| 人才招聘中的信号传递博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 贺寿南.人才招聘中的信号传递博弈分析[J].娄底师专学报,2010(3):51-53. |
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| 作者姓名： | 贺寿南 |
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| 作者单位： | 衡阳师范学院人文社会科学系,湖南衡阳421008 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社科基金项目（06BZX050）;衡阳师范学院科学基金项目（09803）. |
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| 摘 要： | 信号传递博弈是一种比较简单而应用相当广泛的不完全信息动态博弈，人才招聘模型是一个典型的信号博弈。在人才招聘过程中，应聘者与用人单位之间可以通过信息的传递来决策各自做出何种选择。在此过程中，在非对称信息的情况下，应聘者在向用人单位提供的信号中有可能有误，容易造成逆向选择问题，这就需要用人单位进行信息甄别。这个信号愈强，成本愈高；能力愈高的人，愈容易发出强的信号。
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| 关 键 词： | 信号传递博弈 人才招聘 非对称信息 信息甄别 |
Analysis on Signal Passing Game of Talent Recruitment |
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| HE Shou-nan.Analysis on Signal Passing Game of Talent Recruitment[J].Journal of Loudi Teachers College,2010(3):51-53. |
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| Authors: | HE Shou-nan |
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| Institution: | HE Shou-nan (Department of Humanities and Social Science, Hengyang Normal Institute, Hengyang, 421005, China) |
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| Abstract: | Signaling game is a simple, widely used and dynamic game of incomplete information. Talent recruitment model is a characteristic signaling game. In talent recruitment process, candidates and employers can make their own decision through the transmission of information. In this process, in the case of asymmetric information, the signal that candidates produce to employers may be wrong and likely to cause adverse selection, which requires employers to have information screening. The signal is more stronger, the cost is more higher; the human whose ability is more stronger, is more easy to send a strong signal. |
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| Keywords: | signal passing game talent recruitment asymmetric information information screening |
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