We investigate the incredible threat issue caused by players' sequential actions in a rational secret sharing protocol. We propose a general rational secret sharing protocol satisfying k-resilient (m,n) Nash equilibrium which eliminates incredible threat. In our protocol, when some player deviates from the equilibrium, other players do not choose to abort but instead they continuously punish the deviator in enough runs. We do not need online distributor in our protocol but instead we use the negotiated random numbers by participants to update shares. |
| |
| Keywords: | secret sharing game theory extensive game sequential equilibrium |
|
| 点击此处可从《》浏览原始摘要信息 |
| 点击此处可从《》下载免费的PDF全文 |
